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 i 
Résumé 
Cette thèse propose l’émergence d’une poésie de l’entre deux dans la littérature expérimentale, 
en suivant ses développements du milieu du vingtième siècle jusqu'au début du vingt-et-
unième. Cette notion d’entre-deux poétique se fonde sur une théorie du neutre (Barthes, 
Blanchot) comme ce qui se situe au delà ou entre l'opposition et la médiation. Le premier 
chapitre retrace le concept de monotonie dans la théorie esthétique depuis la période 
romantique où il est vu comme l'antithèse de la variabilité ou tension poétique, jusqu’à 
l’émergence de l’art conceptuel au vingtième siècle où il se déploie sans interruption. Ce 
chapitre examine alors la relation de la monotonie à la mélancolie à travers l’analyse de « The 
Anatomy of Monotony », poème de Wallace Stevens tiré du recueil Harmonium et l’œuvre 
poétique alphabet de Inger Christensen. Le deuxième chapitre aborde la réalisation d’une 
poésie de l’entre-deux à travers une analyse de quatre œuvres poétiques qui revisitent l’usage 
de l’index du livre paratextuel: l’index au long poème “A” de Louis Zukofsky, « Index to 
Shelley's Death » d’Alan Halsey qui apparait à la fin de l’oeuvre The Text of Shelley's Death, 
Cinema of the Present de Lisa Robertson, et l’oeuvre multimédia Via de Carolyn Bergvall. Le 
troisième chapitre retrace la politique de neutralité dans la théorie de la traduction. Face à la 
logique oppositionnelle de l’original contre la traduction, il propose hypothétiquement la 
réalisation d’une troisième texte ou « l’entre-deux », qui sert aussi à perturber les récits 
familiers de l’appropriation, l’absorption et l’assimilation qui effacent la différence du sujet de 
l’écrit. Il examine l’oeuvre hybride Secession with Insecession de Chus Pato et Erin Moure 
comme un exemple de poésie de l’entre-deux. A la fois pour Maurice Blanchot et Roland 
Barthes, le neutre représente un troisième terme potentiel qui défie le paradigme de la pensée 
oppositionnelle. Pour Blanchot, le neutre est la différence amenée au point de l’indifférence et 
de l’opacité de la transparence tandis que le désire de Barthes pour le neutre est une utopie 
lyrique qui se situe au-delà des contraintes de but et de marquage. La conclusion examine 
comment le neutre correspond au conditions de liberté gouvernant le principe de créativité de 
la poésie comme l’acte de faire sans intention ni raison.  
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Abstract 
This dissertation proposes the emergence of a poetry of the threshold in experimental 
literature, tracing its development from the mid-twentieth century to the early twenty-first 
century. The notion of threshold poetry is premised on a theory of the neutral (Barthes, 
Blanchot) as that which is located beyond or between opposition or mediates. Chapter One 
retraces the concept of monotony in aesthetic theory, from the Romantic period, where it 
figures as the antithesis to changefulness or poetic tension, to the emergence of conceptual art 
in the twentieth century. Chapter One further examines the relationship of monotony to 
melancholy through an analysis of “The Anatomy of Monotony” by Wallace Stevens and 
alphabet by Inger Christensen. Chapter Two proposes a ‘poetry of the threshold’ through an 
analysis of four works of experimental, paratextually structured works of poetry: Louis 
Zukofsky’s index to “A”; Alan Halsey’s “Index to Shelley’s Death,” which comes after The 
Text of Shelley’s Death; Lisa Robertson’s Cinema of the Present; and Carolyn Bergvall’s 
multimedia work Via. Chapter Three retraces the politics of neutrality in translation theory. 
Against the oppositional logic of original versus translation, it hypothetically proposes the 
realization of a ‘third’ or threshold text, which also serves to disrupt the familiar narratives of 
appropriation, absorption and assimilation that efface the difference of the writing subject. It 
examines the hybrid work Secession with Insecession by Chus Pato and Erin Moure as an 
example of threshold poetry. For both Maurice Blanchot and Roland Barthes, the neutral 
represents a potential third term that baffles the paradigm of oppositional thought. For 
Blanchot, the neutral is difference taken to the point of indifference and the opacity of 
transparency while Barthes’ desire for the neutral is for a lyrical utopia that is located beyond 
the constraints of purpose and marketability. The conclusion examines how the neutral 
corresponds to the conditions of freedom governing the creative principle of poiesis as the act 
of making without intention or purpose.  
Keywords: monotony, melancholy, neutrality, the fragment, 20th-century poetry, early 21st-
century poetry, conceptual poetry, experimental poetry, translation, paratext, book indexes, 
poiesis 
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 2 
Introduction 
 
 
The neutral is often seen as the answer or alternative to a conflict or opposition. In political 
conflicts, the neutral nation may be called upon to negotiate. Neutral zones are delineated for 
refugees who have become stateless as a result of conflict. Even in quotidian moments and in 
situations of relative peace and stability, an idea of the neutral is invoked to unify a scene. In 
fashion, the neutral is called upon to balance an ensemble, even as it points beyond the colour 
spectrum, achromatic. Speaking in a neutral voice is professional and also appropriate in 
certain situations, whether to demonstrate scientific detachment or to present facts seemingly 
with rational control under conditions of legal constraint. Whether in the face of toxicity or 
terror, the neutral response or the response of neutralization is expressed to affirm that a 
situation has been contained.1 Neutral nations, neutral zones, neutral solutions, neutralized 
agents and situations — the neutral designates a position or place we aspire to and that we 
approach when there is no other option or when there is nowhere else to turn. The neutral zone 
represents both the non-place and non-presence of place, the condition of being without place, 
without bias.  
                                                
1 For example, following terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015, leaders repeatedly reassured the public 
that the threat had been or will be neturalized. In a speech on November 14, 2015, François Hollande 
evoked a solution of ‘neutralization’ as a political euphemism for the elimination or containment of 
criminal actors behind acts of terrorism, as reported in Le Monde: “Nous avons, sur ma décision, 
mobilisé toutes les forces possibles pour qu’il puisse y avoir la neutralisation des terroristes et la mise 
en sécurité de tous les quartiers qui peuvent être concernés.” Similarly, in August 2015, after the 
Thalys train attack, officials reported that the terrorist threat had been ‘neutralized.’ 
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This dissertation examines the problematic of the neutral according to three central 
axes: 1) the rhythm of neutrality; 2) the structure of neutrality; and 3) the politics of neutrality. 
The literary objects examined are works of twentieth- to twenty-first-century poetry. The three 
central axes can be briefly summarized as follows. First, in Chapter One, “Stylized Monotony: 
The Rhythm of Neutrality,” I set out to map a poetic history of the notion of monotony as the 
quiet antithesis to the aesthetic notion of tension, from the time when romantic aesthetics 
flourished to the present. Here, in the field of rhythm, neutrality is expressed as an aspect of 
monotony and thereby assumes an impenetrable form — an unchanging, unbreaking form that 
has neither beginning nor end, is without variance, and by extension is produced at a remove 
from the realm of judgment as facilitated by impartiality. This chapter is also concerned with 
the problem of neutrality as indifference — as a condition of controlled or effaced affect —
and as an aesthetic and ethical problem. In the second chapter, I approach the concept of 
neutrality through a discussion of database forms and other structures of apparent subjective 
impartiality, including the alphabet itself, by considering the deployment of “reference genres” 
in literary experiments (e.g. lists, catalogues and other paratextual forms).2 Here, the neutral 
corresponds to a condition of subjective detachment that is either productive or dangerous, 
depending on the position of the scriptor. Thus, Chapter Two, “Playing the Index: The 
Structure of Neutrality,” is about the desire for detachment and objectivity as a constituting 
                                                
2 In Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age, Ann M. Blair uses 
the phrase “reference genre” to designate a wide range of bibliographic reference materials, from 
dictionaries and florilegia to the alphabetical index, the branching diagram, the catalogue, etc. The 
notion of the paratext is defined by Gérard Genette as any threshold textual element, such as an index, 
title, table of contents, etc. 
 
 4 
gesture, and for a liberatory poetic-aesthetic gesture that disrupts a binary logical paradigm to 
forge new associations through the seemingly neutral ordering of poetic fragments. Finally, in 
the third chapter, “One More Word: Translation and the Politics of Neutrality,” I argue that the 
problem of neutrality represents an impasse of translation theory and translation itself, where 
neutrality, as an aspect of transparency, figures as a corollary to the problem of invisibility. 
Here, I am concerned specifically with the translator’s invisibility, a condition of effacement 
produced through an emphasis on readily-legible, generic language usage and voice, the idea 
that the translator’s voice itself leaves no residue, and that the translator does not intervene in 
what he or she says.3 Thus, Chapter Three is about the limiting desire for seamlessness and 
transparency in works of translation, underscored in any context of imperialism and 
specifically, English-language hegemonies. Here, a desire for transparency supports the 
appropriation and assimilation of the foreign at the risk of difference and at the risk of 
literature itself — which, as Deleuze notes, always already speaks in a foreign language. 
Overall, this dissertation problematizes the position of the impartial and the indifferent within 
contemporary poetics where neutrality figures as both a literary and political trope.  
Notably, by extension, neutrality can also be construed as a key problematic of the 
discipline of Comparative Literature and studies in Intermediality. By definition, Comparative 
Literature is a discipline that is resistant to narratives of assimilation and appropriation as it 
recognizes there is no language usage that can be simply reduced to the neutral, and that there 
                                                
3 While the neutral figures indisputably as an aspect of transparency, it should not be reduced entirely 
to this matter: “Let us then also say that if transparency has the neutral as its trait, the neutral does not 
belong to it; it is not a neutral of transparency.” Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, Trans. 
Susan Hanson (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 303. 
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is no neutral translation or instance of transmission since borders are charged sites. In short, no 
one and nothing crosses a border unchanged. In parallel, the field of Intermediality studies is 
founded on the argument that no medium is a transparent or neutral platform and undertakes to 
foreground the embodiment of transmission in all its forms. The material condition of an 
object and its propensity to decay or disintegrate are not secondary, not mere technical aspects 
of the work, nor are the conditions of its dissemination and circulation. If neither language nor 
medium is ever neutral in these respects, every literary object returns us to its primary 
specificity, and the act of comparison demands a continual renewal of the position from which 
and against which the comparative gesture arises and extends.   
Neutral arises etymologically from the Latin neutralis, as that which is grammatically 
neither masculine nor feminine, but also as something intransitive: that which produces no 
effect on any object and shapes no outcome. Although the earliest usage of this Latin word 
bears a strictly grammatical denotation, it re-emerges in English in the Renaissance in a 
political context as the notion of a neutral nation or community, “not taking part in a war 
(1536), not taking sides in a dispute (c1600).”4 Thus, the neutral comes to represent a non-
position in a conflict and an expression of non-participation: “They that tooke part with neither 
of them, were called Newtralles.”5 To speak of a neutral group or nation is to define that group 
in relation to a conflict, even though it is the refusal to participate in the conflict that earns 
such a group this designation. In terms of nationhood, which is defined by external opposition 
                                                
4 “neutral, n. and adj.”. OED Online. December 2015. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/126457?redirectedFrom=neutral&. (accessed December 11, 2015). 
 
5 Ibid. 
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and an internally binding grammar of belonging, it is questionable whether any group could 
properly be designated as a nation if its definitive characteristic were neutrality: a consistent 
non-position leading to non-participation. This is the paradoxical position of the neutral, 
whether considered in its original sense as a non-gendered expression (the neuter that is 
neither one nor the other) or in terms of juridico-political neutrality: the neutral expresses a 
position that is somehow beyond a conflict or opposition, a position that is a non-position, the 
position of a ‘one’ that is not part of a conflict but that remains irrevocably defined by the 
conflict as a passive, uninscribed surface, an absence of presence, a negative definition.  
In this sense, the neutral is reducible to a ‘one’ that exists without comparison because 
it stands outside opposition, and therefore as a singularity that is either beyond opposition or 
one that is between opposing forces and mediates impartially. Whether the neutral is 
positioned beyond or between opposites emerges as a point of contention that can be examined 
in an exchange of dialogue in Plato’s Gorgias (468A), where the term ‘µεταξύ’ is posited in a 
relationship with good and morality where it is distinct from the opposition between bad and 
good. Not contrary to the moral good, ‘µεταξύ is translated in different translations as either 
“intermediate,” “indifferent,” or “neutral” in the selections that follow: “Then, do people do 
these intermediate things, when they do them, for the sake of the good things, or the good 
things for the intermediate?”6 “Socrates: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the 
good or the good for the sake of the indifferent?”7 Or, “Socrates: Are these neutral activities 
                                                
6 Plato, Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. Trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1925), 329. 
 
7 Plato, The Dialogues of Plato. Trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), 526. 
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done for the sake of the good or does the good exist for the sake of what is neutral?”8 Among 
these variable translations for µεταξύ emerges the Platonic view of the medium as a site of 
passive neutrality that is not inscribed with difference. In “On Touch and Life in the De 
Anima,” Long translates µεταξύ as medium and elsewhere as what exists in-between, a 
transparency that despite its apparent lack of appearance is neither an absence nor emptiness.9 
The neutral that exists beyond comparison avoids conflict altogether. This face of the 
neutral as way “d’esquiver le conflitual” [of dodging the conflictual], or “prendre la tangente” 
[taking something on the bias], forms the fundamental problematic of Roland Barthes’ series 
of lectures at the Collège de France, given shortly before his death, on the topic of le neutre (a 
concept that was at the center of his life’s work, as seen clearly in Le degré zéro de 
l’écriture).10 In Le Neutre Barthes argues that the “l’évitement du conflit est 
fondamentalement annulé, frappé de néant, par l’idéologie occidentale” [avoidance of conflict 
is fundamentally annulled, reduced to nothing by Western ideology] because it involves 
assuming one of two unsupportable positions: a position of pure ignorance (avoidance) or a 
                                                
 
8 Plato, Gorgias, Trans. Benjamin Jowett, revised by Albert A. Anderson (Mills, Massachusetts: Agora 
Publications, 1994), 31. 
 
9 Christopher P. Long. “On Touch and Life in De Anima.” Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of 
Sight. Vol. 13. Eds. Antonio Cimino and Pavlos Kontos, 69-94.  
 
10 Roland Barthes, Le Neutre: Cours au Collège de France (1977-1978), Ed. Thomas Clerc. 
Seuil/IMEC, 2002) 167; Roland Barthes, The Neutral, Trans. Rosalind Krauss and Denis Hollier (New 
York: University of Columbia Press, 2005), 127. Throughout this introduction, when referring to this 
text in English translation, I have used Krauss and Hollier’s translation. 
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contradictory position (accepting the arguments of both sides). An ideology that is formed on 
conflict pre-emptively eliminates the possibility of an area beyond conflict as anything but an 
avoidance of the facts or an illogical accretion of contradictory arguments resulting in 
absurdity.  
Thus for Barthes the neutral comes to represent a glissement or slipping away from 
binary logic, the zero or third term he alludes to in Le degré zero de l’écriture: “Writing 
degree zero is a third term — the neutral appears between two terms of polar opposition (a 
third term or zero element).”11 Yet, even as the neutral appears between terms of opposition, it 
points beyond that opposition to another possibility. In Le Neutre, Barthes thus expresses his 
thesis on the neutral as “tout ce qui déjoue le paradigme” (that which foils or frustrates the 
paradigm), by which paradigm, he means the opposition of two virtual terms — any logic 
formed on binary opposition: “l’opposition de deux termes virtuels dont j’actualise l’un pour 
parler, pour produire du sens.”12 In Writing Degree Zero, Barthes traces the origins of the 
neutral in writing to Sartre and Camus, where it originates, he argues, as a mode of innocence 
rather than a strategy for escaping opposition or conformity.13 While this understanding of the 
                                                
 
11 Roland Barthes. Writing Degree Zero. Trans. Rosalind Krauss and Denis Hollier (New York: 
University of Columbia Press, 2005), 76. 
 
12 Barthes, Le Neutre, 31.  
 
13 Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 67. Elsewhere, Shoshana Feldman notes the “naïve, idealistic faith in 
witnessing” embodied in Camus’ The Plague. (Shoshana Feldman, Testimony: Crisis of Witnessing in 
Literature, Psychoanalysis and History (New York: Routledge, 1992), xviii.) As I discuss below, the 
figure of the witness is of great importance to the place of the neutral in literature, which position 
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neutral removes it from the condition of ignorance or mere avoidance of opposition, the 
innocence sought is yet defined against given structures of knowledge and therefore in relation 
to it, as an emergent between rather than beyond. Bernard Comment notes Barthes’ persistent 
efforts to explore such a third or zero element:  
 
Ce débordement de l’opposition, cette façon d’infléchir la force du sens vers des zones 
d’inquiétude et d’indécidablité, tout cela doit se lire comme un refus du sens tel qu’il 
est normé et imposé. La logique oppositionnelle (réglée par le principe de non-
contradiction) doit être troublée pour produire un premier ébranlement de la machine 
sémantique, et un premier pas vers le Neutre.14  
 
Thus, Comment paraphrases a thesis that informs all of Barthes’ work on the neutral, from 
Writing Degree Zero to The Neutral, his last work: oppositional logic must be disrupted so 
that the semantic machine can shudder toward the neutral. While Barthes’ writing on this topic 
remains predominantly concerned with questions related to linguistics, it shares some 
momentum with certain radical art movements in art in the twentieth century, which gravitated 
primarily away from a monolithic view of representation, a coextensivity of movement 
portending a future re-examination of the neutral.  
                                                
necessitates, as Barthes’ envisions it, an ethical approach to “minimizing one’s interface with the 
world’s arrogance.” (Barthes, The Neutral, 129). Such a position can be seen in the objectivist tradition 
in American poetry, for example, notably in the work of Charles Reznikoff.  
 
14 Bernard Comment, Roland Barthes, vers le neutre (Paris: Éditions Christian Bourgois, 1991, 2002),  
56. 
 10 
As stated, in Chapter One, I trace a movement toward monotony in the twentieth 
century as art and literature purports to remove itself from a history of aesthetic idealism and 
to liberate itself from the tyranny of beauty. If, in the nineteenth century, monotony figures 
only as a necessary, albeit unpleasant or ugly, part of an economy of deferred aesthetic 
pleasure, by the mid 1950s with colour field painting and conceptual art, monotony fills the 
space of beauty with its own relinquished authority. Simultaneous to this anti-aesthetic 
movement away from expressionism and symbolism, the author/artists’ identity is 
decentralized, allowing for a participatory experience of art. Just as the notion of a singular 
subjective position is decentered, the very possibility of expression, in accordance with its 
conditions as generated by a notion of romantic self-expression, becomes suspect. The blank 
page or canvas imparts nothing other than what is conveyed in the encounter or the instant of 
experience. While what it imparts may be infinitely multiple and various, there is nothing on 
the outside of experience that can be impartially imparted, so to speak, across time.  
 Yet minimalist art, despite anti-aesthetic trends, would continue to be described in 
aesthetic terms by critics, an issue Barthes takes up in the passage below, where he argues 
with the description of American “minimal art” as suggested by Encyclopedia Universalis on 
the following terms: 15   
                                                
15 From the footnotes to The Neutral (English translation), the Encylopedia Universalis entry Barthes 
was referring to here offered the following definition for minimalist art: “Anti-expressionist before 
anything else, intent on neutralizing form and color, minimal art uses extremely simple and readable 
figures that are multiplied to the infinite.” 
 11 
De mon point de vue, l’assimilation du Neutre et du minimal est un contresens 1) parce 
que le Neutre n’abolit pas l’affect mais seulement le conduit […] 2) parce que le neutre 
minimaliste ne concerne pas l’esthétique, mais seulement l’éthique.16  
 
Here, Barthes argues that the desired neutral does not erase affect. Indeed, in the case 
of conceptual, anti-expressionist art, affect can circulate with great intensity, as I discuss in 
Chapter Two, “Playing the Index: The Structure of Neutrality.” Chapter Two considers literary 
poetic works comprised of fragments that are arranged in alphabetical order. This is a 
paratextual style that points to a strategy of neutralization that involves a distance from the 
experience of one particular subject and thereby from the constraints placed on language in the 
name of communication. Because this poetry borrows the paratextual index, a genre usually 
reserved for the data associated with the book, it is a poetry of the threshold, provoking a 
defamiliarization not only of the threshold or paratexual element but also of the book itself. 
Ironically, if neutrality is usually associated with the objective imparting of information, 
neutrality appears in these literary works as the absence of any imperative to inform or 
communicate information with paratextual elements. Chapter Two is primarily concerned with 
the emergence of a third or neutral element that disrupts oppositional structures of narrative 
sequence and linear expression by means of a turn to an arbitrary or neutral systemic logic. In 
particular, I discuss Louis Zukofsky’s index to “A,” Alan Halsey’s “An Index to Shelley’s 
Death,” and Lisa Robertson’s Cinema of the Present, all of which are literary works where the 
individual fragments, lines or pieces are arranged in alphabetical order.  
                                                
 
16 Barthes, Le Neutre, 249. 
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In the final part of Chapter Two, in relation to the work of Carolyn Bergvall (Via in 
particular), I question Kenneth Goldsmith’s claim that “It is the objective of the author who is 
concerned with conceptual writing to make her work mentally interesting to the reader, and 
therefore usually she would want it to become emotionally dry,” a statement that calls for the 
neutralization of affective transmission in poetry.17 My argument, developed below, is 
twofold. First, I argue that if affect cannot be reduced to expressionist notions and does not 
merely originate in the speaking subject in the first place, then it is neither in the artist’s 
purvey nor capacity either to control or eliminate affect. Secondly, I argue that the conceptual 
artist’s position of neutrality risks becoming reduced to one of mere indifference if the 
framework of a performance operates without taking into account the voice of the other.  
Any claim to eliminate affect from art is problematically reductive, misconstruing 
affect as a simple expressionist phenomenon, as a set of feelings that originate with a singular 
subject, the genius or maker. As Sara Ahmed argues in the Cultural Politics of Emotion, 
affects do not originate or belong to individuals, but rather travel and are sticky. As such, they 
are contagious, circulate, and in the process become attached. Accordingly, it would be 
impossible for a work to be made devoid of affect by its author, if only its author’s feelings 
were to be withheld. This is due in part to the very participatory nature of the poststructuralist 
experience of art or writing, which de-emphasizes the position of the author in determining a 
work’s meaning and significance. In other words, a work of art can be a site of sticky affects 
even if the author has not poured his or her own feelings into it.  
                                                
17 Kenneth Goldsmith, “Paragraphs on Conceptual Writing,” accessed on October 1, 2015, 
http://epc.buffalo.edu/authors/goldsmith/conceptual_paragraphs.html. 
 13 
Secondly, what are the ethical implications of assuming a position as an artist or author 
that presupposes that once can effectively eliminate affect from a work: a position that is 
devoid of any gesture of social or collective responsibility, even in terms of the ancillary 
framework for the writing or performance? Such indifference has the capacity to produce 
sensationalism, which serves to bring the author of sensationalism into the spotlight. But what 
else?  
American poet Sueyeun Juliette Lee addresses the place of the ethical in forms of 
contemporary experimental writing that rely on appropriation and transcription in an article 
titled “Shock and Blah: Offensive Postures in ‘Conceptual’ Poetry and the Traumatic 
Stuplime.”18 To establish an important point of contrast, Lee looks back to the major 
documentary poetic works of Charles Reznikoff (particularly of importance here are 
Testimony: The United States, 1885-1915 and Holocaust) and notes a striking difference 
between Rezinkoff’s position and that of the contemporary poets who have recently reclaimed 
him.19 First, however, she notes the obvious similarity: Reznikoff’s reliance on transcription 
                                                
18 Sueyeun Juliette Lee, “Shock and Blah: Offensive Postures in ‘Conceptual’ Poetry and the 
Traumatic Stuplime,” Volta 41 (May 2014). http://www.thevolta.org/ewc41-sjlee-p1.html. As to what 
constitutes the contemporary ‘conceptual’ poetry Lee’s argument refers to, Craig Dworkin and 
Kenneth Goldsmith’s Anthology of Conceptual Writing is one definitive source. 
 
19 The first volume of Reznikoff’s Testimony was published in 1965 by New Directions, but was 
widely attacked in critical reviews. In one of these, “Hayden Carruth said that the “cold, neutral 
language” makes Testimony “uninteresting” and “lifeless.” New Directions as a result dropped its 
options on the sequel volumes and indeed on any of Reznikoff’s future works; he was thus driven to 
publish the second volume of Testimony: The United States, 1891-1900: Recitative himself, in 1968.” 
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neutralizes the writing subject. Also, as an objectivist, Reznikoff’s work is constructed from 
materials that originate outside the experience of the writing subject, and nowhere in his text 
does an expression of subjective opinion emerge except in his choice of what materials to 
present and how to arrange them.20  Yet, Lee argues, what sets Reznikoff’s gesture apart is his 
intention to bear witness to injustice and atrocity. Implied in this differentiation is a critique of 
indifference — such a critique as Barthes’ distinction between superficial indifference (in 
which he is not interested) and the desirable neutral he names. Lee’s argument, a plea for the 
ethical intentions that inform the act of bearing witness, imply a neutralization of the writing 
subject, which makes space for the other’s voice to be heard, but a neutralization that does not 
assume a posture of indifference. Reznikoff’s work is highly effective as its unrelenting 
revelation of the facts of suffering hone an affective response to injustice through accretion 
and repetition. It does not arise from indifference to violence, nor is it a monotony of violence, 
so routine it is absorbed numbly and dumbly into the system. The neutrality afforded by 
Reznikoff’s objectivist removal in his later works relates to Barthes’ description of the neutral 
ethic as “minimizing an interface with the world’s arrogance.”21 The decentered subject 
                                                
Milton Hindus, “Charles Reznikoff Biography,” http://www.poetryfoundation.org/bio/charles-
reznikoff. 
 
20 Notably, Rezinkoff’s work was the object of a 1927 essay by Zukofsky, “Sincerity and 
Objectification,” where Zukofsky first developed his ideas that would later come to be under the label 
‘objectivism;’ Louis Zukofsky, “Sincerity and Objectification,” Poetry 35 No. 5, (Feb 1931): 272-285. 
 
21 Barthes, Le Neutre, 249. “Il pourrait en effet y avoir une pensée minimaliste du Neutre : ce 
minimalisme se situerait ainsi : un style de conduit qui tend à diminuer le surface de contact du sujet 
avec l’arrogance du monde […]”  
 15 
differentiates along an axis that neutralizes the potential indifference of neutrality: this is the 
decentering of the authorial voice. Throughout this process, Reznikoff’s remains a position 
that does not abolish the notion of care, which is where, Lee argues, a new generation of 
conceptual poets risks faltering, using methods of transcription similar to Reznikoff, yet 
assuming a position of uncaring indifference, a supposed non-position. If neutrality is mere 
indifference, we are left with a poetics that derides the very compulsion to care about the 
world and the voice of the other and thus serves only to perpetuate the violence it represents.  
At times, the evocation of unbiased neutrality can also act in the service of a position 
(for example, of ignorance) to excuse or mask a stance that is, rather, biased — as a way to 
hide bias within the mechanisms and inaction of apathy. Thus, since neutrality is understood 
as a passive, non-judgmental position, as that which produces no effect on any object and 
shapes no outcome, it risks exploitation as a conveniently easy position of concealment (the 
opacity of transparency, as Blanchot writes). For example, in response to and in critique of the 
unfair omission of Barbara Guest’s poetry from an early anthology that helped define the 
circle of poets known as the New York School (a group of poets among which Guest and her 
writing had played a central formative role), Rachel Blau Duplessis argues against the blithe 
ignorance of those responsible for this erasure: “reception and dissemination are never neutral 
phenomena, and the familiar bumbling can always occur (‘Gee, honey, I lost women's 
writing’).”22 In this sense, retreating under the shelter of the neutral does not guarantee 
                                                
22 Rachel Blau Duplessis, “The Gendered Marvelous: Barbara Guest, Surrealism and Feminist 
Reception,” in Blue Studios (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 167. 
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impartiality on part of the actor who poses as unaccountable or a non-participant: here, the 
neutral is only indifference.   
Barthes’ definition of the neutral, he claims, is “structural,” seeking a conceptual order 
beyond the limits of opposition. Temporally, the neutral is an idea for a structure that is not 
linear, not founded upon the opposition of past to present, not bound to the linear narratives of 
progress. The neutral establishes itself as pure duration beyond the constraints of 
origin/beginning and finality/closure. Indeed, the desire for the neutral informs not only the 
content but the structure of the text of “Barthes’ last book,” published posthumously — a text 
that was composed as a series of lecture notes on the neutral, but written against the 
constraints of publication, as a desire for the ephemeral, unintended for the book market. (For 
Barthes, the truly neutral would not be marketable.23) In one aspect, like Benjamin’s Arcades 
Project, the book Le Neutre is a collection of writings presented posthumously in a catalogue 
form. Also, Barthes’ text incorporates marginal key words to guide the reader. For Barthes, 
not only the content but the form of this non-linear collection of writings furthers his argument 
against what he describes as the “dissertation style,” which of course, remains mired in a mode 
of critique and oppositional ideology. For Barthes, the neutral represents a beautiful idea, an 
impossible yet potential alternative to conflict, a utopia, a longed-for state of androgyny, an 
unmarketable passion and desire.  
                                                
 
23 Barthes, Le Neutre, 39. “En règle générale, le désir est toujours vendable : nous ne faisons que 
vendre, acheter, échanger des désirs. Le paradoxe du désir de Neutre, sa singularité absolue, est qu’il 
est invendable ! on me dit : « Vous ferez un livre avec ce cours sur le Neutre ? » Tout autre problème 
mis à part (notamment de performance), je réponds : Non, le Neutre, c’est l’invendable.”   
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Thus, Barthes’ writings on the neutral are disinterested in the notion of a bleak 
indifference or impartiality that is often associated with neutrality; Barthes is concerned, 
rather, with documenting a burning, passionate intensity: a desire for the neutral.24 While I 
share Barthes’ longing, mine is rather melancholic; this is where my desire for the neutral 
departs from his. The matters of aesthetics — or, more specifically, contemporary conditions 
of irrecoverable beauty in matters of creation — are indispensible to my investigation of 
poetry. Furthermore, if beauty were to crack the surface of indifference, this long-sought 
neutral might be glimpsed, seeping thus through any imperfect indifference. Indifference, 
although pervasive, is merely a posture, a façade, a surface, a way of saying, “I don’t care,” or 
“whatever,” an insincere posture, a simplistic style of deriding the meaningful in all of its 
forms. It’s only when this façade breaks, and in its failure the fragile, vulnerable beauty of 
multiplied possibility cracks through, that the neutral emerges as a desirable presence, as 
possibility intensified. 
Therefore, somewhere between this social façade of neutrality that is indifference, 
draping the landscape of the world with its bleak surface, and the neutral as a zero or third way 
through unchartered waters of logic and conformity, there is a glissement or slippage away 
from the competing interests of individualistic and collective will. The neutral remains elusive, 
an absence of absence that does not affirm its presence, the opacity of transparency, or the 
difference of indifference, as Blanchot describes it. Barthes’ work on the neutral draws on the 
thought of Maurice Blanchot, whose extensive writings on the neutral are collected in 
                                                
 
24 Barthes, Le Neutre, 38. “En raccourci: je désire le Neutre, donc je postule le Neutre. Qui désire, 
postule (hallucine).”  
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L’entretien infini [The Infinite Conversation]. As for Barthes, in Blanchot’s work, the neutral 
points to the elusive third term that complicates and disrupts binary logic. As Blanchot writes 
in L’entretien Infini: 
 
Le neutre : cela qui porte la différence jusque dans l’indifférence, plus justement, qui 
ne laisse pas l’indifférence à son égalité définitive. Le neutre, toujours séparé du neutre 
par le neutre, loin de laisser expliquer par l’identique, reste le surplus inidentifiable. Le 
neutre : surface et profondeur, ayant partie liée avec la profondeur si la surface semble 
régir, avec la surface quand la profondeur dominer (devient un vouloir qui domine), la 
rendant alors superficielle tout en l’enfonçant. Le neutre est toujours ailleurs qu’on ne 
le situe […]25 [The neutral: that which carries difference even to the point of 
indifference. More precisely, that which does not leave indifference to its definitive 
equalization. The neutral is always separated from the neutral by the neutral, and, far 
from allowing itself to be examined by the identical, it remains and unidentifiable 
surplus. The neutral: surface and depth, casting its lot with depth when the surface 
seems to rule, and with the surface when depth seeks to dominate (that is, become a 
dominating will), thus rendering it superficial all the while pushing it under. The 
neutral is always elsewhere that where one would situate it […]26 
 
The third or zero element that Barthes theorizes in Writing Degree Zero finds a 
correlate in the figure of the neutral in Blanchot’s work, where it is continually evoked to 
disrupt binaries or facilitate a slippage in oppositional logic. In Chapter 3, “One More Word: 
Translation and the Politics of Neutrality,” the concept of the third term takes the form of a 
                                                
25 Maurice Blanchot, L’entretien infini, (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 450.  
 
26 Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993), 305. 
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hypothetical third text that situates itself in relation to two texts that are perceived as the 
original and its translation. This third text is located both between and beyond the two texts it 
measures. The third text exists as that against which the original and the translation can 
measure themselves, since the original and the translation cannot be measured directly against 
each other, as Paul Ricoeur argues in Sur la traduction:  
Le dilemme est le suivant : les deux textes de départ et d’arrivée devraient, dans une 
bonne traduction, être mesurés par un troisième texte inexistant. Le problème, c’est en 
effet de dire la même chose ou de prétendre dire la même chose de deux façons 
différentes. Mais ce même, cet identique n’est donné nulle part à la façon d’un tiers 
texte dont le statut serait celui du troisième homme dans le Parménide de Platon, tiers 
entre l’idée de l’homme et les échantillons humains supposés participer à l’idée vraie 
et réelle. À défaut de ce texte tiers, où résiderait le sens même, l’identique sémantique, 
il n’y a pour seul recours que la lecture critique de quelques spécialistes sinon 
polyglottes du moins bilingue [….]27 
 
 When a translation is measured against the original text, it always appears to be 
flawed if not to fail massively. Not only is there no way to measure the meaning of a living 
language, there is no way to prove any simple equivalency of given terms in one language to 
terms in another language. Therefore, the perfect translation must, paradoxically, point to its 
original incommensurability, to the impossibility of equivalence that renders every translation 
spurious in advance of its production. Ricoeur’s notion of the hypothetical third text is a 
realization of the slippage between a text in one language and its translation in another. In 
Chapter Three, I argue that Secession with Insecession by Chus Pato and Erin Moure 
                                                
 
27 Paul Ricoeur, Sur la traduction (Paris: Bayard, 2004), 14. 
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accomplishes the task of pointing to its own slippage. Here, the third text — which takes the 
literal form of a third text, written by Erin Moure in response to the text by Chus Pato that she 
has translated, and laid-out on facing pages opposite the translation — inscribes the voice of 
the translator as an indisputable presence, a third reverberation of a complicated passage, a 
threshold of crossings.   
As Moure’s third text draws attention to the composing voice of the translator, it also 
draws attention to the decentered subject of the lyrical I who writes. For who writes Secession 
with Insecession? Is it Pato or Moure or the reader who writes across the gutter of the page, 
across that faint shadow of a border separating Pato’s text from Moure’s? The third text also 
draws attention to cultural difference (where on the left, Moure’s I embodies a Canadian 
nationalist perspective and on the right, Moure translates Pato’s I and Galician nationalist 
perspective): variegated lines and complex layers of subjectivity that emerge in any process of 
translation. Importantly, Moure’s gesture resists a climate of indifference to cultural difference 
within translation practices, resists the gestures of absorption, assimilation and neutralization 
that govern translation in North America. Instead, the translator inscribes her presence, a 
visible subjectivity, against prevailing customs according to which the translator’s very name 
is often elided or eclipsed entirely by reviewers and the reading public. This is in part because 
the translator (although he or she may own the copyright to a work of translation) is not 
perceived as the author of that work but rather as a sort of machine that has reproduced a text 
in a new language.28 Emily Apter argues that the translator remains in the shadow of the 
                                                
28 Or, the translator is not a machine, but more specifically, the ghost in the machine: “In habitual 
parlance about literary works in translation, the translator is the ghost in the machine, and the one who 
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creator or author of a work as a result of the patterns of possession that underwrite literary 
circulation and scholarship in general: 
 
[…] one reason why literary studies falls short as anti-capitalist critique is because it 
insufficiently questions what it means to “have” a literature or to lay claim to aesthetic 
property. Literary communities are gated: according to Western law and international 
statute, authors have texts, publishers have a universal right to translate (as long as they 
pay), and nations own literary patrimony as cultural inheritance. Translation, seen as 
authorized plagiarism, emerges as a form of creative property that belongs fully to no 
one.29  
 
That the translation “belongs fully to no one” — even if the translator formally owns 
the copyright to his or her work — should present a fruitful challenge to capitalist limits 
imposed on collective textual ownership; however, in reality, the translator is most often 
forgotten or glossed over, their part in a partial ownership unacknowledged.  
That the translator can be so easily elided shows how a significant strain of 
indifference to cultural difference dominates the fields of literary circulation. Indeed, such a 
position of indifference to difference is often internalized and assumed by translators 
themselves, where it manifests a style of translation that seeks to erase any marks of 
                                                
wrote them in the first language is the person we call the Author. But, this Author, in fact, enacts 
nothing in the translation. The ghost does it all.” Erin Moure, “Cotranslating Nicole Brossard: Three-
Way Spectacle or Spectre de Trois?” in Translating Translating Montreal (Montreal: Press Dust, 
2007), 35.  
 
29 Emily Apter, Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability (London and New York: 
Verso, 2013), 15. 
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foreignness from the translated text. In this situation, the translator seeks to make a text that is 
readily marketable and easily readable in the target language at the expense of the specificity 
of the text, the very specificity that qualifies it as literature. Often, these marks of difference 
might be eradicated or neutralized in translation. To render such a surface that is indifferent to 
difference — a slick and easy surface — the translator must resort to flattening the intensity of 
the original, presumably in the name of communication or intelligibility. Yet, the “aura” of the 
original is not only an expression of literary intensity, but also of an irrecoverable specificity 
that is its uncontested difference. A slick translation is considered suspect and contentious 
because it is superficial and indifferent to the difference of the author. Taken the other way, 
the translator might choose to render the text so different or strange as to be indifferent to the 
difference of the reader in the target language. These two opposed movements — the first 
according to which the translator makes the translated text slick (easy to read, culturally 
familiar in the target language) and the second, according to which the translator makes the 
translated text sticky (strange and a challenge to read in the target language) — can be 
summed up by a description offered by Friedrich Schleiermacher in On the Different Methods 
of Translating originally published in 1813. Schleiermacher famously posited that the 
translator faces one major dilemma: whether to bring the writer closer to the reader by making 
the translated text as familiar to the reader as possible, or to make the reader travel to the 
writer by rendering the translated text strange to the reader and thereby allowing the difference 
of the original text to affect changes on the target language.  
These possibilities are elaborated upon by Lawrence Venuti’s in his theory of the 
translator’s invisibility. Venuti argues that the translator faces a choice between two possible 
methods or approaches to their work. These he names as domestication versus foreignization, 
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where domestication involves rendering the text familiar and easy to read (slick) in the target 
language and foreignization involves using strategies that render the target language strange. 
Domestication involves a gesture of cultural assimilation that renders the translator’s voice, as 
mediator between cultures, invisible; a process of containment or neutralization. 
Foreignization is a process by which the translator must operate with a degree of creativity or 
poetic license to bend the target language, just as any literary text bends its language of origin. 
 Finally, my argument on translation is based on the idea that every literary text arises 
as a trembling in the language of origin, as potential difference that is both a unique utterance 
and an expression of the language in which it is written, an unusual intensity. The writer is a 
foreigner inside the language of origin, experiencing that language as difference and 
disrupting its clichés. This forms the basis of Deleuze’ argument in the essay “Bégaya-t-il…”: 
any literature is written as a trembling within a given language, a unique or minor usage of 
language within a given language. This “new language” does not arise outside a given 
language; rather, it is the outside of a given language, an exterior surface, an eruption of the 
very limits of a language: 
Les deux aspect s’effectuent suivant une infinite de tonalités, mais toujours ensemble: 
une limite du langage qui tend toute la langue, une ligne de variation ou de modulation 
tendue qui porte la langue à cette limite. Et de meme que la nouvelle langue n’est pas 
extérieure à la langue, la limite asyntaxique n’est pas extérieure au langage: elle est le 
dehors du langage, non pas au-dehors.30 
 
In this passage, Deleuze points to the infinite tones that emerge as the result of a 
friction produced by the limits of a language and the language itself which varies infinitely 
                                                
30 Gilles Deleuze, Critique et clinique (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1993),141.  
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along the idea of terminal axes. This rich tonality arises as a result of the literary language’s 
potential to be both on the outside and inside of a language at once, as a modulation that forms 
an exterior surface from the infinite materials within the language. This metaphor of infinite 
tonality illustrates the model of translation I describe in Chapter Three, where it stands as the 
complement to the prosodic notion of monotony with which I began my investigation in 
Chapter One.   
Throughout this dissertation, I chart a movement toward a model of literary poetic 
work that enacts or performs the formal model for a critique it bears within its conceptual 
framework. This model does not represent the mere conflation of the critical gesture with the 
creative, nor does it merely entail an expression of the critical voice within the context of a 
poetic or literary work. As works that are formally strange in terms of genre, the texts I have 
chosen to examine, from the threshold or paratextual poetics of Chapter Two to the 
linguistically and culturally hybrid text of Chapter Three, call attention to the cultural and 
political frameworks of knowledge production and permeate invisibility with the marks of 
difference. Just as the perfect translation must point to its own incommensurability, the critical 
translation points to the fact of the translator as an active voice and agent of intervention. This 
materialization of the translating voice (the outside of the inside: the threshold voice) also 
brings into relief the difference of the translated text. If the two oppositional terms of 
translation discourse are established according to an idea of the monolingual (the one and the 
other), the hybrid text can offer a third term that baffles the paradigm. This third element, like 
the gutter of the page taking flight, exists with all its beautiful potential, not just between, but 
also beyond, two finitudes.  
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Chapter One 
Stylized Monotony: The Rhythm of Neutrality 
  
 
 
 
The livelong day he sat in his loom, his ear filled with its monotony, his eyes bent close 
down on the slow growth of sameness in the brownish web, his muscles moving with 
such even repetition that their pause seemed almost as much a constraint as the 
holding of his breath. 
— George Eliot, Silas Marner 
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On Monotony 
The hum of a ceiling fan, the mechanical grind of an escalator, pilates repetitions, treadmills 
and exercycles, waiting room musak and its tedious refrain: regularly, these imperturbable, 
monotonous sounds taunt the ear with the sort of relentless persistence that imperils interest. 
Uninteresting, tedious, continuous, regular, repetitious, unchanging: in common English usage 
the word monotonous is ascribed such undesirable synonyms. Truly predictable, the sameness 
of monotony is particularly unbearable for it does not stop; its tedium is an expression of its 
unbending relationship to time, an excessive duration. Monotony never wavers, never falters, 
never surprises. Monotony cannot seduce; there is no attraction of fleeting adventure or 
freedom in monotony, which is absolute prolongation without hesitation or variation, purely 
anticipatable.  
Not merely signifying a technical lack of variation or difference, monotonous is 
frequently associated with boredom in popular thought. Yet, at the same time — even as it 
popularly denotes the sort of assembly-line dullness that would signify the end of art —
monotony also now has come to represent the form preferred by anti-aesthetic movements in 
post-modern poetics and art.31 This chapter is an attempt to account for various, anomalous 
                                                
31 Consider one of conceptual art’s practioners, On Kawara, whose work was recently shown in 
retrospective at the Guggenheim, the repetitive monotony of whose serial endurance performances 
perfectly exemplifies a “non-aesthetic” monotonous practice. Particularly poignant in this regard is the 
series of telegraphs repeatedly inscribed over the years with the unchanging phrase, “I am still alive.”  
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and formally generative examples of monotony in artistic production and to trace the 
emergence of monotony as an unlikely poetic trope in the 20th and 21st century.32  
In the argument that follows, I initially examine the problem of monotony as a sign of 
cosmetic uniformity according to cultural theorists of modernist aesthetics such as Theodor 
Adorno and T. S. Eliot. Their rejection of monotony as that which signifies a lack of vitality in 
art differs somewhat from John Ruskin’s earlier views on the sublime where monotony figures 
as a necessary and useful counterpart in an aesthetic economy of deferred pleasure, although 
itself unpleasurable. Undermining a persistent aesthetic opposition between monotony and 
change, postmodern experimental poet Inger Christensen’s book-length cyclical poem 
alphabet suggests that the force of monotony in nature is an aspect of being itself, a force that 
is vitally opposed to the total destruction of nuclear war. Considering alphabet and the 
apparent resistance of monotony in the face of anthropic devastation leads to a comparative 
discussion of “The Anatomy of Monotony” by Wallace Stevens, a poem that anticipates even 
its own end in monotony, its inevitable thanatos and melancholy. Ultimately, I am interested 
in laying the groundwork for a theory of monotony as a prevalent élan of late twentieth 
                                                
32 Monotony is not a figure in the sense that it does not mean something other than it says. Further, 
monotony is the saying of one thing, the saying of one thing only, according to a certain pattern or 
design. On the one hand, monotony is thus an excess of literality; even a repeated trope can risk falling 
into literality by repetition. Implied in the repetition of this saying one thing that is monotony there 
arises the possibility for it to mean another thing and therefore to simulate the function of a trope as a 
result of its overall action. Therefore, the sense of monotony as a trope rests somewhere between the 
notion of a figure and a motif. It is a motif that by virtue of its repetitious nature becomes a figure of 
style but a figure that by lack of external reference becomes a motif and points only to itself. (This 
contextual nature of monotonous signification is exemplified in some contemporary conceptual writing 
where discourses are displaced from their habitual contexts).  
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century and early twenty first century art and writing, as a categorical alternative to describe 
certain works that might otherwise fall under the label ‘conceptual’ or ‘experimental,’ 
depending on medium or genre. This chapter attempts to account for the changing valuation of 
monotony and repetition from the period when romantic aesthetics flourished to the present 
time.   
 
Monotony and the Vitality of Art 
 
The problem of monotony as a modern phenomenon is expressed most clearly in the field of 
music theory because monotony is a form of rhythm. Adorno points — in a passing comment 
— to monotony as an emergent limit circumscribing all new music in an essay titled “On the 
Current Relationship between Philosophy and Music.” In particular, Adorno addresses a 
problem arising from the categorization of musical types that occurs alongside a contemporary 
crisis in classical music. Tuning from radio station to station in search of “some serious music, 
or as it is known in the sphere of informed barbarism, ‘classical music’ — the mere fact that it 
takes place amid the monotony [of pop music] as one category among others means that it in 
turn appears, even its difference, as simply another facet of that monotony.”33 Adorno’s 
‘monotony’ defines a quality of pop music, that is, rhythmically uniform, commodified and 
therefore contrasted to what he perceives as “serious” music: specifically, classical music 
performed and heard live in a traditional venue, an experience that, according to a nostalgia 
                                                
33 Theodor W. Adorno, Night Music: Essays on Music 1928-1962, Edited by Rolf Tiedemann, 
Translated by Wieland Hoban (London; New York: Seagull Books, 2009), 427.  
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for modes of listening of the past, is construed as more complex than the experience of 
listening to a monotonous recording. It is no coincidence that the radio, with its capacity for 
mass diffusion of musical recordings, figures in this aphoristic view of the sad fate of classical 
music, as it is a medium that supports a listening experience that is asynchronous with 
performance. Adorno implies that classical music becomes monotonous as a result of its new 
context and media of dissemination. Thus, rather than inscribing monotony as an inherent 
category of a certain type of music, Adorno posits it as a contingent quality affecting all 
contemporary music. For Adorno, monotony expresses a characteristic category for recorded 
music in general, of which classical music is simply one type.  
Adorno’s critique presumes a uniformity of performance among the technological 
apparatuses that produce recordings and a transparent or neutrally non-intervening medium of 
dissemination, as though any audio recording represents merely a watered-down version of a 
live performance. However, in terms offered by media theorist Jonathan Sterne, it becomes 
clear that the repeatability of a recording is not continuous with the repeatability of a 
performance — of any sort, whether of classical or pop music in the example above:  
 
Recording is a form of exteriority: it does not preserve a pre-existing sonic event as it 
happens so much as it creates and organizes sonic events for the possibility of 
preservation and repeatability. Recording is, therefore, discontinuous with the ‘live’ 
events that it is sometimes said to represent (although there are links of course).34  
 
                                                
34 Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past : Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction, (Durham, NC : Duke 
University Press, 2003), 332. 
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If the recording medium and the radio offer the possibility of repeatability for the first time, it 
is a repeatability that applies to the recording itself, not the performance, reframing 
modernism’s distinctions between high and low art against a field of emergent technology. 
If Adorno offers a view of the recorded medium as that which produces a type of 
music that is, by the very fact of its recording, monotonous, his view complements another 
fundamental take on the place of monotony within a given artistic work. For Adorno, both 
commodified modes of circulation and the emergent rhythmic monotony of pop music 
exacerbate the production of monotony. Other cultural theorists, including T.S. Eliot and John 
Ruskin, discuss monotony in terms of an aesthetic economy of predictability and surprise, of 
agony and pleasure, of tension and inertia.  
T.S. Eliot raises the notion of monotony to point to a compositional principle that he 
insists is opposed to the type of composition that is proper to poetry and which defines the 
production of poetry. In this view, Eliot argues, regardless of whether one is writing metered 
verse or free verse (a distinction he finds problematic from the outset), all poetry should by 
definition avoid monotony: “It is this contrast between fixity and flux, this unperceived 
evasion of monotony, which is the very life of verse.”35 As with Adorno’s opposition between 
popular and classical music, Eliot presents monotony as the antithesis of poetry, or its very 
death, to be precise, as a force opposed to “the very life of verse.” Notably, the type of poetry 
in question here, verse, has a general analog in classical music, as both the fields of literature 
and music saw an explosion of new forms and rhythms emerge in the era of industrialization. 
                                                
35 T.S. Eliot, To Criticize the Critic: Eight Essays on Literature and Education (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1965), 185. 
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As such, traditional verse only becomes “traditional” and classifiable as a type of poetry with 
the emergence of free verse — and thereby, as one type of monotony among many, to use 
Adorno’s expression.  
  Eliot argues that any distinction between verse and free verse is misleading because all 
verse by its definition thrives on “fixity and flux,” on a tension between repetition and 
difference, whether formally inherited or not. In “Reflections on Vers Libre” (first published 
in 1917 in New Statesman and later collected in To Criticize the Critic), Eliot acknowledges 
that the very unhealthiness or pathological nature of modern society compels the radical 
breaks with tradition that define the avant-garde. However, just short of condemning the 
position of the avant-garde, he expresses wariness that a radical, polemical attack on tradition 
actually fails art as it traps the artist in a reductive set of constraints wherein art can be 
conceived only as a negation of the tradition of which the artist is suspicious. It is the ironic 
fate of the avant-garde gesture that the suspect traditions of the present will be supplanted with 
suspect traditions of the future. You might say, to make a long story short, that this is what 
happened to vers libre in the twentieth century. Far from the freedom cry against the tyranny 
of meter, which the explicit reference to liberty in its name vers libre originally suggested, by 
the end of the twentieth century, free verse instead came to signify a type of formalism with 
conventions of its own.  
 Total monotony, it would seem, has no proper place in the conservation of poetry’s 
vitality. According to the Robert Dictionnaire Historique de la langue francaise, ‘monotone’ 
is a late borrowing from the Latin monotonus, which signifies “uniforme, qui se suit sans 
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interruption.”36 Therefore the monotonous can be defined as that which does not stop or vary, 
that which continues uniformly, without any break. Connoted in the descriptive word 
‘monotonous’ is lack of variation, of difference, of interruption, of breakage. Yet traditional 
and free verse are both premised on the existence of an interruption that is anticipated at the 
end of the line, a notion of interruption that bears affinities to poetry’s quality of suspense 
evoked by Mallarmé or hesitation, in the words of Valéry.37 In other words, the reader hangs 
on the end of the line; the poem turns toward or away from us as the line turns. Caesura, that 
capture of breath in the middle of the line, also contributes to rhythmic variation; overall, the 
opposition between of fixity and change is the beating heart of poetry, poetry’s vitality.  
Traditionally, such tension between fixity and flux was sustained by metrical verse, by 
prosody and rhyme, but in the case of free-verse poetry, the means of sustaining that tension 
must be deferred or localized within the line, against its solitariness and its potential ending.38 
                                                
36 Dictionnaire historique de la langue française, s.v. “monotone.” 
 
37 Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture, Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 109.   
 
38 Marjorie Perloff highlights the continued dominance of the notion of ‘the line’ in the transition from 
traditional to free verse poetry in an important essay entitled “After Free Verse: The New Nonlinear 
Poetries.” Perloff’s analysis, which includes a definition of free verse comprising a detailed and 
expansive list of potential characteristics (see note 63), concludes that while a number of common 
characteristics can be found for a diverse range of ‘free verse’ poetry, the only criterion that everyone 
seems agreed upon is that its basic unit of free verse is the line. Thus, from traditional verse to free 
verse poetry, an emphasis remained on the second of the two terms, ‘verse’ (le vers: the line) instead of 
the newfound freedom implied by the name of free verse. Marjorie Perloff, “After Free Verse: The 
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Giorgio Agamben addresses the topic of enjambment in a short talk entitled “The End of the 
Poem,” presenting an argument that bears some affinities to Eliot’s definition of poetry, if only 
in the preliminary claims presented:  
I will have to begin with a claim that, without being trivial, strikes me as obvious — 
namely, that poetry lives only in the tension and difference (and hence also in the 
virtual interference) between sound and sense, between the semiotic sphere and the 
semantic sphere.39 [Dovrò, per questo, esordire da una tesi che, senza essere triviale, 
mi pare tuttavia evidente, e, cioè, che la poesía non vive che nella tensione e lo scarto 
(e, quindi, anche nell’interferenza virtuale) fra il suono e il senso, fra la serie 
semiótica e quella semántica.]40  
 
Rather than define poetry against all the other arts, Agamben begins by distinguishing it from 
prose according to the function of the poetic line: by extension, enjambment is the 
characteristic by which poetry obviously distinguishes itself from prose, and thus by its very 
potential to oppose a syntactical limit to a metrical limit. Prose, by definition, cannot do this, 
does not embody this potentiality or this tension. Then, in an attempt to examine the pathos 
inherent in the last lines of verse, Agamben offers the hypothesis that a poem ends, or dies, in 
its very last lines, when any tension (for example, between fixity and flux) is literally 
flattened, when there are no more potential limits to oppose as phantasms but only final, total 
limits, wherein all tension terminates. For what is poetic suspense or hesitation if not a 
                                                
New NonLinear Poetries,” In Close Listening: Poetry and the Performed Word, Edited by Charles 
Bernstein (Oxford University Press, 1998).  
 
39 Agamben, Stanzas, 109, emphasis mine.  
 
40 Giorigio Agamben, Categorie Italiane : Studi di poetica (Venezia: Marsilio, 1996), 113.  
 34 
heightened illusion of potentiality? The texture of the poem goes flat at the point where rhyme 
ceases to perpetuate rhythm, which then devolves into monotony.  
  There is a notable similarity in these two formulations, by Agamben and Eliot, in their 
use of specifically figurative critical language that extends a life-like quality to poetry, 
particularly in terms of personification. Eliot writes of poetry’s ‘life’ and Agamben states that 
poetry ‘lives’ (vive). More specifically, to reiterate the phrases in question: “poetry lives only 
in the tension and difference” (Agamben via translator Heller-Roazen) and “this contrast 
between fixity and flux … is the very life of verse” (Eliot). In both statements, poetry 
figuratively comes alive; it is vivacious; yet this prototype of living language must also 
therefore face the capacity to die, to be injured, to be proud, like any sort of feeling being. 
Contrasted to such living poetry is reviled monotony, which poetry apparently evades just as 
living beings seek to avoid death. Monotony would appear to present a threat to poetry’s 
vitality. Following Eliot’s line of thinking, the unperceived evasion of monotony is the rhythm 
of poetry, whether characterized as free verse, metered verse, Olson’s projective verse, 
Hopkins’ “sprung” rhythm or any poetry of modernism.  
 
Stylized Monotony in Inger Christensen’s alphabet 
 
I write like wind 
that writes with clouds’ 
tranquil script 
 
or quickly across the sky 
in vanishing strokes 
as if with swallows 
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I write like wind 
that writes in water 
with stylised monotony 
 
— Inger Christensen, alphabet 
 
 
If monotony once represented the very thing that music and verse must by definition avoid 
according to early 20th century critics, it was to emerge and dominate art as a quality that was 
prevalent and promoted rather than opposed in the later part of the twentieth century, with the 
emergence of conceptual art.  
Inger Christensen, in her pioneering work in experimental poetics, binds the voice of 
the lyrical I with writing that is a form “stylized monotony,” “like wind that writes in water.”41 
In alphabet, originally published in 1981, monotony figures thematically in the reassuring 
rhythm of natural phenomena, as an aspect of nature’s repetitive certainty. Stylistically, 
alphabet does not demonstrate the deployment of a monotonous poetics (the language of 
repetition in Christensen’s work is based on the figure of the simile and the process of 
figuration rather than monotony); however, the notion of monotony is represented in the text, 
suggesting a hypothesis about the place of monotony in poetics. 
Rhythm may be properly human, but monotony, as one variation of rhythm, does not 
in fact point by opposition to the realm of death; rather, monotony as an aesthetic value might 
point toward various forms of non-human living expression. Inger Christensen’s work 
alphabet troubles the simple opposition between repetition as death on the one hand and 
                                                
41 Inger Christensen, alphabet, trans. Susanna Nied (New York: New Directions, 1981), 59. 
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difference as life on the other, as dictated by received categories. In this view, it is nature that 
repeats, whereas the mind, by virtue of its memory, invents; along these lines, monotony 
would describe the life-rhythm of flora and fauna, of non-human nature, by extension, of any 
seemingly natural life of repetitious action and therefore monotonous in rhythm of life. 
However, constituting a vital turn in this narrative of monotony and concomitant ontological 
hierarchies, undermining an inherent dualism that sets apart nature and humanity, the poetry of 
Inger Christensen challenges us to reconsider the empty associations we hold for monotony as 
her text deconstructs this very opposition.  
How monotony figures within the aesthetic is a matter of style, and more particularly 
of stylistic economy. “Style,” Deleuze writes, “is the economy of language.”42 With regards to 
monotonous rhythm and style, such an economy is not restricted to the release of 
unpleasurable tension to achieve pleasure, as Freud suggests in his theory of the pleasure 
principle; indeed, in poetic theory it would seem that the tension of opposition is itself the 
source of pleasure and vitality despite the paradoxical drive toward death thereby implied. 
Christensen’s alphabet, commences on the threshold of existence, with an emphasis on being, 
and only after destruction is introduced does the possibility of metaphorical correlation 
                                                
42 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 113. (“Le style est l’économie de la langue.” Deleuze, 
Critique et clinique, 142). In similar terms, but with the aim of arguing for the existence of a singular, 
unique language usage that emerges within each literary work, Deleuze discusses the tense limits of a 
language as a frictious, productive force, a description that resonates with Agamben’s claims for poetic 
rhythm (opposing a semantic and syntactic limit) cited above. “Les deux aspects n’en sont pas moins 
corrélatifs : le tenseur et la limite, la tension dans la langue et la limite du langage. Les deux aspects 
s’effectuent suivant une infinité de tonalités, mais toujours ensemble : une limite du langage qui tend 
toute la langue, une ligne de variation ou de modulation tendue qui porte la langue à cette limite.” 
Ibid.,141.   
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between things emerge stylistically. In alphabet and with the alphabet, Christensen asks us to 
examine whether being is sufficient before the law according to an economy that is aimed, 
ultimately, at its own destruction.  
In alphabet, a serial long poem structured according to a mathematical formula, 
Christensen’s critical immersion in the non-human life-world proposes a redemptive 
potentiality of nature’s monotonous ‘thought’ as ontological thought, especially when 
considered in relation to devastation and worldly destruction in the twentieth century. This 
immersion does not constitute a romantic retreat from the social world, but rather a radical 
rethinking of its mechanisms, even as all formal capacities (whether for nuclear physics or 
poetry) spiral out of control. Monotony emerges as a possible response to the threat of utter 
destruction by nuclear weapons, of unfathomable nothingness, against which alphabet is an 
affirmation of existence. Christensen’s stylized monotony belongs to water, air, the elements 
and seasons, including “spring that writes / the common alphabet / of anemones beeches / 
violets wood sorrel,” but these “natural” elements are allied with the vitality of thought in her 
work, not relegated to non-rational or mystical status, as the alphabet’s writing in nature would 
suggest.43 The conventional trope, the poetic simile, is rendered astonishing in the context of 
this austerely and numerically constructed poetic work. The self-referential aspect of writing 
itself as a figure of comparison (“I write […] with stylized monotony”) conveys a lyric code at 
the threshold of potentially monotonous repetition.44 
                                                
43 Christensen, alphabet, 60. 
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First published in 1981, alphabet is unique, in part because its formal structure is based 
on mathematical and alphabetic sequences — on number and letter — instead of a poetic verse 
form as a conventional set of measures and lines. Thus, while being highly structured or 
formalized, its form is unfamiliar, systematic, numerical, new to poetry, and seemingly 
neutral. For this reason, alphabet constitutes an example of Danish “systemic literature,” 
meaning “alphabet is not merely a collection of poems but a work that integrates each text into 
a whole, generated by a specific and unique system.”45 Two systems in particular are deployed 
in this poem: the Fibonacci sequence and the alphabet.  
The Fibonacci sequence is a mathematical expression that represents an application of 
the geometric principle known as the Golden Mean, the Golden Section or the Golden Ratio. 
The clearest and earliest definition of what was to later be called the Golden Mean comes from 
Euclid (who refers to it as the “extreme and mean ratio”): “A right line is said to be cut at a 
point in extreme and mean ratio when the whole line is to the greater segment as the greater 
segment is to the less.”46 The “mean” ratio came to represent a desirable, ideal proportion in 
                                                
44 The lyrical I of poetry, which has no correlate in other genres, constitutes what is perhaps the 
ultimate and most enduring poetic experiment, due to the ambiguous nature of its participation in a 
mode of representation, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
 
45 Lis Wedell Pape, “Oscillations – On Subject and Gender in Late Modernism.” Orbis 
Litterarum 53 (1998): 259-60.  
 
46  Euclid, The First Six Books of the Elements of Euclid and Propositions I.-XXI. Of Book XI., 
and an Appendix on the Cylinder, Sphere, Cone, Etc. with Copious Annotations and Numerous 
Exercises, trans. John Casey (Dublin: Hodges, Figgis & Co., London: Longmans, Green & 
Co., 1885), 135.  
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aesthetics. While perhaps obscure to most contemporary contexts, its structures can 
nonetheless be found in the works from the history of music, art, architecture and literature as 
a proportion that has been associated with beauty since the classical period. In terms of literary 
history, the Golden Ratio was used by Virgil, as shown in elaborate, painstakingly precise 
exegesis of Virgil’s Aenid by George Duckworth, who claims that such mathematical 
patterning was a common compositional trend among Roman poets of the period, including 
Catallus, Horace and Lucretius, in whose work he also finds examples of the Golden Ratio. 
During the Renaissance, the Golden Ratio influenced the work of artists such as Durer and 
Leonardo da Vinci, and its impact did not stop there but continued to intrigue modernist artists 
and architects across time, especially the cubists.47 While the first expression of the concept of 
the mean ratio dates back to the writings of Euclid of Alexandria around 300 BC, the 
discovery of the Fibonacci sequence is attributed to a 13th century Italian mathematician, 
Leonardo Fibonacci of Pisa.48  
Translator Susanna Nied explains the role of the Fibonacci sequence in the 
construction of Christensen’s alphabet as follows: “the length of each section of Inger 
Christensen’s alphabet is based on Fibonacci’s sequence, a mathematical sequence beginning 
0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21… in which each number is the sum of the two previous numbers.” 
                                                
 
47 Mario Livio, The Golden Ratio: The Story of Phi, the World’s Most Astonishing Number 
(New York: Broadway Books, 2002),169.  
 
48 “The sequence 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, 233, …, in which each term (starting with the 
third) is equal to the sum of the two preceding terms, was appropriately dubbed the Fibonacci sequence 
in the nineteenth century by the French mathematician Edouard Lucas.” (Livio, 97)  
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More specifically, in alphabet, numerical terms in the Fibonacci sequence determine the 
number of lines in each poem, depending on the poem’s place in the sequence so that the 
number of poetic lines accretes additively. In combination with this mathematical structuring 
device, the alphabet constitutes a second system. Sequentially iterated letters of the alphabet 
appear in lieu of titles for each poem in the series. In addition, these letters determine the 
primary vowel sound of the words in each poem. For example, the first poem in alphabet 
(which is one line in length) lists nouns beginning with a, the second b, the third c… and so 
forth. The first poems in alphabet commences a list bound thematically by a central 
ontological concern as nouns referring to elemental phenomena are connected syntactically by 
the repetition of a single verb, “exist.” The first poem in alphabet is simply: “apricot trees 
exist; apricot trees exist” and the second, “bracken exists; and blackberries, blackberries; / 
bromine exists; and hydrogen, hydrogen.” The letters of the alphabet offer a means of 
“innocent ordering — ‘adamic’ & ‘prelasperian’ as Roland Barthes suggests.”49 However, 
thematic elements of ruination appear throughout Christensen’s list of innocently ordered 
phenomena.  
In fact, an element of destruction already surfaces thematically in the second (b) poem 
of the sequence: “hydrogen” will resurface in a later poem in the form of the “hydrogen 
bomb.” In the excerpt below, an additive and expansionist poetic form is marked by the 
mathematical precision structuring the length of stanzaic units, which sequentially grow 
                                                
49 Joris and Rothenberg, Eds, Poems for the Millennium, Volume 2, 535. Also see Barthes’ reflections 
on fragmentation and alphabetical order in Roland Barthes Par Roland Barthes, where he writes: 
“L’ordre alphabétique efface tout, refoule toute origine. [The alphabetical order erases everything, 
banishes every origin.]” (178).   
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longer. Each contains a number of lines equivalent to a prime number, starting with 1 and 
increasing incrementally. Both in terms of form and theme, Christensen shows how an 
accumulative web of connection ironically (and pathetically) returns us to the beginning, an 
originary point of both departure and destruction, a cycle of devastation. The following 
translation is by Pierre Joris: 
 
atom bombs exist 
 
Hiroshima, Nagasaki 
 
Hiroshima 6 
august 1945 
 
Nagasaki 9 
august 1945 
 
140, 000 dead and 
wounded in Hiroshima 
 
about 60, 000 dead and  
wounded in Nagasaki 
 
frozen numbers  
somewhere in a distant 
and ordinary summer 
 
since then the wounded  
have died, many at first, indeed 
most, then fewer, but in the end 
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all; in the end 
the children of the wounded,  
stillborn, dying, 
 
many, continuously,  
some, finally the 
last ones; in my kitchen 
 
I stand and peel  
potatoes; the faucet  
runs and nearly 
covers the noise of the  
children in the yard;  
 
the children yell and  
nearly cover the noise  
of the birds  
in the trees; the birds 
sing and nearly 
 
cover the murmur 
of the leaves in the wind;  
the leaves murmur  
and nearly cover 
the silence of the sky, 
 
the sky which is light  
and the light which since  
then has nearly 
resembled the fire 
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of the atom bomb50 
 
From the image of peeling potatoes at the kitchen sink, a spiral of separating surfaces 
emblematizes the poem’s movement. This is a movement toward exteriority through 
concentric scenes and sounds of dailyness, such as are only observed in the quiet of isolation. 
Each of these scenes, with its relative sound and image, is supplemented by the next, in a 
movement that spirals away from the specific subject to its lyrical immersion in a vast expanse 
of sky and all light. If monotony and repetition represent definitive qualities of the quotidian, 
Christensen’s poem divulges a lyrical indifference to the question of whether experience 
evolves as an exteriority or a domestic privacy, whether or not the public voice will endure. 
The spiral offers a movement toward exteriority that emerges with the material of the interior 
code that composes it, an additive movement rather than one of exclusion or negation, one that 
carries forward patterns from the material it has named.   
In one of the few English-language articles on alphabet, Lis Wedell Pape argues that in 
terms of theme, alphabet is an apocalyptic poem because the simple phenomena named 
immediately contain elements of their own destruction such that “the unfolding of the theme 
repeats the uncontrollable growth of the system.”51 If there may be a process of disclosure 
enacted through additive nominalization patterns in the text, it is an accumulation that is not 
yet subsumed in an apocalyptic terminal point, an accumulation that foresees neither the end 
of the world nor the end of time. alphabet’s spiral is additive in a highly calculated 
                                                
50 Trans. Pierre Joris, Poems for Millennium, Volume 2, 533-4.   
 
51 Lis Wedell Pape, “Oscillations…,” 260.  
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exponential pattern based on a complex possibility of return. Formulaic, if the text is not 
entirely uncontrolled, it is, at the very least, substantively overwhelming, exceeding 
conventional bounds of representation even as it inscribes the existence of “given limits.”52 
While the possible scope of destruction is immense, the beginnings of knowledge are 
disclosed as the state of their own continuous present, just as the lyrical emergence of a 
subject is an event of its own writing, its perpetually renewed enunciation. The subject that 
endures in time, the public voice that is an end in itself and a vested authority, constructs the 
end of time as its antithesis, and works against it. While Pape argues that the notion of a 
terminal (and historically masculine) subject of enunciation is deconstructed processually in 
Christensen’s alphabet, it is also important to reconsider the implications of worldly 
terminality implied by an apocalyptic reading in terms of the subject, who is not against or 
indifferent to the world. In other words, there is no neutral isolation of the subject in the face 
of an apocalypse.  
Formally, Christensen’s poem becomes unwieldy as it grows too long and complex for 
the scope of its containment. The sequence ends on the letter “n,” only halfway through the 
alphabet. Does this n-point represent the poem’s nuclear half-life? Is the process of radioactive 
decay underway, revealing a potential for timely self-destruction embedded in the beginnings 
of signification as always already unfolding? Is the alphabet — substance of writing, of 
written language — a metaphor for chemistry and the substance of matter? 
In alphabet, as the series proceeds, the poems grow increasingly complex in their 
syntax, accommodating the introduction of diverse verbs in addition to ‘exist’ and thinking 
                                                
52 Christensen, alphabet, 17. “given limits exist, street, oblivion…” 
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grammatical subjects in addition to the simple phenomena listed in the first poems. Turning 
away from the apparent neutrality of first few poems, partway through the alphabet series, the 
atom bomb and devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki drop shockingly into the poem’s 
landscape. As noted previously, the element “hydrogen” is reiterated as the poetic form spirals 
outward, building in the process on material that already exists, substance provided by the 
world ironically as the element of its own nuclear and compositional accretion and decay. In 
this way, Christensen’s alphabet formally deploys a unique system of minimalist poetic 
variation and repetition to grapple with the phenomenon of nuclear destruction, the destructive 
elements of which originate in the very natural world that the human economy ironically seeks 
to destroy. Here, we witness the subject confront ordinary and extraordinary fears of death and 
annihilation. These challenges range from ontological reflections on the beginning and end of 
existence to sociopolitical horror at the depravity of a nuclear arms race where the 
unspeakable goal is to build something ensuring the “harm is as great is it can be.”53 
This scale of damage, unfathomable in scope, unfolds from microscopic potential, 
from such condensed beginnings. Passing through the industrial world, each named 
phenomenon sheds the joy of the world that first spoke it — the very world it composes. 
However, inception is deceptive; each name bears its own harm in the poem that is the seed of 
its variation. Christensen’s “stylized monotony” is the groove or furrow in which the vers or 
the line is drawn with seeming indifference, a form of objective repetition as ephemeral and 
unforgiving as weather. Yet the cracks in indifference of such experimental poetic industry 
                                                
53 Ibid, 40. “cobalt bombs exist / wrapped in their cloaks / of cobalt-60 isotopes / whose half-life / 
ensures the most / harmful effects / there’s no more to / say; we ensure that / the harm is as great / as it 
can be…” 
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also represent a generative and productive form of monotony, transforming along crystalline 
forms as names are recycled and associated with socio-historical contexts – those that early on 
in the sequence are iterated a-historically as though springing from asocial neutrality in 
reverse. The rhythm of monotony masquerades as a neutral surface to resist subsuming forms 
of capitalism and nationalism, just as it ironically resonates with superficial forms of twentieth 
century communications that exceed the borders of nations. 
Finally, I would like to draw attention to the progression of imagery in the poem 
excerpted above in terms of a gradual distancing from the sounds of human language and the 
rhythms of human speech and dialogue to the sounds of the faucet, yelling of children, songs 
of birds and the wind and, at the emergence from the spiral, finally, the silence evoked by the 
sky after the emergence of the atomic bomb. Christensen’s sky holds the traces of atrocity and 
memorializes the possibility of nuclear annihilation: “the sky which is light / and the light 
which since / then has nearly / resembled the fire / of the atom bomb.” Instead of 
metaphorically pointing to the possibility of eternity, this sky bodes of disaster in a way that 
would have been unimaginable before the invention of nuclear arms.  
 
Monotony as Thanatos in Wallace Stevens’ “Anatomy of Monotony” 
 
In contrast to the post-nuclear sky that figures in Christensen’s poem, there is the sky that 
figures in American modernist poet Wallace Stevens’ “Anatomy of Monotony.” Written 
before Hiroshima but during the interbellum years, here, the sky functions metaphorically as a 
figure for death and individual fatalism according to a depiction of human life as a 
phenomenon that is determined purely by biological mechanisms and aimed only at death. In 
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this poem, the body, that vulnerable frame of human life, is thematically associated with 
nature’s monotony and dissociated from the mind. “Anatomy of Monotony” was added to the 
second printing (revised text) of Steven’s collection Harmonium when it was reprinted in 
1931. (Stevens added several poems between the first (1923) printing of Harmonium and the 
second)54:  
 
I. 
 
If from the earth we came, it was an earth  
That bore us as a part of all the things 
It breeds and that was lewder than it is.  
Our nature is her nature. Hence it comes 
Since by our nature we grow old, earth grows  
The same. We parallel the mother’s death. 
She walks an autumn ampler than the wind 
Cries up for us and colder that the frost 
Pricks in our spirits at the summer’s end,  
And over the bare spaces of our skies 
She sees a barer sky that does not bend.  
 
II. 
The body walks forth naked in the sun 
And, out of tenderness or grief, the sun 
Gives comfort, so that other bodies come,  
Twinning our phantasy and our device, 
                                                
54 “Anatomy of Monotony” appears in the middle of a group of fourteen poems that were added after 
the first edition. These fourteen poems were inserted between “Nomad Exquisite” and the penultimate 
poem of Harmonium, “Tea.” 
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And apt in versatile motion, touch and sound 
To make the body covetous in desire 
Of the still finer, more implacable chords.  
So be it. Yet the spaciousness and light 
In which the body walks and is deceived,  
Falls from that fatal and that barer sky, 
And this  the spirit sees and is aggrieved. 
 
 
Between the first and second stanza, the poem’s figurative turn is marked by the insertion of 
the word “fatal” in the description of the bare sky at the end of the second part, as compared to 
the last two lines of the first, where it is simply bare and foreboding of something barer. The 
fatalism of Stevens’ poem is absorbed and deflected by the figure of the bare sky (note that the 
adjective “bare” is repeated three times, as are the key concepts in the poem, “nature” and the 
“body”) — a monotonous absorption that, by definition, does not alter the lyrical subject. 
Mirroring bleak, bare, unbending skies, the fatalistic lot of human life is paralleled to the fate 
of the greater Earth. Nature, thus personified, and the human body share the same course 
toward death. Over life, the sun’s “versatile motion, touch and sound” stimulate the senses to 
distract the body from an unchanging and bleak end, to incite fantasy and desire. 
“Spaciousness and light” fall from the sky, which is aloof, indifferent, Other. The deceptive 
stimulation of “touch and sound” results only in the monotonous repetition of life, which takes 
the form of even more lives, conveying bodies forward indifferently through birth to death, 
where life finds its final end. 
Formally, Steven’s poem rhymes only in the ultimate lines, at the end of each stanza. 
Further, these rhymes are separated by an unrhymed line, which has the effect of emphasizing 
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the final rhyme, underscoring its inherent, unyielding fatalism, affecting the reader who is also 
aggrieved. As such, the rhyme scheme aptly seals the fatalistic promise offered by the scene 
represented in the poem. In “The End of the Poem,” Agamben argues that the final rhyme in a 
poem represents an impasse, where the tension between sound and sense slackens because the 
poem is given prerogative to surface and to congeal semantically in a manner contradictory to 
poetic movement, causing a backwards doubling and interruption of all poetic hesitation that 
has gone before as language turns to prose. Stevens’ use of end rhyme as the only rhyme in the 
poem emphasizes the incomprehensibility of the event of fatalism as a total end that cannot be 
grasped by sense, but remains unwritten, untouched, an unbending unchanging sky. The 
deception of the sky, which offers the warmth of fantasy to mask its ultimate promise of 
ungiving unbending nothingness, is represented in a way unimagined by the author of The 
Anatomy of Melancholy, whose 17th-century treatise on the dark humour is surely alluded to in 
Stevens’ title. Is monotony a contemporary term for melancholy? Is boredom synonymous 
with monotony? What is the relationship between monotony and boredom or between 
melancholy and monotony, and negative affect in general (where “negative” implies a literal 
absence of something)? How might Steven’s flat, unvarying sky screen us from death? The 
sky – traditional figure for the heavens, for constellations, eternity? 
Stevens’ anatomy of nature and the figure of the sky’s deception is first of all a 
description of alienation through which the living subject is deflected by the nature of his or 
her willed participation in the deception of joy. The deception of joy might be the non-
understanding that is the pleasure of reading poetry, when enjoyment is permitted as a form of 
understanding that allows rhythmic sense to complement semantic sense, for example. It is a 
willed and willing deception that knows through enjoyment rather than communication, and 
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cannot therefore be represented. The end of the poem is a mise-en-abyme for the end of the life 
of verse, whether that is understood to be a paroxysmal or anticlimactic repetition of thanatos. 
Nature itself cannot will the lyrical subject to participate in its monotonous repetition, which 
breaks the floodgates to a grief that cannot be closed through mourning, even as the lyrical 
poem seeks closure as a form of absorption. Nature cannot will the lyrical subject’s 
abnegation, but rather the mind of nature is repeated as an unwilled rejection. As Deleuze 
explains: 
ce pourquoi l’on dit que la Nature est concept aliéné ; esprit aliéné, opposé à soi-
même. A de tels concepts, répondent des objets qui sont eux-mêmes dénués de 
mémoire, c’est-à-dire qui ne possèdent et ne recueillent pas en soi leurs propres 
moments. On demande pourquoi la Nature répète : parce qu’elle est partes extra 
partes, mens momentanea. La nouveauté alors passe du côté de l’esprit que se 
représente . . .55  
 
[that is why it is said that Nature is an alienated mind or alienated concept, opposed to 
itself. Corresponding to such concepts are those objects which themselves lack 
memory — that is, which neither possess nor collect in themselves their own moments. 
The question is asked why Nature repeats: because it is partes extra partes, mens 
momentanea. Novelty then passes to the mind which represents itself…]56  
 
In Stevens’ poem, the novelty of the mind is aggrieved by the representation of itself as yet 
another form of monotonous absorption.  
                                                
55 Deleuze, Différence et Répétition, 24.  
 
56 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 14. 
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Novelty, therefore, belonging to the mind, emerges and breaks off from monotony, 
which is mere repetition without memory, the capacity for invention or critical distance. This 
is how Stevens’ speaker is presented, and why life’s repetitive meaninglessness summons the 
speaker’s grief, drawing the poem to a close. Christensen, on the other hand, writing in the 
post-war period, knows a different world: one in which annihilation is possible, a world in 
which all traces of human memory may be obliterated by human invention. As noted, Stevens 
composed “Anatomy of Monotony” during the interbellum years, before the epistemological 
break caused by the scientific discoveries that led to nuclear destruction, which announced 
itself with the tragedy of Hiroshima. Stevens’ depiction of the sky in “Anatomy of Monotony” 
was made before such a rupture was even fathomable, while Christensen’s post-nuclear lament 
conceives of human memory and achievement under a radically different sky, where 
meaninglessness is a possibility that looms beyond (not in) theoretical uniformity, beyond the 
invariable hum of monotony.  
Within these two skies, which differ radically, the figure of the sun supplies a further 
point of comparison, yet in neither case is the sun a neutral figure. In both poems, the sun 
corresponds to a truth/deception dichotomy, concepts have been alternately associated with 
nature or science in different epochs. In “Anatomy of Monotony,” the sun is deceptively 
warming. It promotes Eros and stimulates life with its “versatile motion, touch and sound,” but 
this versatility is rendered suspect by the singular bareness of the uninhabited sky. In contrast 
to the sun, Stevens’ bare sky with its repetitive, monotonous promise of nothingness 
figuratively represents the cynical fate of modernity, wherein the “goal of all life is death,” for 
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every biological organism is driven by Thanatos “to return to the inanimate state.”57 The 
formally non-teleological structure of Stevens’ poem, which culminates in peculiar end-
rhymes, carries out this intention via this non-lexical but importantly meaningful formal 
attribute. The poem’s investment in biological science is further represented in its title: the 
poem announces itself as a reflection on “anatomy,” and by allusion, as a symptomology of 
depression such as Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy. However, the post-war historical context 
of the poem’s composition and recall the conditions that compelled Freud to write Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. After the war, and grappling with the trauma induced by the war, Freud 
introduced the notion of the death drive, controversially, as a negative compulsion based on 
the biological inevitability of death, suggesting that such a compulsion was inescapable, 
irresistible and necessary. This biological explanation for wilful behaviour (which was 
problematic and would be revised later) originated at key historical moment, during the 
interbellum years, historically close in time to when Steven’s poem was written. “Anatomy of 
Monotony,” Stevens’s title, points to a conceit that is directed overall at the discovery and 
exposure of biological and universal truisms through the figure of the body and its 
monotonous reproduction.   
In Christensen’s poem, the sun is not named and is therefore less explicitly present 
than in Stevens’ poem; instead, it is implied metonymically by the words “sky” and “light.” 
The sun’s light depends on hydrogen “at the star’s core,” the first element of the periodic 
                                                
57  Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. 
James Strachey, vol. 18, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (London: Hogarth Press and the 
Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953), 38. 
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table, because the sun itself is a natural product of the combustion of the hydrogen molecule, a 
process that has its technological analog in the hydrogen bomb, to which the sun is compared 
metaphorically: “the light which has since then resembled the light of the hydrogen bomb.”58 
In Christensen’s poem, the sun thus irreparably figures as a harbinger of devastation. Although 
it might hide every self-contained potential for destruction in its apparently natural neutrality 
and innocence, its light now forever bears a terrible association with the unspeakable blaze of 
nuclear destruction. The sun comes to function as a continual admonition in the speaker’s 
vision of the natural world, a persistent reminder not of Eros and life but of the danger of war 
and annihilation.59  
 
                                                
58 Christensen, alphabet, 47, 25. 
 
59 While an article published by the American Ornithologists’ Union on “The Monotony Threshold in 
Singing Birds” by C. Hartshorne may not seem to offer any resonant insight into the conditions of 
contemporary art and poetry, it does immediately raise the question of cognition as it relates to 
memory, which serves in an analysis of the phenomenon of monotony. For one, the author stresses that 
“continuous” monotony is “intolerable,” where continuous monotony is more specifically defined as 
“many repetitions unrelieved by substantial pauses.” The notion of memory is at the center of this 
discussion because, according to the naturalist’s view, the effectiveness of stimuli depends on the 
experience of memory after a period of discontinuity or change. The notion of stimulus as a vector of 
change and versatility implies that the contrary is also a given: that any ongoing, unbreaking and 
unvarying repetition is “deadening.” This perspective, which draws a spectrum for monotony that 
claims death at its most extreme manifestation and implicitly aligns change with vitality, has been 
more or less maintained in the natural sciences and art as an ironically continuous and unchanging idea 
that extends across modernisms. It is one threshold that cannot be crossed (literally, the threshold of the 
mono, the one).  
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The Neutral Sun 
…change being most delightful after some prolongation of monotony, as light appears 
most brilliant after the eyes have been for some time closed. 
 — Ruskin  
 
The poetic deployment of such unsettling inversions as these, where the figuratively neutral or 
nourishing light of the sun is shown to promise deception on the one hand or devastation on 
the other, is based on a principle that also underlies a common device in surrealist works of the 
period. By depicting the impossible or disparate in such a way as to create unsettling harmony, 
one of surrealism’s tenets was to bring together shockingly incompatible images in order to 
reveal “previously neglected associations.”60  Consider, for example, how the sky functions in 
Empire des Lumières, a group of paintings produced in 1954 by René Magritte, one of which 
is included here. In this image, the sky is pale blue, bright as though illuminated by full 
daylight, while the earth is dark, shadowed, as though by night, illuminated only dimly by 
streetlights and soft electric fixtures glowing in the windows of townhouses lining the street: 
the monotony of ever-present light, of electricity. Does this image depict a simple quotidian 
phenomenon: that fleeting instant of dawn, the blue hour, when the sky holds the potential for 
light, before it illuminates the ground? Or is there something more sinister at work in these 
inversions and juxtapositions of night and day, darkness and light? What knowledge does the 
sky bear that is unknowable on earth? Is civilization impervious to the illumination of daylight 
                                                
60 André Breton, “From Manifesto of Surrealism 1924.” Poems for the Millennium, vol. 1. Trans. 
Richard M. Seaver and Helen R. Lane, 468. 
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or merely powerless in comparison to this vast natural source? Or has civilization turned its 
back on its natural resources? The quiet incongruity of Magritte’s image is unsettling, strained 
as it is between what is revealed and what is concealed where the unknowable pulses with the 
tension of poetic metaphor.   
  
 
Fig. 2. René Magritte, The Empire of Light II, 1950. Oil on Canvas, 31 x 39" (78.8 x 99.1 cm). 
Museum of Modern Art.  
 
 
(Some notes on the sky) 
 
Sky’s light: an expanse that can hold an infinite number of contradictions. Denuded of clouds, 
the sky boasts no outcomes and does not reveal itself any further than it is. It is no more than it 
is, cerulean, expressionless, exquisite. It is no more than it is, constant, close, blind. The sky is 
its existence; it begins to exist as a beginning without fixity, with nothing more to its depths, 
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which are infinite, than this measure of its own existence. It is an adamant “je ne sais quoi” 
that cannot be translated. An untranslatable phrase that writes itself into the cliché of common 
usage to evoke a shared idea of the unutterable or sacred. Its customs have no beginning, while 
its rituals are unfixed in a bygone style. Its existence is ceremonial and giddy with oxygen, 
resplendent with nuance and seamlessly nude.  
These contradictions of nudity and nuance in the seemingly smooth surface, 
contradictions of coldness and warmth, of meaning and pleasure, of vivacity in death and 
death in life and the attraction of the sky as a muscle that does not hesitate, a tenacity that does 
not give, a collection of amorphous desires, fears, phantasms or daydreams. Burning up in the 
sky with a monotonous indifference that cannot attend to the presence of the other or love.  
 The sky arrives at the end of poem as an end not to the poem per se but even more 
fatally as an end to ending’s rivalry, as the death of meaning’s rivalry. The poem does not end 
but in such a flatly perceived expanse of depthless eternity. This illusion of flatness contradicts 
itself as a form of closure that gapes and slackens. Monotony is such an illusion of flatness. 
Omnipresent, impermeable, the monotonous sky is where the poem has led us since its 
established beginnings.  
 
Monotony and the Sublime 
 
Monotony is characterized adversely as an anti-aesthetic principle in Eliot’s negative 
definition of poetry cited above (i.e., that poetry by definition avoids monotony). In this 
passage and definition, monotony is framed as a failure of the tension between “fixity and 
flux” that is the heart of poetry and the driving force of poetic rhythm. Monotony is the failure 
that poetry must avoid in order to stay alive as such, and announces itself as a slackening of 
 57 
aesthetic rhythm, a diminishment tantamount to a slackening of vitality and life force and 
therefore a rhythmic failure that amounts to the death of poetry, the collapse of which is 
caused by monotonous cessation. In these terms, monotony is not a force or drive in and of 
itself but rather a description of absence, of the lack of such a force as that which drives life 
and diversity. It is both the negation of the life force and its failure according to Eliot’s 
formulation.  
Similarly, Adorno characterizes monotony in terms of depreciation, as a lack of quality 
or depth that he finds to be characteristic of contemporary pop music and even of all recorded 
music in general. While both Eliot and Adorno thereby write off monotony as an undesirable 
characteristic of poetry or music, both also inadvertently acknowledge the increasing force, 
presence and pressure of monotony in the modern world. Indeed, while these early twentieth 
century writers understood monotony as a force to be avoided, repressed, constrained, even 
eliminated, the romantics before them conceived of monotony as useful to the economy of 
pleasure, although not pleasurable in and of itself.  
For the romantics who witnessed the birth of industrialization, monotony figured in an 
economy of sublime natural beauty and aesthetic pleasure, but this view was incompatible 
with and superseded by the phenomenon of miserable human monotony in emerging forms of 
industrial labour. Across this landscape of shifting values, monotony figured as an integral 
part of the economy, which involved exchanging values of repetition and change, first as a lull 
necessary for deferred aesthetic pleasure, but then as a force to be reckoned with, one that 
posed a threat to human invention, thought and art in general. This changing economy is 
clearly rendered visible in John Ruskin’s The Stones of Venice, specifically in a chapter on the 
“Nature of the Gothic.” Here, the concepts of “monotony” and “changefulness” are expressed 
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as two poles of Ruskin’s definition of aesthetic pleasure, where the pain of the monotonous 
experience enhances the future pleasure of the experience of change.  
The concept of changefulness is first introduced in Ruskin’s attempt to define Gothic 
architecture when Ruskin names six “characteristic or moral elements” ranging in importance 
from savageness to redundance, with “changefulness” (or “love of change”) occupying the 
position of second-most importance. Then, through his attempt to define Gothic architecture, 
Ruskin explores the concepts of changefulness and monotony at length (a discussion that is 
excised from the text in many later, abridged versions of The Stones of Venice, but which was 
printed at length in the three volume edition of 1851-3). Ruskin’s notion of changefulness, 
explored as a quintessential aspect of Gothic architecture, leads to his consideration of the 
absence of changefulness, which he calls monotony. In the process, Ruskin defines different 
types of monotony, and describes the various instrumental ways in which monotony is broken 
in nature and art.61  
To begin, Ruskin’s definition of Gothic architecture stems primarily from a dichotomy 
he identifies in the structures of labour relations that inform architectural construction. 
Specifically, he identifies three types of ornamentation styles in architecture that are based on 
the relationship of the builders to their work. Thus, these three styles, the “servile,” the 
“constitutional” and the “revolutionary,” are defined according to the relative degree of 
agency in each case of the “inferior” workman who executes the architect’s designs, with the 
                                                
61 John Ruskin, “The Sea-Stories,” volume 2 of The Stones of Venice (London: Smith, Elder and Co, 
1853).  
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revolutionary style showing the greatest freedom of the workman and the servile the least.62 
Ruskin remarks on the greater individuality (and thus decreased regularity) demonstrated in 
medieval architecture as compared to classical Greek or the British architecture of his period, 
for example. By contrast, he distinguishes Gothic architecture by its propensity for “perpetual 
change” in variations invented by medieval builders and the generative potential of each break 
with tradition seen in Gothic architecture.63 Ruskin suggests that the scope and number of 
these variations attests to the freedom of the worker in that era.  
Just as Ruskin associates “perpetual change” with freedom, he criticizes his 
contemporaries’ views on architecture, which esteem order, regularity and functionality over 
variation and novelty. He argues for a greater understanding of architecture as an art form, 
which he believes should be appreciated like literature for its complexity and capacity for 
innovation, a view that would allow for and valorize variation as opposed to absolute 
regularity, which Ruskin associates with monotony:  
 
Let us then understand at once, that change and variety is as much a necessity to the 
human heart and brain in buildings as in books; that there is no merit, though there is 
some occasional use in monotony; and that we must no more expect to derive either 
pleasure or profit from an architecture whose ornaments are of one pattern and whose 
pillars are of one proportion, then we should out of a universe in which the clouds were 
all of one shape, and the trees all of one size.64  
                                                
 
62 Ibid., 158.  
 
63 Ibid., 172.  
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Through his exploration of monotony, Ruskin’s masochism expresses itself keenly. Here 
monotony figures as a state of withheld pleasure, which makes the enjoyment of future 
variation all the greater by its deferment. This is the principal “occasional use” of monotony 
that Ruskin refers to in the above selection, and later more explicitly. When exposed to 
monotony in nature and music, the hearer or observer must “endure with patience” the 
“recurrence of the great masses of sound or form, and to seek for entertainment in a careful 
watchfulness of the minor details” or “bear patiently the infliction of the monotony for some 
moments, in order to feel the full refreshment of the change.” Ruskin claims that the pain 
endured becomes the “price paid for future pleasure” in a rhythmic economy of monotony and 
change.65   
Ruskin locates parallels to the aesthetic economy of monotony and change in nature. In 
nature as in art, monotony and change are inseparable, alternating elements, “change being 
most delightful after some prolongation of monotony, as light appears most brilliant after the 
eyes have been for some time closed.”66 Here, in Ruskin’s argument, darkness comes to 
occupy a position metaphorically comparable to monotony as the absence of light and 
variation, as an unbending, singular visual rhythm. However, Ruskin then admits to the 
sublimity of darkness, which elevates darkness, and thereby monotony, from a state of simple 
deprivation. To do so, Ruskin briefly turns to music to examine the “true relations of 
                                                
64 Ibid., 175.  
 
65 Ibid., 177.  
 
66 Ibid., 176.  
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monotony and change” where he identifies a primary “sublimity and majesty” in monotony. 
This discussion extends to all of nature and the attendant sublimity of the sea, where “majesty” 
emerges with monotony. Specifically, Ruskin argues that the musician must break with 
monotony after a certain time and notes two possible ways in which this is generally done, 
first by introducing small depth and harmonic variations into the monotonous rhythm, or 
alternatively, by introducing an entirely new passage. There are two analogies in nature for 
this process: a correlate to the first method of internal variation can be noted in the small 
pattern variations of the ocean’s waves. With respect to the second, where an entirely new 
passage is introduced to break the monotony, an analogy can be found in nature in the 
example of an unchanging field that is broken by uniquely by a large stone. Thus, with a 
certain degree of synesthesia across the fields of sight and sound, monotony comes to figure as 
a fundamental element in a rhythmic economy of aesthetic theory: an economy of pleasure 
that depends on an exchange and tension between change and monotony.  
 
The Black Sun: Monotony and Depression 
 
According to Ruskin, the artist’s genius is expressed through manifestations of variation rather 
than sheer repetition, through a capacity for invention and novelty rather than monotony. This 
potential for “perpetual novelty” as an aspect of genius develops digressively from his 
introductory discussion of medieval architecture with its manifold variations that place its 
ornamentation closer to the revolutionary and free than to the servile in his over-arching 
models for types of labour and production of ornament in architecture. The genius is therefore 
free of the need to defer to a master-authority.  
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 In contrast to the figure of the brooding melancholic, consider that of the toiling 
worker whose repetitive motions are monotonously executed, with neither beginning nor end 
in sight. At the beginning of the industrial era, this figure still might labour independently, as 
an artisan, with their hands, like Silas Marner: “The livelong day he sat in his loom, his ear 
filled with its monotony, his eyes bent close down on the slow growth of sameness in the 
brownish web, his muscles moving with such even repetition that their pause seemed almost 
as much a constraint as the holding of his breath.”67 With rise of industrialization, this toil 
increasingly takes place with machines, and on a large scale, in factories and mines. Such 
monotonous experience of toil is unrelenting, and if change looms on the horizon, it is only as 
a fading perception. Yet, while the melancholics might express themselves with monotony, 
their sense of stagnation is libidinal rather than purely material and based on necessity. 
Ruskin’s perceived economy of monotony and change in relation to the builder’s agency is 
based on a pre-industrial vision of work. The figure of the melancholic, however, remains a 
relatively unchanged transhistorical phenonmenon across these shifting economies.  
In the figure of melancholic genius, a potential economy of monotony and change 
takes shape in the field of desire, as a libidinal economy. Genius is traditionally associated 
with melancholy, which is depicted in classical and renaissance periods as burdensome 
(consider Durer’s Melancolia for example), as stagnation and immobility, or in the Middle 
Ages as acedia, in which the desired object figures as an unattainable lack, a negative 
possession, “reversing privation as possession” and arising with or as a result of a co-extensive 
                                                
67 George Eliot, Silas Marner (Dover Publications, 2012), 27. 
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inability to act.68 Afflicted by the “noonday demon,” in torpor and tortured, the melancholic 
struggles with their own wilfulness in the realization that their anticipated desire is one of loss.  
Despite such desperation and torpor, which has long associated with slothful 
melancholy, melancholy has been seen to go hand-in-hand with genius and invention since 
Aristotle first articulated the connection. If monotony surfaces, it is as the antithesis of human 
genius, exemplified first by nature and then by the machine as the mode of production proper 
to that which cannot think and that which the human genius abhors. In Book III of the 
Problemata, Aristotle famously asks, “Why is it that all men who have become outstanding in 
philosophy, statesmanship, poetry or the arts are melancholic and some to such an extent that 
they are infected by the diseases arising from black bile […]?”69 Since, a plethora of answers 
to Aristotle’s question have emerged, while different eras saw sufferers of melancholy or 
depression alternately condemned and glamorized. Andrew Solomon traces the history of 
melancholy and later depression in The Noonday Demon where he offers numerous examples 
of writers who suffered desperately from melancholy or depression (as characterized 
depending on the era in which they lived). Creation has long been accompanied by this state of 
melancholy that is the counterpoint of productivity, and which counts monotony as a 
symptom.  
That monotony is one tangible indication of depression is shown, for example, by Julia 
Kristeva who identifies the monotonous use of language as symptomatic of the negative 
                                                
68 Agamben, Stanzas, 7.  
 
69 Aristotle, Problems II: Books XXII-XXXVIII, Translated by W. S. Hett (Cambridge, Mass. & 
London: Harvard UP and William Heinemann, (1937) 1983), 155.  
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pathology of depression. In the following passage from Black Sun, Kristeva offers 
“monotonous” as a characteristic key feature of melancholic speech in particular: 
 
Rappelez-vous la parole du déprimé : répétitive et monotone. Dans l’impossibilité 
d’enchaîner, la phrase s’interrompt, s’épuise, s’arrête. Les syntagmes même ne 
parviennent pas à se formuler. Un rythme répétitif, une mélodie monotone, viennent 
dominer les séquences logiques brisées et les transformer en litanies récurrentes, 
obsédantes. Enfin, lorsque cette musicalité frugale s’épuise à son tour, ou simplement 
ne réussit pas à s’installer à force de silence, la mélancolique semble suspendre avec la 
profération toute idéation, sombrant dans le blanc de l’asymbolie ou dans le trop plein 
d’un chaos idéatoire inordonnable.70  
 
[Let us keep in mind the speech of the depressed — repetitive and monotonous. Faced 
with the impossibility of concatenating, they utter sentences that are interrupted, 
exhausted, come to a standstill. Even phrases they cannot formulate. A repetitive 
rhythm, a monotonous melody emerge and dominate the broken logical sequence, 
changing them into recurring, obsessive litanies. Finally, when that frugal musicality 
becomes exhausted in turn, or simply does not succeed in becoming established on 
account of the pressure of silence, the melancholy person appears to stop cognizing as 
well as uttering, sinking into the blankness of symbolia or the excess of an unorderable 
cognitive chaos.]71  
 
While depression is a modern pathology, melancholy is a concept that extends across multiple 
historical periods and has its contemporary analog in studies of depression, and thus Kristeva’s 
                                                
70 Julia Kristeva, Soleil Noir : Dépression et mélancolie (Paris : Gallimard, 1987), 45. 
 
71 Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, Translated by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1989), 33. 
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reference to the “melancholy person” where melancholy comes to function as a synonym for 
depression. This depressive communicates their state of mind as much by the form of their 
speech as by its content; Kristeva emphasizes the melody and rhythm of speech as significant 
above and beyond the semantic function of language itself, where the formal aspect of 
language, its rhythm and melody, is as meaningful as its content, whether that is repetitious or 
not. Kristeva’s observations affirm the equally meaningful importance of non-verbal aspects 
of speech such as rhythm and gesture within the clinical setting. Further, that the monotonous 
musicality is cast as “frugal” notably locates the functions of rhythm and repetition in an 
cautious economy of expression —  one that, in the case of the melancholic, avoids any excess 
or extravagance, by extension. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud postulates that 
repetitious speech functions economically as an expressive compulsion toward death and 
displeasure because it repeats tension, which tension is associated with displeasure in Freud’s 
thought, and therefore the compulsion to repeat is a function of the death drive. Kristeva’s 
introduction of the notion of “monotonous” rhythm as an intrinsic aspect of depressive speech 
expands the possibility for an understanding of this economy in relation to poetics.  
 Following T. S. Eliot and Giorgio Agamben, I previously noted that poetry is seen to 
live in a tension between “sound and sense” or “fixity and flux.” By extension, monotony, 
which is the failure of this tension, must announce the death or the “end” of the poem as we 
know it. Further, following Freud and Kristeva, it becomes possible to conceive that 
underlying the semantic complexity of any poem is an essential rhythmic tension that is a 
product of the death drive and against which an intrinsically lyrical erotic force, in the form of 
the address to the beloved for example, intensifies and is the life of poetry. The vitality of 
poetry can therefore be severed only by an intensification of tension to the point where it 
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breaks like a wave against a rock and slackens irreparably in the abandonment of all rhythm, 
even of monotony. Then the language that remains is a residue-stained surface, mundane, 
quiet and simple, concealing the poem’s pointed death in dullness and disillusion.  
While the aim of the pleasure principle in Freud’s thought is the release of tension in 
search of pleasure, and therefore quite linear as an aim, poetic tension is, on the surface, less 
direct and linear in its function. In part, this is because the existence of tension is essential to 
the poem’s vitality and therefore also an important feature of aesthetic pleasure. Therefore 
poetic tension is not a currency that can be cashed in at each juncture, because it is a friction 
created by multiple oppositions, and it produces a multitude of frictions, of harmonies and 
cacophonies of frictions.  
 
Monotony and the Neutral 
 
The monotonous by reason of its repetitious nature and by its sameness, and more so, by its 
oneness, evades origins. Monotony has neither beginning nor end; it is an ongoing regularity 
without cessation. Yet its duration is remarkable like glass that withstands all the random force 
of weather against it. The monotonous continues in time despite and even against its own 
fragility. Its tedious hard rule comes to form a husk of sounding around the future and the past, 
encasing temporality in sameness or oneness that denies lateral distinctions and difference. 
The monotonous knows no sides but only its singular uniformity, which may lapse into series 
of slackness or drown with one terrible wave of sameness, never ceasing, never subsiding to 
leave a visible froth of knowledge in its path. No fluidity lasts as long as this unchanging one, 
none is as unacceptable, and nothing else is as rejected by vitality without being actually 
turned toward death.   
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 The future appears as a semicolon in the sentence of the past, but monotony never 
pauses, never hesitates, never stops. It desires neither a before nor afterward, and it knows no 
grammatical tense. Its subject too is reduced to a matter of permanence in flux. Roses dry in a 
vase on the windowsill, petals crumbling, curtains drawn. Unlike melancholy, which is 
steeped in judgment, monotony is neutral continuation, but while its neutrality seems innocent 
like the neutral duration of sunlight or moonlight and diurnal closure, monotony is without 
beginning and end. Its body does not succumb in time as the ageing organism. It is a sounding 
that revolts against mortality and yet simultaneously rejects vitality because to accept life 
would mean to acknowledge death. Monotony acknowledges nothing in time and that is its 
power and that is the principle that renders it unpleasant, even dangerous. It lacks moderation 
and variation, and its lack of variation is an immoderate extension in time.    
 To designate monotony as a form of neutrality implies, first of all, that it assumes an 
impartial form. Monotony, which knows no sides, is predisposed to absolute neutrality. 
Moreover, the monotonous structure does not confer a context that would be a part of 
judgment and therefore it is apart from judgment in its neutrality. Monotony knows no sides 
and so it approximates indifference both in form and judgment. Neutral, detached, indifferent 
and uninvolved, the monotonous form emerges without the fury of futurity just as it remains 
apart from literary history and styles of former legitimacy. As such it is exquisitely and 
resolutely present.    
 The notion of melancholy assumes positions of hesitation, doubt and procrastination, 
but monotony does not hesitate; it is pure certainty and unwavering continuance. 
Melancholy’s doubts are plural and arise from its capacity to assume many positions at once 
and thus the overwhelmed state in which melancholics find themselves immobilized in 
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indecisiveness and inaction, undone by a capacity for complexity and an accompanying 
anxiety about the future. But monotony is singularly simple and without doubt or grief. This is 
because it is apart from judgment and because it anticipates no ending. This is its potential 
violence. Its inevitable duration is its ceremony of certainty, but know that it is deadly certain, 
with a sureness that supersedes the notion of expectation. In monotony, there is no doubt and 
no alternative, there is no stopping, there is no judgment, and this is its absolute danger.  
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Chapter Two 
Playing the Index: The Structure of Neutrality 
 
  
Le hasard. Dans quel ordre mettre les figures, puisqu’il faut que le sens ne prenne pas? 
[…] Donc procédure arbitraire de consécution. L’année dernière, l’alphabet. Cette 
année, renforcement de l’aléatoire : Intitulé ! Ordre alphabétique ! Numérotation 
[…] Je voudrais faire remarquer que mes efforts répétés pour employer et justifier une 
exposition aléatoire (en rupture avec la forme « dissertation ») n’ont jamais eu aucun 
écho. On admet de commenter, de discuter l’idée de fragment, on admet une théorie du 
fragment, on m’interviewe là-dessus — mais on ne se rend pas compte quel problème 
c’est de décider dans quel ordre on les mettra. Or le vrai problème du fragment est là 
[…] Pour moi, balbutiement : hasard « électronique » = solution.  
— Roland Barthes, Le Neutre 
 
The letter is autonomous but only prior to signification.  
— Erin Moure, My Beloved Wager 
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Introduction 
If the regularity of any system is constant and unbending, then monotony may be said to 
represent the application of any system with constant regularity. This explains how monotony 
can be constant and repetitious at once. It is a continuous application of a repetitious system or 
a repetitious application of a continuous system. Monotony as a form of regularity operates 
according to rules that render it totally predictable, unlike the constraints of stylistic 
convention.  
The rule is a norm that is law and that is orderly, whereas the convention is traditional, 
ceremonious and grounded in conformity. For example, we might say that a content-focused 
lyric poetry (i.e., what became of free verse in the twentieth century) is conformist because it 
adopts as its informal model a longstanding canonical apparatus of style. Opposed to this, the 
notion of a post-lyrical or content-less poetics of appropriation and transcription is often 
claimed in contemporary poetry. However, in this chapter, I argue for a third approach in 
contemporary poetics, one that represents a glissement or a slippage from the dilemma posed 
by the overwhelming opposition of content to form. In this chapter, I argue for a poetics that 
appropriates the structure of a paratextual or threshold element: the alphabetical index. This 
work may be called threshold poetics: not without content, on the threshold of form.  
On the one hand, this work differs structurally from most lyric poetry and as such is 
hardly recognizable as lyric poetry according to conventions of form. It draws upon poetry’s 
lyric legacy even as it is informed by a regular, apparently neutral system commonly deployed 
in information science: the alphabetical index. This form of non-intentional or aleatory poetics 
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abides by the rules of an alphabetic ordering system as it resists conforming to generic 
conventions and to the notion of genre itself.72 
 In the literary works discussed in this chapter, the overarching structural system 
deployed in the process of poiesis is, as noted, that of alphabetic order, a system traditionally 
deployed to arrange information, for example in book indexes. According to this structure, the 
primary letter-principle governing the sequential order of fragments functions autonomously 
from the signification of the content. The letter is of language, but in this usage it is also the 
outside of a language, literally exceeding this language as it emerges on the threshold of the 
paratextual to form a random order. 
Just as Inger Christensen’s long serial poem alphabet, discussed in the previous 
chapter, is organized according to alphabetical order, the following works use this basic 
system as formal, acrostic scaffolding. First, Louis Zukofsky’s life-long work “A” (1928-
1974) is supplemented by an index comprised of unusual terms (including parts of speech such 
as indefinite articles and conjunctions). Second, Alan Halsey’s “An Index to Shelley’s Death” 
appears at the end of his book-length work The Text of Shelley’s Death (published 2001), an 
index that is composed not of keywords but of lineated poetic fragments the writer gathered in 
the process of researching the work. Third, Lisa Robertson’s Cinema of the Present, published 
                                                
72 It is important to specify that the term aleatory as it is used here, may recall the deterministic and 
chance procedures that that were deployed by writers such as Jackson MacLow or John Cage 
(especially Cage’s mesostics), or even Mallarmé, yet it operates somewhat differently in the texts 
discussed below. In the following discussion, the aleatory does not impart a compositional principle 
per se, but supplies a secondary, framing device, an operation that imposes a randomizing order on a 
chaos of fragments, as in Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project for example, which exemplifies the 
problem of a series of fragments that are brought together as adjacent entries in a catalogue.  
 72 
in 2014, is a book-length poetic work with a double structure: lines of poetry are arranged in 
alternating alphabetic order and random sequence as every line (or almost every line, to be 
precise) appears twice in the work, once in alphabetic sequence and once randomly. Finally, 
Carolyn Bergvall’s Via (published in 2003) is a poetic work that, like an archive, is comprised 
entirely of found material: extant texts that are then systemically ordered. At stake in these 
literary experiments is a reformulation of the extent of the author’s role in constructing 
meaning, for the alphabetic order supplies a simple technological and arguably neutral form, a 
device for “ordering the fragments” that is universally used in Western alphabetic cultures and 
that imparts a structure that is uninformed by individual authorial intention.   
 We have noted that the alphabetic order randomly organizes things because it is a 
neutral device, yet is the given order it imposes on the uncompromising randomness of chaos 
in fact neutral? Is any imperative to order neutral? Alphabetizing textual fragments means to 
respond in some part to the demand for rational order, even while rejecting narrative 
exigencies of temporal progression, stable location or the concerns of a subject that is 
instituted across time and space. In the texts I discuss in this chapter, the subject is decentered 
in the work of re-assembling fragments. As Barthes suggests, the randomness of alphabetical 
order dismantles a text’s originary intentions:  
 
Il se souvient à peu près de l’ordre dans lequel il a écrit ces fragments ; mais d’où 
venait cet ordre ? Au fur et à mesure de quel classement, de quelle suite ? Il ne s’en 
souvient plus. L’ordre alphabétique efface tout, refoule toute origine. Peut-être, par 
endroits, certains fragments ont l’air de se suivre par affinité ; mais l’important, c’est 
que ces petits réseaux ne soient pas raccordés, c’est qu’ils ne glissent pas à un seul et 
grand réseau qui serait la structure du livre, son sens. C’est pour arrêter, dévier, diviser 
cette descente du discours vers un destin du sujet, qu’à certains moments l’alphabet 
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vous rappelle à l’ordre (du désordre) et vous dit : Coupez ! Reprenez l’histoire d’une 
autre manière (mais aussi, parfois, pour la même raison, il faut casser l’alphabet).73 
[He more or less remembers the order in which he wrote these fragments; but where 
did that order come from? In the course of what classification, of what succession? He 
no longer remembers. The alphabetical order erases everything, banishes every origin. 
Perhaps in places, certain fragments seem to follow one another by some affinity; but 
the important thing is that these little networks not be connected, that they not slide 
into a single enormous network which would be the structure of the book, its meaning. 
It is in order to halt, to deflect, to divide this descent of discourse toward a destiny of 
the subject, that at certain moments the alphabet calls you to order (to disorder) and 
says: Cut! Resume the story in another way (but also, sometimes for the same reason, 
you must break up the alphabet).]74 
 
 
Barthes suggests that alphabetical order “erases every origin” as it frees the subject to continue 
in a state of flux and contiguous formation that is always commencing. It is a form that does 
not trap the text in a surplus of signification but, quite the contrary, releases poetic 
signification from the bonds of representation as convention and releases the poem from the 
conventions of verse. It also offers another way of considering the poem formally, as a 
collection of fragments, such as Barthes’, instead of a unified vision of an instance in time, as 
the notion of the free-verse lyric has defined the poem.75 The random ordering of the text 
                                                
73 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes (Éditions du Seuil, 1975), 178.  
 
74 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard (New York : Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1977), 148.  
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supplies an element of levity and allows fresh air into the text, air that seeps between the 
fragments simultaneously and that fills the lungs of the reader as a freedom that arises in the 
act of reading. For the alphabetical order is as basic as air, as invisible and as innocent, and it 
belongs to no one. Formatively, it is a randomizing system and therefore one which can be 
seen on the one hand to impose a searchable order on a mass of chaos, or on the other hand, it 
can be seen to free the text from the conventions of reason, of origin, of temporal progression, 
of linearity, teleology and closure.  
However, while it may be innovative to structure a long or serial literary work 
according to the random and arguably neutral scaffolding of alphabetic order, the alphabet 
itself is hardly a new technology. It persists as the most essential technology for writing in the 
West as we know it, in function basically unchanging even while the modes of textual input 
and circulation have changed over millennia. The concept of using alphabetical order for the 
organization and retrieval of knowledge did not appear until the Middle Ages, when the idea 
of the book index was introduced to help readers locate information in texts systemically. The 
alphabetical index emerged as a new technology in an era when knowledge was still 
                                                
75 Marjorie Perloff identifies the six key characteristics of lyric poetry, which can be summarized as 
follows: 1) free verse uses variable sound patterns to describe a feeling subject’s relationship (that of 
the ‘I’) to some incomprehensible aspect of the world that needs to be resolved; 2) free verse is 
organized according to the power of the image, following both the Symbolist tradition in Francophone 
poetry and the Imagist tradition in Anglophone poetry; 3) although free verse is speech-based, its 
syntax is regular and the subject speaks in sentences; 4) it flows in a linear fashion toward closure; 5) 
free verse enacts a continuity of rhythm that depends on unobtrusive sound structures, and guarantees a 
linear reading toward the closure mentioned in 4; and 6) free verse is remarkable for its lack of 
distinguishing visual characteristics (unobtrusive textual layout – following the traditions of verse). 
Marjorie Perloff, “After Free Verse: The New NonLinear Poetries,” 94-96. 
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memorized by scholars (e.g., in the memory palaces discussed at length in Frances Yates’ The 
Art of Memory), and when techniques of memorization were taught. In the human memory, 
however, knowledge was supposed to be kept in rational rather than random order. Thus, the 
emergence of textual supplements to reading that were arranged alphabetically accompanied a 
conceptual leap from rational to random order, while former imaginative mnemonic 
techniques were rendered redundant. Ivan Illich, in his commentary on Hugh’s Didascalicon, 
indicates that the introduction of alphabetical order constituted a major innovation:   
 
The use of signs for both consonants (which are obstacles to breath) and for vowels 
(which indicate the color given to the column of air that is “spirited” out of the lungs) 
constitutes a technique of immense social significance… But few scholars have yet 
realized that the arrangement of names or subjects in the order of these letters is a 
comparable technical breakthrough, something done in the course of a generation. In 
analogy to the watershed which divides pre-alphabetic Greek oral culture from Greek 
culture under the aegis of letters and science, so it seems reasonable to speak of the 
pre- and post-index Middle Ages.76  
 
In Authentic Witness: Approaches to Medieval Texts and Manuscripts, Mary and Richard 
Rouse detail the gradual introduction of alphabetically ordered textual “supplements” starting 
in the late twelfth century and note a general resistance to this new order arising from a 
contemporary preference for ‘logical’ or ‘rational’ order, which continued to dominate 
scholarship into the thirteenth century. The learned reader was expected to discern rational 
relationships between the parts of the universe, which was imagined to form a harmonious 
                                                
76 Ivan Illich, In the Vineyard of the Text: A Commentary to Hugh’s Didascalion (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1993), 103. 
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whole until the introduction of alphabetical order.77 For this reason, the Rouses’ claim that 
“the adoption of the alphabet to order ideas, by a handful of men in the late twelfth century, 
implies on their part a major change in attitude toward the written word.” 78 During the Middle 
Ages, the use of the alphabetical index would come to imply that “each user of a work will 
bring to it his own preconceived rational order, which may differ from those of other users and 
from that of the writer himself.” 79  
 That a particular rational order could be the entitlement of each reader attested to a 
burgeoning access to literature and information such that readers would in theory be free to 
develop their own understanding of the harmonious universe as a result. The index, while 
remaining relegated to the status of paratext as a threshold reading element, guides the reader 
                                                
77 Even though alphabetical order implied a random and neutral ordering system that was universally 
available, it was not applied in strictly precise fashion — at least, alphabetization did not generally 
extend beyond the first syllable of the word — as Frances Witty shows in her work on late medieval 
manuscripts.  
 
78 Mary A. and Richard H Rouse, Authentic Witness: Approaches to Medieval Manuscripts and Texts 
(Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 202. 
 
79 Ibid., 204. While the alphabetical index was introduced in the Middle Ages, it pre-dated printing by a 
few hundred years, meaning that book indexes were, like the manuscript text they referred to, 
composed by hand. The precise, standardized index that would eventually be incorporated as part of 
the book itself was not in existence until after the printing press was invented. A further complication 
of this system could also be seen in the existence of two types of indexes: the ready-made index which 
was available for classics, and the individual reader’s or owner-produced index which would be made 
by a book’s owner in the case of contemporary works. (Ibid., 231, 255) 
 77 
in the reading process. It is illustrated in marginalia as a finger: a manicule, pointing finger, 
index finger, digit, informer, sign, maker of the known.80  
 
Louis Zukofsky’s “Index of Names and Objects” 
Given the technical status of the alphabetical index as a reference tool for information 
retrieval, and the fact that to all literary intents and purposes of exegesis it remains mostly 
marginal as a mere textual supplement or paratext, its emergent appearance as a literary genre 
in works of poetry is particularly curious. One such modern example is the index that appears 
at the end of Louis Zukofsky’s long poem “A,” a life-long work and serial poem, the first half 
of which was published in 1940, and subsequent parts then published in serial increments until 
the complete text of the long poem appeared in 1978. Several poetic concerns seem to be at 
work shaping the index found at the end of “A,” with its unusually broad range of subjects, 
from the proper names and ideas that are common to indexes, to common nouns that name 
parts of the body or quotidian things, to the inclusion even of simple grammatical articles, 
such as “a” itself. Notably, in “How to End a Life’s Work: Louis Zukofsky’s Indexes,” 
Abigail Lang points out that, in his early writings on objectivism, he had celebrated the notion 
of “the entirety of the single word, which is in itself a relation, an implied metaphor, an 
                                                
80 From the Oxford English Dictionary, s.v.. “index”: Origin ME from L. index, indic- ‘forefinger, 
informer, sign’ from in- ‘towards’ + a second element rel. to dicere ‘say’ or dicare ‘make known’; 
indicium – Latin “informer, sign.” 
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arrangement and a harmony.”81 Lang suggests that the index functions doubly in Zukofky’s 
work, as a list poem unto itself, wherein each word is cast as a stronghold of its own harmony, 
but also as an index: a reference tool that leads the reader back into the text of “A” in 
infinitely various ways. Thus, Lang suggests, Zukofsky’s index “rounds off” the text by 
inviting the reader back in. Like a swinging door, the index acts as an antidote to the problem 
of the “end of the poem,” that is, the poem’s inevitable failure in the act of ending, such as is 
proposed by Agamben, which I discuss in Chapter One. Doubling as a poem and paratextual 
device pointing into another work, the poet’s index to “A” invites the reader to hesitate on the 
threshold of the book, potentially to turn back the page and re-enter the poem. Zukofsky’s 
index creates a slippery continuity between the notion of the text and paratext by complicating 
the boundaries between them, blurring the distinction between their intended usage. In the 
following excerpt, proper names such as Amsterdam and Alexander are poetically mixed in 
with common nouns such as ‘air’ or ‘action’ or indefinite articles such as ‘a’ and ‘an’: 
                                                
81 Abigail Lang, “How to End a Life’s Work: Louis Zukofsky’s Indexes,” SPELL: Swiss Papers in 
English Language and Literature 18 (2006): 131.  
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Fig. 2. Louis Zukofsky, “Index of Names and Objects.” From “A.” New York: New 
Directions, 2011.   
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If Zukofsky’s idea of objectivism emphasizes the word as its own complete context and thus a 
beginning and ending unto itself, it does so as an embrace of the reader’s attentiveness and 
freedom, in turn, to choose to enter and re-enter the poem alternatively and according to their 
inclination, guided by the page numbers given in the index. In Zukofsky’s “A” the concluding 
index does not so much end the poem as provide another possibility in lieu of ending, a 
terminal supplement that introduces another set of conceptual affinities and, while adhering to 
the poem that has gone before, remains compacted and different in its form that glows with the 
aura of each word in its complete harmony. The “Index of Names and Objects” is not 
instrumental to research, unlike an ordinary index; it does not a supply a short cut, as it does 
not lead anywhere definitive or purposeful. It intends no end, like the poem that resists ending 
and closure. Zukofsky parodies the paratextual index, and defamiliarizes it for the reader in the 
processs, disrupting its ordinary function and instrumentality.  
 
Alan Halsey’s “Index to Shelley’s Death” 
 
If Zukofsky’s index redresses the notion of closure and acts as a new departure for the reader 
in a process of reassessing the end of the poem, it finds an analog in a late twentieth-century 
literary work that ends with a poetic index (or more precisely, with a poem called an “Index”), 
The Text of Shelley’s Death by Alan Halsey. In this case, because the general theme of 
Halsey’s work is the mythic nature of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s death in a boat accident and 
multiple conflicting accounts thereof, the problem of poetic ending and closure in relation to 
the subject is doubly invested with significance. In Halsey’s rendering of the conflicting 
stories of Shelley’s death, which remains mostly shrouded in mystery, we quickly perceive 
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that there are no definitive facts to be related, but only copious versions of contradictory 
information to be transmitted, variations on the truth that blur the boundary between the 
literary and documentary with such persistence that “the reader … comes, with reason, to 
suspect a double meaning in every line.”82 However, as we shall see, the “Index” at the end of 
this book, while occupying the position typical of an index as that which comes after (both in 
terms of the time of composition and the material space of the book), in fact constitutes yet 
another poem that bears few of the typical features of an index. Further, while its structure is 
systemic and therefore as predictable as an alphabetic list, there is nothing repetitive or 
monotonous about Halsey’s index, which arranges lines of Shelley’s verse and other notes. 
Halsey’s index is an alphabetic list poem, compiled from the residue of his research — for 
example, unincorporated lines from Shelley’s verse and other notes — or in other words, 
unused lines and research that remained after Halsey had completed the first two parts of the 
book, the first of which is a long prose poem and the second, a short expository essay. These 
residual fragments are the tonally rich debris of an archive, and as such, are lyrically useless. 
Thus, the index provides for a melancholy containment: although the index formally belongs 
to the category of informational, technical device, Halsey’s is definitively lyrical, the 
inconclusive, haunting persistence of the mystery of Shelley’s death emerging between broken 
lines of verse and text. With its line breaks, the index might seem more recognizable as a 
poem than the long prose work to which it is attached, which ironically claims to relate the 
“events of [Shelley’s] life” in “language energetic and simple (var. monotonous, emphatic),” a 
                                                
82 Alan Halsey, The Text of Shelley’s Death (Sheffield: West House Books, 2001), 71.  
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doubling of voice through variations that calls any sincerity into question.83 Since every story 
relating Shelley’s death is categorically inventive and allusively literary, any clear border that 
might exist between literary imagination and documentary fact is confounded by references 
that point across the line.  
The Text of Shelley’s Death never purports to offer a definitive text or history as such. 
A collection of versions of the story of Shelley’s death, it claims no greater legitimacy for one 
over the other, allowing the differing testimony of multiple voices to co-mingle with their 
inconsistencies and contradictions while the author remains neutral, without weighing the 
veracity of the tales recounted. The irony of the first line, “Everybody knows the text of 
Shelley’s death,” is precisely that there is no such text and therefore there is nothing definitive 
to be known. It is not that “no one knows” but rather that everyone knows there is nothing to 
know, in fact.  
Halsey uses the form of the variorium to allow these multiple versions to surface. As 
noted, the work is organized in three main parts: the first part is a poetic collage of multiple 
versions or “tellings” of the tragedy and “an embodiment of contradiction”; the second part is 
an expository account of the various tellings that have informed the author’s research; and the 
third part, appearing in the customary place of a book appendix is the aforementioned “Index 
to Shelley’s Death.”84 Poets Lisa Robertson and Matthew Staedler note in their gloss on 
Halsey’s text that it takes the form of the variorum in order to:  
                                                
83 Ibid.,14 
 
84 Ibid., 61. 
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track the proliferating differences in the many accounts of the Shelley story, including 
Trelawney’s, the Tuscan authorities, Mary Shelley’s, the spy Torelli’s, Byron’s, all of 
the individuals in the Shelley circle and a whole lineage of later embellishers. 
Although this is death, no final story will be possible. Repeating, doubling, self-
contradicting, it starts off in multiple directions, returning repeatedly and hypnotically 
to the altered and shimmering motif: a boat, a storm, three corpses. This is the project’s 
closing index; it sets the tale loose like a burning ghostship.85  
  
The metaphor of the ghost-ship is doubly apt, first as the disappearing boat in which Shelley’s 
fatal accident occurred, but ironically as a vessel that resists total closure. The index points to 
the endurance of the boat, an interminable continuance. The “index” to Halsey’s poem is the 
part of the book that is most “poetic” in form and tone; Jeffrey Robinson notes, the “topicality 
that one usually associates with an index becomes all signifier and movement. There are no 
pages numbers, nothing to look up; thus the language here is not referential… It reads like an 
open-form or aleatory version of a Shelley poem [….]”86 There is nothing repetitious or 
monotonous about the deployment of the alphabetical “index” form in The Text of Shelley’s 
Death. Poetically, it accretes a copious trove of nouns that complement each other to create a 
romantic catalogue of sea imagery, of the landscape into which Shelley disappeared. The 
“index” begins of course with the letter ‘a’: 
                                                
85 Lisa Robertson and Matthew Staedler, eds. Revolution: A Reader (France: Paraguay Press, 2012), 
1085.  
 
86 Jeffery Robinson, “Influence of Shelley,” in Active Romanticism: The Radical Impulse in 
Nineteenth Century and Contemporary Poetic Practice. eds. Julie Carr and Jeffery Robinson, 
(Tuscaloosa : University of Alabama Press, 2015), 194.  
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A being within our being 
A boat 
A boat of rare device 
A boat with swift sails winging 
A dome of many-coloured glass 
Airborn shapes 
A lead-coloured fog 
Along the dark and ruffled waters 
A magic ship, whose charmèd sails should fly 
A meteor of light 
Amid the topmost spray, and sunbows wild, wreathed in the silver mist 
Among the closing waves out of the boundless air 
An isle of lovely grief […]87 
  
The writer Shelley’s literal body disappears into the sea and mist, disfigured over the course of  
many days before washing up on shore (the exact number days differs according to who is 
telling the story), after which Shelley’s dead body will be recognized as that of a reader. 
According to several versions of the story, Shelley’s disfigured body is identifiable only 
because of the books found in his pocket and clenched in his hand. Halsey notes a very curious 
and fabulous idiosyncracy in stories regarding the book(s) (the number of books and titles 
vary) that were found on Shelley’s water-ravaged corpse, still in his possession: according to 
one account, Shelley’s index finger was still pressed inside the book marking the page he was 
                                                
87 Halsey, The Text of Shelley’s Death, 73.  
 85 
reading at the time the fatal tragedy struck. This incredible “detail was nevertheless entered 
into the Bodleian catalogue.”88 Among the various tales and tellers is this narrative:  
 
There was a volume of Keats in his breast pocket, but the volume of Aeschylus was in 
his hand, and with the finger clasped in its pages. The volume still opens at the page 
where Shelley had been reading when the storm arose, and the print of his finger is still 
to be perceived on the page. The book was in his hand when the body was found 
[.…]89  
 
Here, the indexical manicule does not take the form of a mere reader’s mark or guide 
impressed upon the margins of the page. Rather, this index appears in the outrageous form of 
the dead reader’s actual finger, as flesh and bone morbidly clinging to the page. But what does 
this signify? Does it point us back into the text like the index at the end of Zukofsky’s “A”? 
Does this pointing finger help unlock the secrets of Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound by 
directing us into Aeschylus’ work? The reader suspects there is a double significance and 
deeply symbolic nature to every part of the tale, as Halsey suggests. The reader remains 
suspicious of the tale. Yet, regardless of the hermeneutical reference implied by the title of the 
book in the poet’s hand at the time of his death, it is notable that Shelley’s relationship to 
reading is described in Halsey’s work as so devoted as to verge on the state of possession: “a 
trance” it was difficult to waken him from.90 As a reader, Shelley is described as one utterly 
                                                
88 Ibid., 41. 
 
89 Ibid., 50 
 
90 Ibid., 35 
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possessed and thus without any of the ironic distance and suspicion that underscores our 
reading of the tale. The Dionysian state of possession that takes hold of the poet in the act of 
reading, and the material reference to his indexical finger immersed in the book, allude to the 
embodiment of reading and remind us that reading is an embodied, physical, material act.   
 Just as there is no one “text” for Shelley’s death, there is no one text in any event, only 
the unique material of a given book and every reader’s individual and embodied interaction 
with it. Both the book that is found clenched in the hand of Shelley’s corpse and Halsey’s 
work of multiple narratives suggest that there is neither an overarching narrative or text but 
only the unique material of the book and every reader’s unique experience of that material. 
Halsey, an antiquarian bookseller, writes into a material tradition of human variation and 
human flaw, of book indexes and ghost ships, of the remnant and the fragment, of archival 
residue that is neither factual nor fictional, but that points to an enduring human uncertainty.  
 
Pascal Poyet’s “Present an Index” and Lisa Robertson’s Cinema of the 
Present 
 
Halsey’s Index to Shelley’s Death has no page numbers so it does not direct the reader back 
into the poem in the manner that, for example, the index after Zukofsky’s “A” has the 
potential to do. Although this text is called an index, is arranged alphabetically and appears at 
the end of Halsey’s work as a sort of supplement that pushes against closure, any resemblance 
to the conventional reference tool ends there. Similarly, at the end of Lisa Robertson’s poetic 
work Cinema of the Present there appears a two-page poem (or is it an index?) called 
“Present: An Index.” Of particular interest in this case is that this “index” has an author: 
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Pascal Poyet.91 Certainly, an index is one of those paratextual elements that is not generally 
authored, at least insofar as the authorship of an index is not commonly rendered visible, and 
as such is considered subjectively neutral, yet the compilation of any index does entail a 
subjective selection of terms, as Zukofsky’s index shows, and a decision either to correspond 
to the norms of discourse or to conform to a text’s unique parameters or to another artistic 
order. Commonly, what we consider to be the “index” is thus often presented as a neutral 
objective phenomenon. In this case, the index in question is authored by a translator, a further 
complication with regard to ascribed notions of neutrality and transparency (or invisibility to 
use Lawrence Venuti’s term), an interesting admission. Pascal Poyet’s “index” is in fact a 
document of the translation process in which he was engaged with Cinema of the Present.92 
His index is comprised of translation residue that doubles as a supplement to the English-
language work. Generally, the figure of the translator is only slightly more visible than that of 
the indexer, existing mostly unnoticed in the shadow of the author, as a sort of ghostly guide 
for the reader, but that is seen to point to an original rather than to itself.  
 Poyet’s index is arranged alphabetically, but it contains no page numbers and does not 
direct the reader back into the text. In fact, it is not immediately clear what relationship, if any, 
exists between Robertson’s work and Poyet’s index (perhaps Poyet’s index is a translator’s 
                                                
91 At the end of Lisa Robertson’s Occasional Work and Seven Walks from the Office for Soft 
Architecture, there is an “Index” by Stacey Doris, which is lyrical and whimsical in its composition 
(including a list of terms such as: “scumble, sincerity’s eroticism, sleaze, snowy cordillera, socket, 
solitude in chaos, spindly blooming tree,” etc.) and which also begins with a Lucretian swerve, with 
two terms out of (alphabetical) order.  
 
92 Poyet’s translation was published as Cinéma du Présent by Théâtre Typographique in 2015.  
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lexicon of key concepts in Robertson’s work?). “Present: An Index” is composed of 
alphabetized clusters of key words, each of which consists uniformly of three words, end-
stopped with a period:  
 
Again, again, again. 
Absolutely, totally, love. 
Annotation, authority, apricot. 
Anonymous, sense, unfounding. 
Arrive, argument, aroma. 
Became, becomes, bodies. 
Body, hotel, surfaces. 
Burning, insult, speculative…93  
   
 For the most part, these three-word clusters do not originate as such in Robertson’s 
text, but emerge, rather, as a response to that text’s conceptual framework and structure. 
Structurally, the lines in Robertson’s work are not traditional poetic lines with enjambment but 
rather spatially separated prose sentences that are end-stopped by a period. Further, Poyet’s 
index structurally reflects a base-line constructional scaffolding in Robertson’s work that 
relies on alphabetization. In this way, Poyet’s index points to both the elements of stopping 
and systemic alphabetization in Robertson’s work, a performance that demonstrates an 
analytical reading of the text. Additionally, Poyet notes that the choice to group the words by 
three is also informed by the syntactical structures of Robertson’s sentences. Each of Poyet’s 
clusters of three words appears as a constellation, a unit that suggests internal resonance, the 
                                                
93 Pascal Poyet, “Present: An Index,” in Lisa Robertson, Cinema of the Present, 108-109. 
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words’ mutual complementarity, potential combinatory or reverberative meaning. However, 
unlike an astral body, each of these words is grounded by deep roots that remain, regardless, 
invulnerable to new associations, and so Poyet’s index, when read in its entirety, is driven by 
an inexorable monotony as the habitual simplicity of these words is underscored in repetitive 
rhythm.  
  It is perhaps only the fact of punctuation that wrests Poyet’s indexical list from an 
iteration of pure monotony, for the list is truly broken only by the periods appearing after each 
third word — breaking the monotony even if that breakage occurs with predictable regularity. 
Earlier I noted that Poyet’s index takes several structural and conceptual cues from 
Robertson’s Cinema of the Present; however the tropes of repetition and systematization that 
inform the structure of the index are complicated differently in Robertson’s work. Poyet’s 
“Present: An Index” is like a monotonously pulsing neon sign outside a cinema of reeling, 
fluid imagery.  
 Although the alphabetic system does provide the scaffolding for Lisa Robertson’s 
Cinema of the Present, it constitutes only one half of the long poem’s bipartite structure.94 I 
say this in an effort to describe the work structurally for it will not be summarized in any other 
way, as is the case of poetry in general, although Robertson herself doubts this work can be 
                                                
94 Notably, this same formal structure can be seen in the first part of Robertson’s R’s Boat, published in 
2010 (four years prior to the publication of Cinema of the Present). However, the patterning of the 
alphabet as an ordered chaos that loosely evades deterministic systems also appears in an earlier work 
by Robertson, The Weather. Here the alphabet does not isolate lines of poetry as organized entries in a 
system, but rather swirls as a wind system in a general movement toward Z, a general, organic system.   
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classified as a poem.95 Cinema of the Present is an extension of an idea and an elasticity that 
calls into question the nature of duality, the duality of you and I, or monotony and freedom, or 
laboriousness and pleasure. It is two-sided and double-edged. It has two distinct parts but they 
are repetitions of each other and co-mingle. For the purposes of this conversation, these two 
parts can be identified superficially by their font, one regular, the other italic. The 
alphabetically organized text is the italicized sequence. At the very beginning of this sequence, 
including all the lines starting with the indefinite article “a,” the second term (either a noun or 
adjective) determines word order, creating a counter-current against the repetition of the initial 
article:  
You move into the distributive texture of an experimental protocol.  
A bunch of uncanniness emerges.  
At 20 hertz it becomes touch.  
A concomitant gate.  
At the middle of your life on a Sunday. 
A dove, a crowned warbler in redwood, an alarm, it stops.  
You set out from consciousness carrying only a small valise.  
A downtown tree, the old sky, and still you want an inventory.  
You were an institution without a concept. 
A gallery, a hospital, an hypothesis. 
                                                
 
95 Personal interview with the author (December 2012). 
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Pure gesture.96 
While the italicized lines are sequenced in alphabetic order, the alternating sequence of lines is 
arranged according to an order that is non-systemic. However, all the italicized lines and 
alternating lines are re-organizations of the same work, such that the lines appear twice in the 
book (with a few irregularities), once in italics and once in regular font, once in an order 
determined by alphabetic sequence and once in an indeterminate order. That is, more 
precisely: once according to random order determined by the alphabetic system and once 
according to a non-intentional order, potential chaos or weather. Robertson has explored the 
poetics of systems in previous work, such as the “formal inexhaustibility” of random weather 
patterns in The Weather.97 Meteorological patterns endlessly vary and swerve from predicted 
course. The meteorologist embellishes the weather with descriptive language that hangs richly 
against discursive patterns that propose sheer predictability. This embellishment functions as 
an admission of the pure failure of predictable forecasting, like any beauty that catches one 
off-guard.  
 Indeed, Cinema of the Present is prefaced by an allusion to the nature of the poetics of 
systems and the chance discoveries that seep into these systems; the epigraph by Émile 
Beneviste reads as follows: “In addition, one must allow for chance discoveries, always 
possible in this vast domain in which the investigation has not been systematically pursued.”98 
                                                
96 Lisa Robertson, Cinema of the Present (Toronto : Coach House Books, 2014), 5. 
 
97 Lisa Robertson. “The Weather: A Report on Sincerity.” Chicago Review. Vol. 51/52 Issue 4/1 
(Spring 2006): 36. 
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Indeed, on the first page of Cinema of the Present, such pattern irregularities present 
themselves:  specifically, drifting lines that will not be repeated in the second half of the book 
and thus insert an element of chance into the system. Similarly, the work ends with pattern 
irregularities, the alphabetic order crumbling or bending under the pressure of the system, 
enacting another Lucretian swerve, introducing an additional element of chaos and chance into 
the system of letters.  
 If for Lucretius, the types of particles in the universe remain constant and eternally 
present, infinite in number, and they are limited in “shape and size. They are like the letters in 
an alphabet, a discrete set capable of being combined in an infinite number of sentences.”99 
Possible combinations of atoms in Lucretius’ universe are limited to certain legible or 
coherent forms, in the same way that letters of the alphabet can only be used in certain 
combinations determined by a code. Nature’s code figures as an unknowable determinant of 
composition for Lucretius. When the index functions to determine poetic composition, what 
code is enacted? The poem’s determining index makes it a self-reflexive system, since the 
structuring principal is found within the material to be structured, and the index points only to 
itself. Robertson’s use of alphabetic order, along with the works of the other authors 
mentioned above, draws attention to the letters themselves, the very compositional units of 
words. In other words, there is nothing outside the material of the poem that orders and 
structures it but the material itself, the particles of written language.  
                                                
98 Émile Beneviste as cited by Lisa Robertson, Cinema of the Present.  
 
99 Stephan Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2011), 187.   
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 The Lucretian swerve represents the element of chance that alters the system and 
affirms the possibility of free will. It therefore accounts for an aspect of unpredictability that 
the system could not anticipate. In terms of rhythm, on the one hand there is monotony, which 
is pure predictability, since it neither begins nor ends and does not vary. As an element of 
chance, the swerve on the other hand appears as that which folds or twists a monotonous 
surface, inserts tension and affect and is the vitality of the poem. On a literal level, it is that 
which disrupts the predictable sequencing of Cinema of the Present at the beginning and end 
of the text, and offers us a way of explicating the existence of unruly pinches in the system. 
 This very material swerve at the end of Robertson’s text also shows that it is a work of 
literature that pushes against closure. Indeed, all of the works discussed above share such a 
redress of closure. Zukofsky’s “A” terminates with an index that, as Abigail Lang argues, 
functions doubly both to point the reader back into the poem but also as a supplemental poem 
unto itself. Halsey’s “Index to Shelley’s Death” comes after a work of multiple incompatible 
narratives where fact and fiction are interchangeable and equally valid, as coherence becomes 
a matter of re-assessing the notion of closure. Authorless by nature, these indexes (which have 
none of the traditional features of indexes such as page numbers) read as list poems. As lists, 
these poems clearly do not work toward closure in the way of free verse poetry but instead 
toward an openness of form that sets the text adrift.  
 
Barthes, Dante and the Mid-life Turn 
 
While the poems discussed above each appear as a supplement to another text, Caroline 
Bergvall's “Via” is an indexical work that stands at a more distant remove from the text or 
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texts to which it points. “Via” collates extant versions in English translation of the first stanza 
of Dante’s Inferno and presents them in an alphabetically-ordered arrangment. While 
Bergvall’s project highlights the misconceived neutrality of the apparently ubiquitous and 
anonymous translator’s voice, the repetitive notion of “mid-life” points beyond the historicity 
of any individual’s life to the timelessness of this turning point, which strikes when one is at 
the far reaches of both birth and death at once.  
“Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita” — Roland Barthes considers this line from 
Dante about mid-life in his lecture course presented (ironically, at the end of his life) at the 
Collège de France, collected under the title La Préparation du roman (The Preparation of the 
Novel). For Barthes, the “mid-life” turning point is not mathematical: qui le saurait en avance 
“for who could calculate it in advance?” Instead, “it relates to an event, a moment, a change 
experienced as meaningful, solemn, a sort of ‘total’ realization of precisely the kind that can 
determine and consecrate a journey, a peregrination in a new continent…”100 It announces 
itself as an awareness of a diverging path, such as is articulated by Dante, at the forks in the 
wood. Barthes identifies three forms in which this experience of awareness may occur. The 
first experience of the mid-life event takes the form of a realization of one’s own mortality, the 
sense that “our days are numbered” even if we can’t calculate exactly how many we have left, 
accompanied by the consciousness that we are surely running out of time, that our time is 
limited.101 Secondly, Barthes suggests that another effect of the mid-life experience is the 
                                                
100 Roland Barthes, The Preparation of the Novel, Trans. Kate Briggs (New York : Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 3.  
 
101 Ibid., 4.  
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feeling that all the work one has done is repetitive. This is when one can predict exactly what 
one will be doing throughout the rest of life, until death. “Foreclosure of anything New.” 
“Condemned to repetition?”102 This moment, when we can no longer expect to change, is 
comparable to a realization of one’s mortality. Finally, Barthes notes that a traumatic event 
can also elicit a realization of the “mid-life” point, as a sort of painful incision that cuts a life 
in two. In all these cases, “whatever the nature of the incident, the middle of my life is nothing 
other than the moment when one realizes that death is real (to go back to Dante, The Divine 
Comedy is the very panorama of the reality).”103 Barthes’s mid-life crisis is accompanied by a 
difficult acedy, a state of gloom and stagnation that “repetitive work and mourning” dispose 
one to, and hence his desire to explore a different genre of writing, the novel, as he is bored to 
death with the monotonous task of writing lectures. Barthes’ attempt to explicate the mid-life 
crisis provokes some unanswered questions: can it occur more than once in a lifetime if it is 
not a mere mathematical point? And if so, does each reinvention of the mid-life lead to an 
obliteration of the last? 
 If the opening lines of Dante’s Inferno evoke the mid-life thematically, its rhythmic 
manifestation can be located in the lyric sonnet’s volta: a particularly definitive turn and 
backward glance that alters the future course of the argument, a gesture that takes place 
outside of time as a double movement forward and backward. Peter Szendy illustrates the 
function of the volta anecdotally with the figure of Orpheus as he leads Eurydice from the 
                                                
 
102 Ibid., 4.  
 
103 Ibid., 5.  
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underworld. The volta is represented as the very moment Orpheus turns around and loses 
Eurydice forever; the possibility of recuperating his love from death is definitively ended.104 
This is comparable to the theory of the mid-life turn given by Barthes in his third hypothesis: a 
fatal rupture, a radical break in time and a realization of one’s mortality. 
 
Caroline Bergvall’s “Via”: Surface Intensities, Transmission, and the 
Unfathomable Depths of a Language  
 
Nel mezzo dei cammin di nostra vita 
mi ritrovai per una selva oscura 
che la diritta via era smarrita 
 
The Divine Comedy- Pt.1 Inferno - Canto 1- (1-3) 
 
1. Along the journey of our life half way 
I found myself again in a dark wood 
wherein the straight road no longer lay. 
(Dale, 1996) 
 
2. At the midpoint in the journey of our life 
I found myself astray in a dark wood 
For the straight path had vanished. 
(Creagh and Hollander, 1989) 
 
3. HALF over the wayfaring of our life, 
                                                
 
104 Peter Szendy, Sur Écoute. Esthétique de l’espionnage (Paris : Les Éditions de Minuit, 2007), 83.  
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Since missed the right way, through a night-dark wood 
Struggling, I found myself. 
(Musgrave, 1893) 
 
4. Halfway along the road we have to go, 
I found myself obscured in a great Forest, 
Bewildered, and I knew I had lost the way. 
(Sisson, 1980) 
 
5. Halfway along the journey of our life 
I woke in wonder in a sunless wood 
For I had wandered from the narrow way 
(Zappulla, 1998) 
 
6. HALFWAY on our life's journey, in a wood, 
From the right path I found myself astray. 
(Heaney, 1993) 
 
7. Halfway through our trek in life 
I found myself in this dark wood, 
miles away from the right road. 
(Ellis, 1994) 
 
8. Half-way upon the journey of our life, 
I found myself within a gloomy wood, 
By reason that the path direct was lost. 
(Pollock, 1854)105 
 
                                                
105 Caroline Bergvall, “Via,” In Fig (Cambridge: Salt Publishing, 2005), 67.  
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In Caroline Bergvall’s “Via,” the paratextual threshold element of the alphabetical index is 
displaced from its habitual position as supplement to the text, functioning instead as that 
which supplies order and form, subtly fixing the shape of the work. “Via” is not a 
supplemental paratext or index to another work. To group lines of poetry according to the 
sequence of alphabetic letters means to combine common sounds: sets of tenuously affirming 
affinities and dissonances along which intensities are transmitted beyond the usual sonic 
pleasures of assonance and consonance.  
With the displacement of the alphabetical index in Bergvall’s “Via,” what is commonly 
understood to be a paratextual element is repurposed as poetic form. Here, the alphabetical 
index serves to supply the text with a predictable and neutral structure. The extrinsic 
informational form of “Via” operates as a randomizing force, independently of any authorial 
intention.  
To complicate matters further, Bergvall, an artist working across many disciplines, 
languages and media, does not place “the book” or “the page” at the center of her practice. 
Indeed, “Via” was an oral performance before it ever appeared in print. In Bergvall’s practice, 
the book is generally displaced from the centre of literary production, itself given the status of 
paratext. Bergvall has been performing and producing audio, video and textual installation 
work since the 1990s, most recently with Drift (2015), a multimedia text installation work 
about the perils of maritime migration, which also circulates in book (print) form. Similarly, 
“Via” is a highly mediated text or set of texts that has circulated and continues to circulate via 
multiple modes of media. The procedure by which the final text is formed is a systemic 
operation of liminal poetics, a poetics that complicates rather than explicates, collecting 
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multiple possible thresholds of meaning and enacting these via multiple forms of transmission.  
 In the pages that follow, I examine some of the notions about genre and translation that 
Bergvall undermines through her adoption of the alphabetical index to structure a literary 
work, as well as the possibilities opened by an enactment of queer strategies of parody and 
appropriation, in this case of the medieval lyric voice. I propose that “Via” is an affectively-
charged poetic experiment. Each of the following three sections provides a discrete reading of 
Bergvall’s poem/archive. Reading the texts on these different levels reveals the extent to 
which Bergvall defamiliarizes our expectations about poetic form and what constitutes a 
typical material support for a literary work: book, MP3 or otherwise. “Via,” an entirely literary 
text, is also a highly mediated work, and one that is aware of its own mediation.  
 
Via(s): Media and Translation  
 
In order to write clearly of “Via,” it is important to address the initial confusion created by the 
fact that this title may refer simultaneously to a number of different objects: a live 
performance, an audio recording that circulates in MP3 format, a written text that circulates in 
codex format, and another written text that was published in a print journal but that circulates 
primarily in portable document format. In each case, the conditions of reception are entirely 
different: whether visual or auditory, in public or at home, live or mediated by speakers, on the 
screen or on the page. Therefore, there is no possibility of writing of a singular, purely textual 
phenomenon that is “Via.” To simplify matters for the purpose of this discussion, I will use the 
term “work” instead of “text” where I mean to refer to Bergvall’s oral performance of “Via” 
rather than to a written record of that performance; to further clarify, I do not mean to suggest 
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a universal, all-inclusive idea of a “work” that precedes the text, and that stands as a source for 
all forms of mediation Bergvall has explored or could explore. Rather, I use these terms here, 
work and text, only to distinguish orality from writing, according to an understanding whereby 
the oral performance of “Via” includes the text, because the text is part of the performance. 
Therefore, borrowing a distinction outlined by Paul Zumthor, I will write of the “work” when 
I wish to speak of the orally performed text and the “text” when I refer to the poem on the 
page:  
[L]’oeuvre embrasse la totalité des éléments de la performance ; le texte est la séquence 
linguistique auditivement perçue. Le texte est l’une des composantes de l’oeuvre ; l’oeuvre 
n’existe pas sans le texte ; mais elle n’existerait pas non plus sans ses autres composantes. 
[the work comprises all of the elements of performance; the text is the linguistic sequence 
perceived auditively. The text is one of the components of the work; the work does not 
exist without the text; but nor would it exist without its other components.106  
 
I should further clarify that my discussion of the oral performance, or the work, will refer 
more specifically to an edited audio recording of Bergvall reading “Via” rather than an 
embodied, live performance. This audio recording circulates in MP3 format, which I have 
downloaded to my private computer, saved to my personal desktop, and listened to in my 
private home. Although I have thus imperfectly appropriated Zumthor’s definition of work 
and text, by which he means to distinguish the live, oral performance of poetry from its written 
record, I have found the general distinction it sets up between orality and writing in relation to 
poetry to be useful for the purpose of the following discussion.  
                                                
106 Paul Zumthor, “Oralité – un inédit de Paul Zumthor,” Intermédialités 12 (Automne 
2008): 196.   
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 An unstable and shifting relationship between orality and writing informs my reading 
of “Via” on many levels. On the one hand, “Via” is a textual collection that is arranged 
alphabetically, and the alphabet is a product of writing; on the other hand, “Via”’s primary 
mode of circulation has been through digital audio format, an MP3 available online, a 
recorded oral performance. Furthermore, in terms of content, the source on which Bergvall 
draws/plays is Dante’s Inferno, composed in the 13th century, when the spaces between words 
that enabled silent reading had at the time only very recently been introduced to Italian 
codices, constituting another historical moment of transition between orality and writing, 
where their related functions were shifting and slippery.107 Rather than posit a historical 
narrative that sees orality gradually as having gradually given way to silent reading, however, 
Peter Middleton, a scholar whose area of research is the oral poetry reading, has argued for the 
ongoing relevance of oral poetry, to the present day, by suggesting that written and oral poetry 
could be seen to operate in a historically continuous economy of interdependence: 
 
Silent reading and reading aloud have been part of a single economy of reading throughout 
history. The difficulty for poets wanting to extend the poetics of orality has been that the 
shift from oral to written culture is usually portrayed as a gradual, irreversible change from 
reading aloud to silent reading, one that happened gradually over centuries until its 
completion in the Renaissance, and eventually led to the utter ascendancy of print at least 
four centuries ago. It is a history with no place for the poetic virtues of orality, which 
assumes that such change is inevitable since silent reading is wholly preferable to the 
cumbersome demands of reading aloud to a group, and only took so long to develop 
because of illiteracy, the scarcity of texts, and a general lack of privacy. Recently there 
                                                
107 See Paul Saenger, Space Between Words: The Origins of Silent Reading (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 1997) 237 - 242. 
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have been signs that historians of writing and reading are finding evidence that supports 
the idea that orality and literacy are much more interdependent than has hitherto been 
supposed, and poets have become less inclined to polarize orality and literacy in such 
value-laden terms.108  
 
While little has been written about the oral poetry performance, even less has been written 
about the new digital forms of its capture and circulation. Martin Spinelli suggests that critics 
need a new taxonomy to theorize digitally captured and edited oral poetry: 
 
We need, at this point, to develop a new taxonomy, a new vocabulary for our speech 
editing, one that considers the characteristics of our technology, that considers the ability 
of listeners to approach material with a variety of interpretive strategies, and finally one 
that recognizes that today’s listeners are media savvy — they do not assume they are 
listening to a ‘real’ or ‘natural’ audio event but to something that is always already highly 
processed and produced.109 
 
 “Via” is not only a highly mediated text at the level of transmission (it has circulated 
and continues to circulate via multiple modes of media), it is also a text that archives, in a 
sense, a history of transmission that is dependent on translation, the history by which Dante’s 
work was brought into English for different reasons at different times, and according to the 
                                                
 
108 Peter Middleton, “The Contemporary Poetry Reading,” In Close Listening: Poetry and the 
Performed Word, Ed. Charles Bernstein (New York, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998), 273.  
 
109 Martin Spinelli, “Analog Echoes: A Poetics of Digital Audio Editing” Object 10 (Winter, 2002) 
http://www.ubu.com/papers/object/06_spinelli.pdf. 
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translators’ varied aesthetic preferences, the political climate in which the translator worked, 
etc.; each instance of translation is always contingent. Bergvall is comfortable working across 
media, but also across languages: she is a writer with a Norwegian-French background but 
who lives and works in England, someone for whom the specific texture of a language is never 
inherently given, predetermined or absolute. In the multilingual text, languages resonate at 
their limits with other languages, languages both living and dead, languages sounding through 
each other and inside each other and informing the present. It is fitting that the English of 
Bergvall’s “Via” spans the English of the Romantic poets to the present: as such, it is not one 
English, not a transparent, universal or imperial English. The multilingual position is one that 
recognizes the multiplicity inherent within languages and well as between them. One of the 
problems of translation in America is, as Lawrence Venuti has argued, that the translator slips 
into invisibility in the popular mind, so that the translated text is taken up as though it 
conveyed the “author’s” words, as though, for example, when I read a translation of Dante in 
English, I am reading the words of “Dante.” However, in translation not only are the words, 
literally, changed, but any idea expressed with different words changes and constitutes a new 
idea. By this tendency to gloss over the specific context in which a work of literature 
circulates, the culture from which it arises (one that may be entirely outside America) is 
obviated, in a gesture that encompasses all the heedlessness of imperialist thought. The 
English idea of Dante’s Inferno is highly mediated in terms of translation and transmission, as 
the sheer number of translations available shows. “Via” is a text that archives, in a sense, a 
vast history of transmission. 
 Composed entirely of extant English translations of the first stanza of Dante’s La 
Divina Commedia, Bergvall’s “Via” is as much a collection of poetry as a poetic work in its 
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own right. More specifically, the text of ”Via” is an alphabetically ordered archive of all the 
extant English translations of the opening stanza of Dante’s Inferno, which the author has 
scrupulously copied and arranged. In this case, the “author” Bergvall’s role in creation is 
modeled on that of the copyist rather than inventor. Her task as an author is to perform a 
procedure that enacts temporal and spatial constraints: specifically, to copy all the extant 
translations of the first tercet of the Inferno that she can find in the British Library up until the 
year 2 000, that is, 700 years after the poem’s original publication. In the process, as “errors” 
creep in through transcription, she fastidiously returns to the source texts as a copyeditor to 
double-check her work for accuracy, in the process repositioning the translations as source 
texts: as originals to be exonerated and perfectly captured. Her performance of reading and 
transcription writing recalls the archaic figure of the medieval amanuensis, yet the media 
through which her captured oral text will be transmitted are not just the codex but also 
contemporary and digital media, including the common MP3. Her composition procedure and 
materials are deeply literary, distinguishing her work from much of the interdisciplinary 
writing that tends to be classified as conceptual writing; yet Bergvall’s attention to media of 
transmission and her resultant interdisciplinary performances, along with the constraints 
according to which she designs her performance, do render her work compatible with 
conceptual movement. Like the conceptual writers, Bergvall performs “writing” in a manner 
that radically opposes Romantic notions of self-expression. This is accomplished by the 
imposition of constraints that limit (or appear to limit, at least) the writer’s intervention in the 
process of creating the work. In “Via,” the only interventions “the author” Bergvall makes in 
the composition of this text are choices related to 1) the overall form of the work, 2) the title 
and 3) the medium in which it circulates. Via’s “content,” however, is not authored by 
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Bergvall; instead, it has already been generated, in this case by 47 different translators over 
time, and as such her work is a sutured polyphonic text. Only the choices listed above are 
authored by Bergvall. It is the performance of process, rather, with all its contingent 
constraints and choices, that bears her signature.  However, as discussed in the following 
sections, Bergvall’s “Via” also pushes up against the limits of what is frequently understood, 
celebrated and dismissed as conceptual writing.  
 
Abandoning the Straight Path 
 
With “Via,” Bergvall’s play with transcription and translation authorizes the copy or the 
shadow of the original as the original. It is a performance that displaces and reinscribes a 
translation as an original, calling into question the notion of true and categorical origins. In the 
process of creating “Via,” Bergvall repositions the translations as source texts (against which 
she checks her copies for accuracy) rather than imperfect replicas of an inimitable original. In 
the process, Via is not located within a paradigm of linear reproduction: Bergvall emphasizes 
the phenomenon of the multiple rather than returning to a singular, ulterior source. If we were 
to consider the Italian lines of verse as the sole, true, singular or unadulterated original 
informing her process, we could see Bergvall’s work as the product of a double displacement, 
where the original is first displaced through the act of translation and then through the act of 
transcription. Yet, because there is no singular or true source text, it is a displacement without 
any singular point of origin. The attention Bergvall gives to reproducing the names of the 
translators renders them visible and audible in lieu of the original author, a mechanism that 
further extends authority to the translators. Finally, in the print-based version of “Via” in Fig, 
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the original Italian stanza appears at the top of the page (the title word “Via” is excerpted from 
the third line: che la dirrita via era smarrita). Translation never produces an exact copy; the 
Italian tercet is most accurately approximated in another language through the accumulation 
and absorption of multiple translations. In this repetition and variation of sources and 
beginnings, “Via” suggests there is no sole and unique origin, on the one hand. On the other 
hand, paradoxically, if a singular translation effaces the difference of the original, a 
multiplicity of translations, paradoxically, begins to render the origin visible. This multiplicity 
of translations defamiliarizes the common trope of translation as reproduction by returning us 
to the materiality of language as difference.  
“Via” is a text that begins repeatedly, and as such, one that sanctions an excess of 
thresholds. Its compositional principle is repetition and variation, constrained to repeating the 
essence of the opening lines of Dante’s epic. In “Via,” we are offered the epic beginning: in 
media res, as the speaker is already walking, but instead of progressing in narratological time, 
the story simply begins again and again with the incipit.  
 
Along the journey of our life half way… 
In the midpoint in the journey of our life…  
HALF OVER the wayfaring of our life…  
Half way along the road we have to go… 
 
 Its texture fluctuates rather than changes. Variations produce a liminal space of 
reiterated openings, each not exactly like what has gone before. The stanza, in addition to 
functioning as a beginning, is an affective threshold, one that can be perceived slightly 
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differently at different times, in different light, in differing moods. This is the work of 
translation, which is always contingent and variable. Dante’s journey starts not at the 
beginning of life, but rather in “mid-life,” at which point the speaker is “lost” in a dark wood. 
Like any fairytale beginning, the dark wood conjures panic, distress and certain foreboding.  
 
…Wherein the straight road no longer lay (Dale, 1996) 
…For the straight path had vanished (Creagh and Hollander, 1989) 
…Struggling, I found myself (Musgrave, 1893) 
…Bewildered, and I knew I had lost the way (Sisson, 1980) 
 
 This formulaic narrative device for beginning is reiterated repeatedly, compounding 
panic. Furthermore, the eerie repetition of this testimony to being “lost,” of having lost “the 
straight path” evokes a narrative in which the speaker remains located in an original sense of 
wilderness, the repeated and incomplete gesture, its numerous iterations that vary across time. 
Regardless of the lack of forward movement, the straight path, the right way, la dirrita via is 
already impossible at the outset. The sense of being lost, to which the speaker attests, contrasts 
with the simple severity of alphabetical order imposed by the archival form, by the 
organizational apparatus of the bibliographic finding aid. In Via, we find ourselves caught by 
the tension between chaos and order, between the imposition of institutional classification and 
form and fear of the wilderness, the imperiled state of the unknown, for the woods are dark.  
 The choice of the alphabetical index as structural device can also be interpreted as a 
framework that resists a totalizing interpretation. The alphabetically ordered list of first tercets 
offers no greater, enveloping concept according to which the poem may be understood or read 
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(such as may have been had the author had chosen to order the translations chronologically or 
according to translator’s name). In “Via,” an elemental incongruity is produced by the 
insertion of proper names, of which there are two distinct types to be discussed: the title of the 
work and the names of the translators. The title, as I stated earlier, is the only “original” 
writing Bergvall has made in the composition of the text. The title, “Via,” appears as a sandy 
shoal, an element of the text partially submerged in the original Italian (a word in the third line 
of the tercet) and obscured nearly completely in the flood of English translations. The simple 
title renders the textual system in its entirety finally perceptible if not total: it means ‘by way 
of’ and implies a route without a definitive beginning and end, but it also points conceptually 
to the problematics of transmission, the network of media (the intermedial formats in which 
Bergvall’s work circulates) and of translations. “Via” points to the notion of passage. At the 
junctions between tercets, the names of the translators are uttered, not conclusively, but as 
sonic bridges that conduct the listener to the next instance of beginning, in succession. Each 
proper name is located on an axis perpendicular to the tercets, acting as an understated stop to 
the prolonged ambient minimalism created by the repetition and subtle variation of translation, 
and the assonance and alliteration produced by the alphabetical constraint.    
 The form of the poem does not provide an analogy in relation to which the poem may 
be read. Instead it functions as a neat, minimalist grid that secures a collection of textual 
objects: a collection that is complete only insofar as the constraints of the author’s process 
dictate, but which bears no pretence to universal completion. That is, the collection’s 
parameters are a function of temporal and spatial constraints (all the translations available in 
the British Library in a specific seven hundred year period).  
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Transmission of Affect and the Conceptual Writing Movement  
 
Poetry is generally seen to produce “feeling” when it can be construed as a display of self-
expression, typically embodied by the lyric mode. For a number of reasons, however, avant-
garde poetry has endorsed the rejection of the lyric mode in favour of other models, recently 
exemplified by the “conceptual writing” movement, which has as one of its main advocates an 
American performer and scholar, Kenneth Goldsmith (or perhaps it would be more accurate to 
use the past tense, since conceptual writing was already declared dead by Johanna Drucker in 
2012). About the place of emotion in the conceptual writing movement, Goldsmith writes: “It 
is the objective of the author who is concerned with conceptual writing to make her work 
mentally interesting to the reader, and therefore usually she would want it to become 
emotionally dry.”110 The Cartesian binary conjured by this statement, the equation of the 
“mentally interesting” with “emotionally dry” is based on the generally accepted 
understanding that emotion is married to a Romantic aesthetic of self-expression, or that 
emotion dulls the intellect and is an obstacle to work that is intellectually interesting. Further 
to Goldsmith, Drucker, in her article on the death of the conceptual writing movement 
(published in The St. Mark’s Poetry Project newsletter in 2012) suggests that conceptual 
writing is “stripped of affect”:  
 
Read aloud, much conceptualism might as well be automated text-to-voice samplings of 
contemporary language across a spectrum from banal to more banal. Flattened, ordinary, 
                                                
110 Goldsmith, “Paragraphs on Conceptual Writing.” 
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stripped of affect, the text-generating machines of its formulae do not compose as much as 
produce a text. Some conceptual writing is downright boring. Some is exceptional, even 
poignantly, richly humanistic, not mechanistic in the least.111 
  
 What is at stake in suggesting that writing can be isolated from emotion and in putting 
forward a binary framework for conceptual writing in which intellect is opposed to emotion 
and championed over it? Does this entail an inadvertent rejection of thirty years of feminist 
endeavours to extend epistemic credibility to feeling subjects of any gender? There is 
something incredibly unsettling about any claim to depleted feeling or to feelinglessness, 
regardless of the degree of artifice involved in the process of making. Further, it is 
questionable whether a prescribed feelinglessness can be claimed for both for the producer and 
the receiver of the work: as though they necessarily share the same feeling. Although I am not 
a proponent of Romantic self-expression, the “conceptual writing” I find intellectually 
engaging is not “emotionally dry.” I would suggest that there are other ways in which feeling 
is integral to the experiences of making and reception that can be explored in “Via,” in 
particular through the strategies of lyric appropriation and aural variation. Pleasure itself is an 
affect that cannot be apportioned in part to the intellect and in part to the emotional.  
In response to Goldsmith, I propose to characterize Caroline Bergvall’s “Via” as 
“emotionally wet” conceptual writing. Sara Ahmed, putting aside the term “emotion” with all 
its problematic relations to Romantic notions of inner feeling and individual ownership, argues 
for the term “affect” instead, in order to theorize the political work of passions or intensities 
                                                
111 Johanna Drucker, “Beyond Conceptualism: Poetics after Critique and the Individual Voice.” Poetry 
Project Newsletter (May 2012).  
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(affects) that circulate and stick to objects rather than belong to them. Affects can attach 
themselves to people or objects or even to other affects, but they do no permanently reside in 
any given subject or object. Affects do not originate with a subject to be transmitted to another 
subject. Therefore, an affect of reception might be entirely separate from an affect of 
production, meaning that it would be remiss to summarize the affect produced by “Via” in 
terms of the author’s subjectivity and feeling in the process of composition and compilation. 
The fact of the matter is that the text of “Via” has no “author” but rather a multitude of authors 
whose work Bergvall has collected and performed. In the process, Bergvall does not express 
her feelings, but clearly affect can still be transmitted, in part by the lyric content, which 
repeats and varies like a minimalist composition. There is, however, certainly the suggestion 
of a linguistic subject, an I, in the repetition of the English pronoun, even if no one author has 
composed the work. Furthermore, in the audio recording, Bergvall and her collaborator, 
composer Ciarán Maher, do add her voice’s fractals to the mix of translators’ voices:  
 
In the summer 2000, a reading of the variations was made by Ciarán. Using calculations 
set up via his software, he unearthed an added line, an imperceptible grain, my voice’s 
fractals, and we let it run, hardly audible, underneath the structure of the reading voice, 
inextricably tied to it, yet escaping it, releasing from it a surprising beauty, magnified 
shrapnel of interior sound. The 48th variation.112  
 
Recording the polyphonic text, Bergvall adds a translation of her voice in a nearly 
imperceptible way: not as a semantic I but as a barely audible sound that accompanies the 
other translators.   
                                                
112 Bergvall, Fig, 64.  
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 Clearly, Dante’s I is not the speaker of Bergvall’s work: “as we enter the world of 
‘Via’ we are no longer following Dante on his journey to find Beatrice, we are tracing the 
mood and predicament of a new speaker.”113 In addition I wish to clarify that in Bergvall’s 
text of “Via”, we have already left Dante’s I behind in translation (the I implied by the Italian 
verb: mi ritrovai — because, of course, there is literally no I in the Italian tercet). Furthermore, 
in the performance of the work, we must take the addition of Bergvall’s voice — literally, the 
sound of her voice — as primary. As Genevieve Kaplan points out, a mood is created via the 
introduction of this new speaker. This speaker (i.e., all the ghostly translators’ voices as 
performed by Bergvall) seems to suffer the repeated trauma of utter loss, in successive 
variations. Not only is a sombre mood thus established, but an irrepressible and ambient 
affect, one of alternating devastation and ambivalence, of proximity and distance. The dark 
wood, after all, is the terrible beginning of any devastating fairytale. The sombre affect is a 
function of both the sonic register, as well as the semantic register whereby the lyric I 
produces its narratives, drawing on accepted mythologies. Even though the author (i.e. 
Bergvall) has not created the lyric I through standard means of self expression — the textual I 
is not the voice of the author, even though the spoken I is — an affect is attached to the lyric 
literary mode that survives all the laminates of reproduction. Haunting and echoing, Dante’s 
mid-life crisis is transmitted across distressed fractal surfaces. 
 Although Bergvall works with constraints in “Via,” her literary method is influenced as 
                                                
 
113 Genevieve Kaplan, “How we read Caroline Bergvall’s ‘Via’ and Why we should care,” 
Jacket 38 (2009), accessed May 2, 2015, http://jacketmagazine.com/38/bergvall-by 
kaplan.html. 
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much by feminism as Oulipo, and therefore does not involve the author’s outright rejection of 
subjectivity but rather the subversive appropriation another lyric voice, in this case that of 
Dante — or, more accurately, his translators. In the foreword to an anthology of “conceptual 
writing by women,” which she co-edited, Bergvall lists the following characteristics as criteria 
defining the work collected in the book: “the main point of commonality is that the pieces 
included here all share an acute awareness of the literarity of literature, of the paratextuality of 
the book, of the technologies of writing, of the examination of the poetic function.”114 As 
much as Bergvall’s work can be placed within a text art tradition (especially her installation 
works), her method and materials are deeply engaged with literary questions in a way that a lot 
of text art is not. Appropriation of voice, in a post-punk feminist literary tradition, following 
Kathy Acker, is certainly one of Bergvall’s strategies in “Via;” in fact, Kathy Acker (or even 
more playfully, “Kathy Acker via Don Quixote”) appears in the list of translators appended to 
the first print version of “Via,” in Chain. In this version, 48 English variations appear, unlike 
the printed text in Fig, where there are only 47 (Acker has been removed). This playful 
insertion of Acker’s intertextual transmission of Dante (via Quixote) says much about the 
literarity of Bergvall’s conceptual methods; the insertion of the work and name of a writer 
Bergvall has been influenced by is a personal gesture that stands out from the constraints of 
accuracy structuring the work.  
 Unlike the definition offered by Drucker, where conceptual writing consists of 
“automated text-to-voice samplings of contemporary language across a spectrum from banal 
                                                
114 Caroline Bergvall. “The Conceptual Twist: A Forward.” (I’ll Drown My Book: Conceptual Writing 
By Women, Eds. Bergvall et al., Los Angeles: Les Figues Press, 2012), 20. 
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to more banal,” Bergvall’s textual samplings do not coincide in time and are not contemporary 
(although the media of transmission are new). Perhaps what renders “Via” an “emotionally 
wet” conceptual work is its multi-temporal appropriation of lyric, according to which 
innumerably minute variations and possibilities and the unfathomable depths of a language 
appears. In the process of language acquisition, the new speaker would find herself astray in 
an expansive dark wood that is language itself.  
* 
Would of the Dark Wood 
 
 Throughout this discussion, I have drawn attention to the affective intensities produced 
by Bergvall’s collection of translations, particularly in relation to the textual form and oral 
transmission of “Via.”  At stake in Bergvall’s unique poetic interventions are a series of 
broader questions for the poetics of the conditional threshold, marked by the question of desire 
and volition, where it is always obscure (in the dark wood). Bergvall’s “Via” resists simple 
categorization by coming into being at different moments not as a single text but as a work 
encompassing more than one performance, more than one text, more than one media. 
Bergvall’s “Via” also challenges the assumed division between writing and archiving. At once 
a seemingly perfectly executed example of conceptual writing, Bergvall’s “Via” also 
challenges assumptions about the place of affect in experimental or conceptual writing. 
However rigid Bergvall’s adopted structure — the alphabetic index — may be, its rigidity by 
no means obfuscates the questions that have persisted throughout the history of poetry and 
poetics. It is a work and a text that demonstrate that the infinite iterability of new media does 
not preclude poetic tension and affective intensity.   
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I opened this chapter with a call for a “third approach” in contemporary poetics — one 
that represents a slippage from the dilemma posed by the overwhelming opposition of content 
to form. In essence, I opened with a call for a threshold poetics — a poetics that lives on the 
threshold of form but one that is not necessarily devoid of content. This is a poetics that does 
not assume — as contemporary conceptual poetry does — that residing on the outer limits of 
poetic form necessarily rests upon the divestment of content and affect. From Zukofsky, 
Halsey and Poyet’s indexes, which are all differently located as paratextual elements, to 
Bergvall’s archive of recovered translations of Dante, one discovers a threshold poetics that 
resists the very binary structure upon which certain schools of experimental poetry have 
sought to define themselves against lyrical forms.    
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Chapter Three 
One More Word: Translation and The Politics of 
Neutrality 
 
Da orixe nada sei, non creo que poidamos ter acceso a algo así como a orixe, a orixe é 
sempre un relato, unha ficción. A escena é sobradamente coñecida: alguén se dirixe a un 
grupo e lles relata a orixe (unha identidade) e a partir de aí configurase unhas formas que 
exclúen a quen non escoita ou non acata o relato. Pero ao tempo que isto sucede, sucede 
tamén que outra palabra comeza, esoutra palabra cando se profire ou se escribe fai tremer o 
Estado. A escena é tamén moi sabida: esa palabra pon de manifesto que o gobernante é 
incestuoso, en consecuencia é expulsado da cidade, a súa muller afórcase, os seus fillos 
comezan unha guerra civil etc. Por suposto os desenlaces poden ser outros. Entendo que esa 
palabra é a palabra do poema. 
 
[Of origin, I know nothing; I don’t believe we can access anything like origin; origin is always 
a story, a fiction. The scene is only too familiar: someone rules a group and tells them their 
origin (an identity) and from this, forms are configured that exclude all who don’t listen to or 
submit to the story. At the same time, something else goes on; another word commences, 
when this other word is proffered and written down, it makes the State tremble. This scene is 
also well known: this word makes clear that the governor is incestuous, and in consequence 
he’s expelled from the city, his wife hangs herself, his sons foment civil war, etc. Of course 
there may be other outcomes. To my mind, that word is the word of the poem.] 
 
— Chus Pato, English translation by Erin Moure 
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Introduction: The Problem of Neutrality in Translation Theory 
 
Recently, at a poetry reading event in New York, a writer whose work I am unfamiliar with, 
whose book had just been published in a bilingual, French-English edition (she was an 
Anglophone-American living in Paris), presented a young woman who was to join her and 
read with her from what she called ‘The French,’ presumably in an alternating bilingual 
reading of her new book. This should have delighted me, as do generally the rare opportunities 
to listen to French-language poetry in New York; however, this particular phrase, ‘The 
French,’ sounded problematically vague to me. If I hadn’t been so keen on maintaining a 
polite demeanor, I might have interrupted on the spot and interjected, “Is the French text a 
translation? And, did you write it yourself?” As a translator, I am exceedingly aware that there 
is never a simple, transparent equivalence to an English-language text, but only multiple 
possibilities contingent on choices made by translators, who are also writers — but here the 
poet had neglected to name the writer of the French-language text and seemed to be passing it 
off as her own. Furthermore, as someone who learned to speak French in Québec, it is 
absolutely clear to me there is no one universal ‘French,’ in the same way that Anglophones in 
North America no longer defer to the Queen’s English. Thus, concentric elisions of difference 
presented themselves to me — in this case, differences that were stifled by not one but 
competing imperialisms.  
While the omission of the translator’s name at this event might be seen by some to be 
nothing more than a small oversight, it is, in fact, symptomatic of a significant cultural blind-
spot. It points beyond a small poetry gathering to a more general situation of enduring 
injustice that is manifested in specific acts of cultural appropriation, absorption and 
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exploitation. In the field of translation, it adopts several forms. First of all, cultural 
appropriation arises from the misconceived notion that an ‘original’ text and its translation 
should exist in a relationship of fluid transparency — as was implied by the omission of the 
translator’s name at the poetry reading, as though the translated text, the authorless ‘French,’ 
were a mere replica of the English-language text. When this happens in the reverse — i.e. 
when English is the translating language — the fallacy of transparency supports the absorption 
of a foreign text into English, consuming it in such a way as to erase its cultural specificity. 
This process entails a desire to represent the Other in a normalizing language such as it is 
already commonly used — in other words, a desire to reproduce or create a replica of the 
foreign text in a language usage so familiar that it draws no attention to itself. Such a 
translating language bears no residue of the source language, as it erases all marks of 
foreignness. Finally, the failure to recognize the translator’s work as subjective writing — an 
omission caused in part by the pervasive worship of the author function as that which 
subsumes all labor — renders the translator invisible, a relentlessly exploited producer, even 
as the translator performs an essential role of introducing new audiences to new ideas and 
ideas to new contexts.  
Addressing these problems, Lawrence Venuti, in his seminal work The Translator’s 
Invisibility, considers two contrasting approaches to translation, the first of which he describes 
as a process of domestication and the second as foreignization. In the first case, a text is 
absorbed into the translating language according to an illusion of fluency and thereby 
‘domesticated’ by the translating language as its cultural specificity is erased in the process of 
translation and book production. Domestication is the result of a desire for slick readability 
and linguistic transparency that afflicts the book market in general: 
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The prevalence of fluid domestication has supported these developments [of an 
aggressively monolingual culture in the USA and the UK] because of its economic 
value: enforced by editors, publishers and reviewers, fluency results in translations that 
are eminently readable and therefore consumable on the book market, assisting in their 
commodification and insuring the neglect of foreign texts and English-language 
translation strategies that are more resistant to easy readability.115   
 
The discursive effect of transparency, Venuti argues, also results in a situation of exploitation 
that causes translators to suffer as unrecognized, underpaid producers of essential work. The 
translator, in effect, disappears in the easy readability of his or her work, according to an idea 
of fluency that is premised on a false illusion of equivalency between two texts and two 
languages, an illusion that facilitates consumption. The translator’s invisibility is symptomatic 
first of all of monolingual ignorance regarding the process of translation itself, a false 
supposition that meaning can simply be repeated from one language to another, or that all 
languages are essentially the same, and that every language has the potential to say the same 
thing as any other. On the contrary, because the production of meaning is a contextual effect 
of relationships occurring along a semantic chain, meaning cannot be repeated or reproduced 
in another language along what is, in effect, a completely different signifying chain, which is 
why there is no simple equivalence that would constitute a true semantic repetition, and 
further, why transparency is a fallacy. As noted, the fact that the translator suffers 
marginalization is additionally indicative of general labour inequities in the capitalist book 
                                                
115 Lawrence Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 12. 
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market where the author-function (who may or may not have actually written the work) takes 
all. But most importantly, the translator’s invisibility is the product of a general incapacity for 
registering cultural difference, a failure to acknowledge the presence of the Other that entails 
an erasure of the Other, a fundamental problem pervasive across hegemonic Anglophone 
cultures.    
To resist this trend toward domestication, Venuti suggests alternative translation 
methods, which he describes in terms of ‘foreignization:’ any method that draws attention to 
the fact the work has been translated, and also tries to create a field of visibility for the 
Other.116 The translator can adopt resistant, foreignizing tactics either through their choice of 
text to be translated or through the process of translation itself. First, by choosing to translate a 
non-canonical work, the translator enacts one possible tactic of foreignization, where the 
translation is not easily absorbed into the consumer market since the author-function does not 
yet exist in the translating language. Second, the translator might use a discursive strategy in 
the process of translation to convey the foreignness of the text. Anything that renders the 
translating language strange would represent a tactic of foreignization that is by definition 
resistant to domestication.  
                                                
116 In The Task of the Translator, Benjamin argues that easy readability in the translating language is 
not a sign of a meritorious translation. “It is not the highest praise of a translation… to say that it reads 
as if it had been originally written in that language.” Indeed, Benjamin makes a plea for literal 
translation (“if the sentence is the wall before the language of the original, the literalness is the 
arcade…”). Walter Benjamin, “The “Task of the Translator,” Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. 
Ed. Hannah Arendt, Trans. Harry Zorn (New York: Schocken, 1969), 79. Literal translation would 
constitute a foreignizing strategy, as it transforms the translating language.  
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These two approaches offered by Venuti — that of domestication versus that of 
foreignization — can be seen to elaborate on a distinction made by Friedrich Schleiermacher 
in On the Different Methods of Translating originally published in 1813. Here, Schleiermacher 
famously asserts that there are two methods of translation: in the first case, the translator 
brings the writer to the reader and “leaves the reader alone” and in the second, the translator 
brings the reader to the writer and “leaves the writer alone.”117 Venuti’s method of 
foreignization would thus describe an approach that makes the reader travel to the writer and 
enter unfamiliar territory, as opposed to domestication, which would entail altering the foreign 
to make it easily legible to the reader, by making the writer travel.  
Ideally, however, any translation process would entail a compromise between the two 
movements identified by Schleiermacher. The reader and the writer would meet mid-way, at a 
point that does not really exist, and that is neither here nor there. This third place might be a 
trembling of being, impossible to locate, a site of experience and a medium that has vanished 
from the scene. Or it might be, in an analogy given by Paul Ricoeur, that non-existent but 
hypothetical “third text” that can be used to measure both the text of departure and the text of 
                                                
117 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On the Different Methods of Translating, 42. Further, consider 
Benjamin’s assertion that a translation should no more think of the reader in its composition than a 
work of literature should: “whenever a translation undertakes to serve the reader” the result will be an 
“inferior translation.” Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator,” 70. The intention of the translation 
should not be to serve the reader because no literary work should ever have this aim. To associate such 
an intention with the translation of work would thereby render it incompatible with the intentions of the 
source text, which it seeks to honor.  
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arrival, since the two cannot be measured simply against each other.118 The third text, thus, is 
neither here nor there, but corresponds to both positions. Paul Ricoeur posits the third term as 
something that exists beyond but in dialogue with the two real texts in question (the translation 
and the original). In Sur la traduction, Ricoeur writes:  
 
Le dilemme est le suivant : les deux textes de départ et d’arrivée devraient, dans une 
bonne traduction, être mesurés par un troisième texte inexistant. Le problème, c’est en 
effet de dire la même chose ou de prétendre dire la même chose de deux façons 
différentes. Mais ce même, cet identique n’est donné nulle part à la façon d’un tiers 
texte dont le statut serait celui du troisième homme dans le Parménide de Platon, tiers 
entre l’idée de l’homme et les échantillons humains supposés participer à l’idée vraie 
et réelle. À défaut de ce texte tiers, où résiderait le sens même, l’identique sémantique, 
il n’y a pour seul recours que la lecture critique de quelques spécialistes sinon 
polyglottes du moins bilingue [….]119 
 
Additionally, we might consider such a third text as a living organism, a text vibrating 
with the life material of both languages and the comprehension of both in the body of the 
translator. The “mid-point” for these purposes is neither temporal, as is the mid-life point that 
                                                
118 The text of ‘departure’ is an alternative terminology for the more commonly used ‘source’ text or 
‘original’ text. Erin Moure rejects the metaphor of shooting (‘target,’ ‘source’) implied by the English 
terms, favouring instead the Galician trope of the voyage (‘departure,’ ‘arrival’) as a metaphor for 
translation. She writes, “[…] translation for me is not a task in which we seek equivalents for words, in 
which we try to tame the source language by making something readily recognizable in the target 
language. Something accommodating. My tactic is to listen to the text of departure, and let the text 
speak.” (Moure, My Beloved Wager, 246).  
 
119 Ricoeur, Sur la traduction, 14. 
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I discussed in Chapter 2, nor spatial. Instead it is ontological, for it returns us to the trembling 
of being that is translation, where the translator, who commences with the act of translation, 
simultaneously becomes an absent figure, one who can read across both texts at once, the ideal 
reader of a translation. Across these movements of varying degrees, translation is an 
expression of transportation, a journey that is not predictable from the outset, even if one 
might have a general idea of a route in mind. If the translator facilitates transmission, the 
medium of inscription is not a site of reception of neutral transmission; rather, transmission is 
an issuance that incompletely inscribes the vitality of the translator within the vitality of 
language.  
Undermining the vital event of inscription is the problem of neutrality, a belief that 
language can be translated with transparency. “En premier exemple, disons que serait neutre 
celui qui n’intervient pas dans ce qu’il dit,” Blanchot writes in his analysis of the neutral.120 
Not leaving a personal trace on what one has written: this is the claim of objective neutrality, 
an illusion the translator is urged to maintain as one who cannot or should not announce his or 
her own presence in what she has written, who will not intervene in what he or she says; nor 
will the foreign language impede the fluid functioning of the reader’s language. Such 
assumptions of neutrality are imperative for the paradigm of translational fidelity to continue 
to produce its impossible desire for an irrecoverable origin and its counterpart: its translation, 
a counterfeit. The assumption of neutrality leads to the notion of transparency in Blanchot’s 
analysis (where the neutral is a feature of transparency), as the opacity of transparency; 
                                                
120 Blanchot, L’entretien infini, 447. In Blanchot’s French, the word neutre is a homonym that refers to 
either the neutral (as in this cited phrase) or to the neuter.  
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neutrality produces the fundamental impenetrability of transparency, paradoxically, at the very 
basis of transparency.  
 
Counterfeits and Creations 
 
While foreign texts and their translations are often misrepresented as simple semantic 
equivalents, the notion of equivalence does not extend to value, where there remains a strict 
hierarchy of values between the ‘original’ text and the translation (as was indicated by the 
omission of the translator’s name at the poetry reading). The economy of loss that is seen to 
govern translation centers on the impossibility of equivalence between an original and a 
reproduction: a copy that is always in some measure inauthentic, a counterfeit. According to 
this economy of loss, any translation is doomed to inferiority and failure from the outset, a 
shadow or a fake, for it can never repeat the original to which it is bound. In the case of poetry 
in translation, displacement occurs doubly, along both semantic and rhythmic axes, conjuring 
a heightened sense of absence in the reader who receives the text in the economy of loss. This 
point is emphasized by Abdelfattah Kilito, in an essay where he critiques Jâhiz’ (776-868) 
interdiction against the translation of poetry:  
 
Revenons au parallèle établi par Jâhiz dans le Livre des animaux entre philosophie 
grecque et poésie arabe. Nous en déduisons que la philosophie est susceptible de 
traduction, alors que la poésie y est réfractaire. Traduire Platon et Aristote peut se faire 
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sans perte notable ; mais traduire la poésie, qui est avant tout une forme, ne peut 
donner qu’un résultat médiocre.121  
 
Translation is burdened from the beginning by its perceived attachment to an 
unrecoverable loss: the reading of the translated poem is a melancholic reading, a longing for 
the impossible originary text, a longing that is impossible because the full presence of 
meaning was always absent even in the original reading. Therefore translation is doubly 
burdened by a longing for what is an impossibly complete meaning, even prior to any 
comparison elicited by the difference between languages. Already, the reading of any 
translated poem is weighted down by a general, anticipatory nostalgia for something that was 
never, in fact, in reach of the reader. This melancholic tendency finds its expression in the 
view that translation necessarily depletes poetry — robs it of its apparent essence — and as a 
result, in a conviction that the translation, and the poet-translator by extension, is a mere thief 
or vandal who brings nothing but damage to the poem.   
How might it be possible to consider translation in different terms, however, moving 
away from the notion of a linear path that extends from an original to its reproduction and the 
concomitant economy of loss? On the one hand, we might consider a translation as a 
beginning in its own right, a newly conceived text or poem, rather than sheer technical 
repetition: a commencement, emerging from the remnants of material that is no-longer and 
not-yet language as we know it. In Lavish Absence: Recalling and Rereading Edmond Jabès, 
Rosemarie Waldrop describes how, early in the translation process “the finished work is 
                                                
121 Abdelfattah Kilito, Tu ne parleras pas ma langue, Trans. Francis Gouin (Arles: Actes Sud, 2008), 
50.  
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dissolved back into a state of fluidity, of potential.” From the process of destruction, of 
ruination, the glowing material of translation emerges.122 Constructed from raw material, from 
the point of another beginning, translation is never a direct derivation from another work. 
Further, in an essay called Irreducible Strangeness, Waldrop deconstructs the narrative of 
simple linearity that typically supports the view of the translation as derivative:  
 
Curiously, the philosopher and critic Wilhelm Dilthey saw the hermeneutic process 
exactly in these terms, as “uncovering the meaning of a text by re-creating the whole 
process of the genesis of that text.” The conceptual premise behind it is Aristotle’s 
distinction between ergon and energeia: interpretation of a work, as Dilthey 
understands it, consists in “translating the ergon — the completed object — back into 
the energeia that brought it forth.123 
 
If translation is a process of creation rather than simple repetition, clearly its circuitous 
beginnings unfold multitudes. In these terms, we might conceive of any translation as one text 
among multiple texts emerging from the singular process of translation, which is not a direct, 
linear path to a ‘shadow,’ a correct copy. If the translator’s body is a third text, a translation 
can be seen as one possible document of its vitality. Just as there are always multiple accounts 
of historical events, no single document can be subject to scrutiny as representative of the 
whole truth of the translational event, which is contingent on the present view of history that 
                                                
122 Waldrop also cites a metaphor from Haroldo de Campos, where the translation process is matter of 
“dissolving the Apollonian crystallization of the original text back into a state of molten lava.”  
 
123  Rosemarie Waldrop, Dissonance (if you are interested) (Tuscaloosa: Univeristy of Alabama Press, 
2005), 158. 
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already occurs as an intersection between a subject and an incidental view of the past. Such a 
relationship of contingency and dependency must be understood to inform any translational 
endeavour. On the threshold of contingency, the translated text is an inscription of a 
performance, a trace of an event, a “record of an encounter,” such as Norma Cole describes. In 
her words:  
 
The translation never takes place since the texts have nothing in common. The words 
are all different.  
Leap of faith.  
Transcendence or encounter. 
A record of the encounter.124    
 
If a translation is a “record of the encounter,” as Cole suggests, it documents an instance, a 
concurrence and a convergence, and as such, transmits an experience otherwise embodied by 
the third text in absentia. In this view, translation is complicated as a notion beyond the dull 
standards of mere technical procedure based on locating and executing equivalencies — as an 
exchange that happens in some mechanistic or formulaic way — and is reconceived as that 
which enacts the encounter and demonstrates difference.  
If we consider translation thus as an encounter that is captured and transmitted as a 
textual record, how might the marks of its own doubleness (or even multiplicity) be inscribed 
in such a document? This is a problem that extends beyond Venuti’s strategies of 
                                                
124 Norma Cole, To be at Music: Essays and Talks (Richmond, CA: Omnidawn Books, 2010).  
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foreignization that show the variegated surface of the translating language as difference. In the 
end, the ghostly third text tends to endure only as a notable absence from a scene of reading 
that does not proclaim its passage as translation: as an irreconcilable absence. How might its 
presence be signalled? As a form of disruption caused by the translator’s hand? Is it possible 
to capture an impression of the translator’s mid-way grasp across two languages?  
In this chapter, I argue that one such challenge to the problem of the absent third text 
can be found in a work published in 2014, Secession with Insecession, by Erin Moure and 
Chus Pato. In this book, translator Erin Moure archives the encounter of translation by 
inserting a third text that is, at once, both a personal memoir and a reflection on the text of 
departure. Laid-out on facing pages opposite her translation of Chus Pato’s Secession, 
Moure’s own memoir, Insecession, emerges as not only a creative work, but also as a 
document of the encounter of translation. Inscribed within the translation Secession, 
Insecession can be read as expressing yet another degree of translation or at least as an 
expansion of the great range of translational possibilities. Moure’s text renders the translator’s 
presence not only visible but as an inevitable and vital force to be reckoned with.  
 To counter the invisibility of the encounter of translation and thus the disappearance of 
the translated text is a matter of resistance. To resist and to counter: to meet in 
contradistinction, to brush up against another, registering difference. “The translation never 
takes place since the texts have nothing in common,” suggests Cole — a statement that 
reminds us that translation, if it is understood as an exchange of equivalencies and as 
repetition, is impossible. This notion is re-affirmed in an essay by Moure: 
 
Though I am a translator, I always affirm that translation is impossible. This appears to 
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languages there is a river to cross and the river has orelas – banks – just as our bodies 
have orellas – ears. The river too is a body that listens. Made, like our body, of water. 
And between two languages … there are rios or perhaps rias – wide inlets – or even a 
sea to traverse. There is no linear relationship between languages.125  
 
Eloquently described here, Moure’s conjecture that translation is a creative, not merely 
imitative task — a point of view she has referred to elsewhere as transelation or 
“transcreation” — counters the depleted paradigm of translation by positioning the translator 
as an actor: an agent whose texts, reconceived as creations, can counteract the conditions of 
their exploitation beyond the tiresome and impossible demands of fidelity to a master text. 
This process arrives at a performative mid-point, inscribing a text that pivots and swirls among 
countless beginnings, and registers its vitality as a countersignature. The translator’s authority 
turns the signature away from a mark of authenticity and towards multiplicity, for it is never 
one thing alone. It is an authority that can count its words once recorded but not its future, for 
it is a vitality that refuses to settle into monotonous predictability.   
 
An Encounter Between Two Poets: Affinities 
 
Moure’s archive of the translation process and memoir inscribed in Insecession, both 
structurally and thematically informed by the poet-translator’s encounter with the text of 
departure, is also a product of the enduring literary friendship between Erin Moure and Chus 
Pato and therefore of numerous previous encounters across different texts and in time. The 
                                                
125 Erin Moure, My Beloved Wager (Edmonton: NeWest Press, 2014), 245. 
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original encounter between these two poets took place many years ago: in a Galician 
bookstore, where Moure purchased a book by Chus Pato when she was just beginning to learn 
the Galician language Galego. Thus, Moure’s original introduction to Pato was as a reader:  
 
On March 20, 2001, I was in Andel bookstore in Vigo with my friend (and first 
Galician teacher), writer and translator María Reimóndez, buying dictionaries and 
simple books to help me learn more Galician. After paying and before turning to leave, 
I saw on the counter a large book with an incredible knobbly cover, bright orange, 
bearing the inscription: m-Talá, and below that, the words Chus Pato.  
 
I had no idea what it was, or what those three words meant. But I could tell it was a 
special artifact. It was a book that refused the standards of book marketing, that made 
itself into a stunning object, that gave you no image of what you would find inside, that 
absolutely refused to interpret the book for you in advance.126  
 
Of the three words that Moure could not understand, two of them were the name of the author, 
words that would eventually come to represent for Moure the writer, Chus Pato, an 
acquaintance whose work she would accompany as a translator and friend. But initially the 
words posed an absolute abyss of referentiality, the author name as impenetrable as the 
untranslatable title. Since undertaking to translate this first ‘impossible’ book, Moure has 
translated several works by Chus Pato into English.127  Secession is her fourth book-length 
Pato translation, following Charenton (2007), m-Talá (2009) and Hordes of Writing (2011).  
                                                
126  Erin Moure, My Beloved Wager, 249.  
 
127 Moure’s friend María Reimóndez warned her that translating Chus Pato’s m-Tala would be 
impossible. (ibid., 250). Elsewhere, in an interview, Moure discusses this point further: “‘Impossible’ 
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There are a number of notable affinities between the two poets, including their 
experimentalism, feminism, and prominence as relative national poets of their generation. 
They share “similar, wary, hopeful, discordant poetic sensibilities,” as Moure herself writes in 
the introduction to m-Talá, a wariness and ‘discord’ that unsettles accepted lyrical clichés, all 
the while affirming poetry’s ethical commitment to dialogue (which necessitates hope), 
mediation, a desire for change and respect for the Other. Both have been described as radical 
expermentalists, admired for the risks they take politically and with poetic language. And both 
live and work within socio-political contexts of nationalism, sovereignty movements and 
minority language activism.128  
Although both Moure and Pato were born in 1955, they were born into very different 
landscapes: Pato came of age in Galicia under the fascist government of Franco-era Spain, 
while Moure was born and raised in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Pato’s formative years 
unfolded in an official state culture that disallowed the public usage of Galician, a resilient 
language and a culture that nevertheless survived, despite the odds. From Charenton (the first 
published translation of Pato by Moure), where a utopian vision of national sovereignty arises 
among the fragmented dialogue of a post-revolutionary madhouse, to Secession, it is evident 
                                                
is what people said when I wanted to translate Chus Pato. Translation is often called impossible. In 
fact, I am most often attracted to translating ‘impossible’ texts, texts that are not served well by the 
worn paradigms of translation based on a contrast between fidelity to the word (much more than this 
goes into translation, and in different ways than the paradigm supposes) and transparency or fluidity of 
the text in the target language.” (“An Autobiography of Translation,” Montreal Review of Books, 
Summer 2014).  
 
128 Moure has lived in Québec for over thirty years; Pato was born and raised in Galicia.   
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that political resistance is a major impetus and focus of Pato’s writing, and that for Pato, 
poetry itself is a force of resistance. Wary of the unrelenting effects of capitalism on an 
unrecognized national community that is melancholy for its origins, Pato has been said to 
question “the pressures that urban cultures put on rural ones and warns against the unforeseen 
consequences that global capitalism and Empire may have for traditional communities that 
have not yet experienced national consolidation.”129 While this dichotomy might be 
understood to locate Pato’s politics within a territorial national paradigm based on 
geographical boundaries and tensions, Pato’s idea of the ‘motherland’ is not of a singular 
natural territory. Galicia, a semi-autonomous nation with no state, complicates notions of 
sovereignty and the idea of ‘natural’ territory, as a result of the nomadic dispersion the 
Galician community, and the presence of its stateless emigrant communities outside of 
Europe. As Maria do Cebreiro writes, Pato relies on Deleuze’s concept of the horde (notably, 
she builds on this concept explicitly in Hordes of Writing) and the notion of ‘immanent 
territoriality’ based on movement rather than permanence. Therefore, do Cebreiro explains, 
“the poet places herself closer to an immanent territoriality — as defined by Deleuze and 
Guatarri in A Thousand Plateaus — than to an identitary essentialism.” This position is 
confirmed by the epigraph cited at the beginning of this chapter. There, Pato aligns the notion 
of origin with identity, both representing a fiction that cannot be accessed in reality but that 
bears the power to harm. To reiterate: “The scene is only too familiar: someone rules a group 
and tells them their origin (an identity) and from this, forms are configured that exclude all 
                                                
129 José María Rodríguez Garcia, “Yolanda Castanño: Fashionista and Floating Poet,  
Discourse, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Winter 2011): 105-106. 
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who don’t listen to or submit to the story.”130 Identitary essentialism is an ideology that risks 
supporting abuses of power on the part of the state apparatus, as it is co-opted by the sovereign 
to create conditions of exclusion that only serve to fortify its power.131 
When identity is co-opted by the state, negations of its conditions can function to 
exclude certain persons from the possibility of belonging. The notion of exclusion, according 
to Giorgio Agamben, is at the heart of Western political thought extending to Aristotle, where 
life is divided in terms of natural life (zoe) and political life (bios), according to which 
distinctions certain humans may or may not participate in political life, in democratic, public 
debate. How does Agamben’s notion of bios inform a reading of Secession? In a note at the 
beginning of the book, Pato’s Secession is described as a biopoetics. What sort of relationship 
between political life and poetics is suggested by this term, and, more specifically, how does 
the lyrical I participate in political life through the writing of biopoetics? Beyond the simple 
mirror of self-expression and beyond lyric poetry’s aporia of representation, biopoetics 
explicitly places the lyrical subject, the I, in relation to the political field. The I in Secession is 
not that of the poet relating an autobiography or expressing interior reflections; rather, the I 
issues from the poem itself, is the utterance of the poem, and also that of its future community, 
the polis. This requires a reconsideration of the figure of the lyric I, starting with the very first 
poem in Secession, which alludes to a work, La Chair des mots: Politique de l’écriture, by 
Jacques Rancière, which discusses this exact topic: the political function of the modern, 
revolutionary poetic lyric. Here, Rancière locates the modern lyric subject’s emergence in the 
                                                
130 Chus Pato, Interview with Geneviève Robichaud, Trans. Erin Moure.  
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Romantic period (not antiquity, although the Romantics’ view of lyrical antiquity was made in 
their own image) as a vector of revolutionary freedom, a subject authorized to depart and 
speak freely by the utopic, communal “we” of the future nation-state. Importantly, in the 
figure of the modern lyric subject, Rancière does not see an expression of internal conflict or 
personal reflection; the lyric mode instead is characterized as one of “accompaniment” 
between the community of the sensible and the I: “la révolution lyrique moderne n’est pas une 
manière de s’expérimenter soi-même, d’éprouver la profondeur de sa vie intérieure ou à 
l’inverse de l’abîmer dans la profondeur de la nature.”132 Instead, Rancière argues, the lyric I 
is coextensive with what is said, which coextensivity he articulates as a mode of 
“accompaniment,” where the I is not defined in terms of what it represents or hides. That is, 
the life of the I in Secession is political and participatory and the word of this I of biopoetics is 
a revolutionary utterance. 
On the other side, we have the sparks of origin, embers, warmly glowing on the shore 
of the translation, where the imagery of the politicized lyrical I connects to the sensible 
community. For example, on page 70 and 71, facing pages, the reader finds two accounts of a 
funeral, one Pato’s (as translated by Moure) and one Moure’s. On the right hand side, we read 
about the burial of the grandfather, Manolo of Almorfe, in Galicia, a narrative of accreted 
layers of generations of hardship and political suffering. On the left page, we read a narrative 
from the translator, Moure describing a funeral she went to with her father in Ottawa, which 
leads eventually to the fortuitous discovery of documents confirming the Galician identity of 
her own grandfather. Moure’s text is addressed to Pato, comprising a personal stake in both 
                                                
132 Jacques Rancière, La Chair des mots : Politiques de l’écriture (Éditions Galilée, 1998), 20. 
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the revolutionary poetics of Pato’s that she translates. The translator’s text, direct in its 
confession of intentions and desire for the Galician language, builds on a series of affinities 
between the experience of one and the other. This economy of desire is not one of loss. Across 
the page, both sensible and metaphorical affinities that lead the reader into several locations at 
once, the figurative unifications of a series of dislocations. “Dearest Cambria: Yesterday we 
buried Manolo of Almorfe, we wandered lost down the highway until we found the funeral 
home:” thus commences the Pato text, while on the facing text, Moure’s begins: “Dearest 
Chus, the only funeral I ever attended on my father’s side was my Uncle Dick’s in Canada’s 
capital.”133 Here is a history of nomadic migration, there of the frayed nets of belonging. The 
translator transports the reader doubly by casting a figurative frame around the translation — a 
frame that also functions referentially, even as if delineates a field — a second, exterior mode 
of figuration. Comparison, figuration, metaphor: these are the modes of reading suggested by 
the literalization of the third text (one that is situated somewhere between or beyond the 
translation and its source) and the complicated lyrical I that emerges as a political subjective 
utterance in Pato’s biopoetics and a doubled coextensivity of the lyrical I in Moure’s 
“echolocation.” If translation is a matter of bringing across, the reading of translation should 
be a matter of reading across, of reading as a vector and a transport.  
Yet, between the Moure text and the Pato (via Moure) text, the complex series of 
comparison along nodes of affinity do not bear on a greater unity. Rather, the parts rub against 
each other, not locking together, neither adhering nor repulsing the other from within. We 
might even say that Moure’s correspondent text, operating at times in the confessional mode, 
                                                
133 Pato and Moure, Secession with Insecession, (Toronto : BookThug, 2014), 70-71.  
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as memoir, produces an excessive subjectivity, that it exceeds containment, that it spills onto 
the facing translation, affects, infects or transforms it. In this case, the third text, which allows 
the reader to read across, operates in a figurative mode that bears most resemblance to the 
allegorical. Its disruptions, further, fragment the text and the reading of the text. Most 
importantly, such fragmentation is at the heart of the figurative incompleteness that 
characterizes any poetic practice. As a way of reading translation, “reading across” thus 
thrums with the vitality of the third text and the performance of the translator’s bodily 
presence, now the very medium of the field of the sensible.  
The revolutionary lyrical I, the poetic I authorized by the community of the sensible to 
speak of and from the political sphere, is essential to the testimony of the oppressed, for both 
Moure and Pato. This discordant production of lyric is the most important point of affinity 
between these poets.  
The Count and the Signature: One More Word 
While certain affinities might be located in the minority-language politics and independent-
nationalist yearnings of Chus Pato’s Galicia and Erin Moure’s Québec, or the nationalism of 
Erin Moure’s Canada for that matter, in Secession/Insecession, nationalism informs the work 
not so much as a thematic affinity but rather as the structuring device of the book itself, 
shaping its production by necessitating the third text as a matter of policy. As noted 
previously, this is Moure’s fourth translation of Pato’s work — three previous books were 
jointly published in the United Kingdom by Shearsman and in Canada by Bushekbooks. With 
Secession, Moure sought a Canadian literary publisher, with the knowledge, however, that a 
Canadian publisher would face funding restrictions if they chose to publish her translation 
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from a foreign language, because the national arts council, the Canada Arts Council, does not 
support literary translation of works by foreign authors.134 Since most literary and academic 
presses depend heavily on government subsidies, there is naturally a great reluctance among 
publishers to publish unfunded books.  
In fact, in 2005, Erin Moure and Robert Majzels campaigned to change this policy. 
Appealing to Canadian writers, intellectuals and artists, they circulated a petition for extending 
national arts council support to publications of translations of foreign-authored words. As a 
plea for the vitality of Canadian literature, their manifesto critiques a prevalent form of 
national insularity to redress the potential situation of cultural isolation such policy limitations 
propagate. Concluding their appeal, Moure and Majzels address specific policy points by 
enumerating solutions. The first of their demands, which was not achieved, is pertinent to an 
understanding of the policy that inadvertently shaped Secession/Insecession, a policy that its 
“third text” counters:  
Canadian literary publishers should be allowed to use a set proportion of their block 
grants (funding without which it is impossible to publish a literary book in Canada, 
                                                
134 Languages supported under the arts council translation grants are French, English and Aboriginal 
languages; further, the original works must have a Canadian author. National publishing, largely 
supported by the Canada Council for the Arts, originated as a protectionist nationalist endeavor and is 
by definition invested in representing national culture. This has been its mandate since it was founded 
in the wake of World War II, during a period when “arts funding was connected rhetorically to the 
collective search for cultural sovereignty and national independence” as well as to the need for 
solidifying national defense. (Berland 24) At this time, the 1951 Massey Report surmised the nation’s 
need to invest in the Arts along the following lines: “it has been suggested to us that one measure of the 
degree of civilization attained by a nation might fairly be the extent to which the nation’s creative 
artists are supported, encouraged and esteemed by the nation as a whole” (Massey Report, 182).  
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especially books that open up practices apart from the mainstream) to publish the work 
of Canadians translating from languages other than English and French, and from 
works of literatures outside Canada by writers who are not Canadians. This major 
change can be accomplished without any cost to the Council, and with great benefit to 
the literature.135 
 
Since such a change was never realized, the publication of Moure’s fourth Chus Pato 
book translation, Secession, necessitated a subversion of the mandate so as to render the work 
eligible for funding. In this case, because a poetry publisher can publish a book by a Canadian 
poet as long as the author is Canadian and their work accounts for more than 50% of the book, 
Moure chose to write a second text in parallel to Chus Pato’s Secession and in the process of 
doing so, ensure that the word count of her text was at least one word greater than Pato’s text: 
one additional word would enable Moure’s text to qualify as sufficiently Canadian and thus as 
eligible for arts council funding. As a result, the ‘encounter’ of translation would be made 
explicit because of the imperative to count the words of Moure’s contribution and to quantify 
her contribution as a qualifying national poet. Here, the author’s signature would depend on 
the word-count of her text, a count that would determine the work’s authenticity, quantify it as 
sufficiently Canadian in content.  
By creating a new genre, in effect — a hybrid text that is just under one half 
translation, the other half personal memoir — she was able to incorporate a translation of a 
foreign work into the official publishing market and to circumvent the arts council’s criteria. 
                                                
 
135 This proposal was originally circulated in an email from Erin Moure and Robert Majzels to a group 
of Canadian writers in  December 2005. 
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The final poem in the book, titled “48, or 49,” sardonically begins, “I still owe 48 words + 1,” 
an allusion to the necessity for her part of the book to be greater than 50% of the total content. 
“48, or 49” represents an excess of ironically quantifiable Canadian subjectivity required to 
justify the book’s publication. In the process of translating and writing Secession/Insecession, 
however, Moure did more than subvert a nationalist and protectionist funding structure — she 
created a text that utterly resists categorization.  
In the case of Secession/Insecession, Moure, as both translator and author within the 
same book, renders visible the encounter between the translator and the text in question, and 
along with that, the material that is most often lost, what she calls the ‘intranslatable’ material. 
The third text, however, is more than a simple metanarrative on the process of translating 
Pato’s book.   
The first problem this double book poses to the reader is where to start and how to read 
it? On the left hand side of the page, one reads Moure’s memoir as a series of responses to and 
anticipations of ideas elaborated on the opposite page, in Chus Pato’s text. Both are lyrical 
memoir projects that neither situate nor conceal the place of the translator and poet as subjects 
in a socio-political landscape. In the lyrical mode, which neither announces the I as 
representative of the poet nor presents it as a fictional construct, the precepts of direct 
representation are subverted, and neither is time linear nor place fixed.  Further, it may happen 
that Moure’s text anticipates an image from Pato’s at one point; at another, the translator’s 
memoir is prompted by images from the translated text and responds to them. In this way, the 
notion of origin again is elided: the source text is not posited in a singular linear relationship 
with the translation; it is not an ‘original’ text, but, in Moure’s words, a ‘departure’ text — a 
point of departure, of beginning. Of this process — in secession — Moure writes: “Translation 
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(the poetry of Chus Pato) is a way of bringing — into the secession or cut — another voice, a 
human voice, markings in words from a culture across a far border, to mark these words (her 
words) into new ears and onto new bodies, just under new skin.”136 The secession is a cut in 
which the potential of language shimmers under the figurative new skin of the translator’s 
body —  that is, as third text and as medium of transmission. It is a cut that appears before the 
text, and then as the potentially different text that separates the text of the translator and 
author.  
The cut of ‘secession’ also evokes a physical wound: a bodily wound where there is 
bleeding but also where boundaries between inside and outside blur, such as on the indefinite 
frontier of the potentially abject state. If in Pato’s Secession, we encounter the subject 
positioned as a member of a nation desiring secession from Spain, while in Moure’s 
Insecession, we encounter the translator whose positioning is identified within the conditions 
of secession, where the translator grapples with representing the sovereignty of the narrator in 
the context of the received sovereignty of the translator’s voice. The cut opens a liminal zone 
of the voice where it is ambiguous where or even whether one thing begins and another ends. 
Similarly, in the double structure of Secession/Insecession, a potentiality emerges in the 
elusive cut between these interlocking texts written from overlapping subject positions, a text 
that points to the experience of the translator on one side and the author on the other, where 
the translator’s text reverberates with that she has translated. Between these two, finally and 
definitively, we are confronted with a more literal cut: the simple gutter of the page, where all 
potential presents itself as a crossing, and which the reader’s gaze must eventually traverse.   
                                                
136 Pato and Moure, Secession…, 144. 
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The Ruin and the Scaffolding 
 
In Secession’s final poem, “Ruin,” “the voice” — a dislocated and perambulatory haunting —  
“is interested in figuring out the difference between remnant and fragment.”137 This lyrical 
‘voice’ might be singular or travel in a horde, but in either case it inhabits the ruins of the text 
as a ghostly voice. The ‘voice’ places the artifact and the remnant on a continuum with 
memory. First, the remnants of human lives the poet sees at Auschwitz provoke a reflection 
that hope for humanity, although devastated, may not have been totally destroyed. The poet, 
faced with the shocking artifacts of the brutality of conditions of bare life at Auschwitz, at 
their unspeakable horror, calls the death camp museum “dark lightning, a perfect 
oxymoron.”138 Here the remnant distinguishes itself from the fragment because it points from 
death into collective memory.  
The remnant — i.e. material that is captured, that endures in time—might share with 
the fragment a pretense of pointing to a destroyed totality, yet the remnant itself by definition 
has resisted destruction; it persists as that which remains. In its persistence, it insists on the 
presence of the real. Further, the remnant points beyond the singular individual (an integrity) 
and into the collective memory, while the fragment speaks primarily to conditions of integrity. 
                                                
137 Pato and Moure, Secession…, 167. 
 
138 Ibid., 65. “In this way, we are all vestiges, remnants of the humanity that was destroyed in us, but 
not totally: not the suitcases, the orthopedics, the shoes, the eyeglasses. All we write are traces of a 
literally razed poetry…”  
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While both the remnant and the fragment participate in the logic of synecdoche, the part that 
indexes an unstated or unrecoverable whole, they differ in terms of their indexical modality. 
The remnant, a piece of the real, seeks to position itself in time (even as the past might escape 
history), whereas the fragment, by contrast, is defined primarily as a part detached from a 
whole and in this sense, it is detached from time and the political implications of history and 
narratives of power as well. The fragment is not defined in terms of temporality or 
remembrance except insofar as it may be a detachment from a notion of whole time, and in 
this interpretation it can be read as an aspect of the destruction of time’s ‘grand narrative.’ 
Still, the existence of the fragment does not necessarily imply the passage of time or any 
endurance, unlike the remnant, which thus comes to represent the memorable aspect of ruins, 
since the primary definition of ruins is “the state or condition of downfall or collapse.”139 We 
might further conjecture that the movement of the ruin-remnant is a downward motion while 
the movement of the whole-fragment is a lateral motion, if indeed there is any motion implied 
at all in the breakage that constitutes the fragment. The ruin collapses toward the earth, 
decaying with the forces of natural history, and resisting such narratives of natural history with 
its indestructible hauntings of collective memory.  
Further, the placement of the poem “Ruins” at the end of Secession, a self-referential 
gesture that suggests a mise-en-abyme of the poetry book itself, contracts the poetic word into 
a variously signifying wellspring for the memory of language and its poiesis. As Pato (via 
translator Moure) writes:  
 
                                                
139 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “ruin.” 
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a poem is a conjunction of ruins, but these ruins are the drives of the language; they 
belong to imagination and from there emit their signals, which desire writing—these 
ruins are really us navigating birth and emerging into life— 
 
thus a poem is not composed of fragments but of ruins that are remainders of an earlier 
collapse or of one still to come, or that never happened, that are ghosts and despite this 
memorable.140  
 
Here, the poetic word takes the place of that which cannot write because it is crumbling. The 
ruin’s active capacity derives from its place within collective memory, where it is not merely 
the site or embodiment of memory but the means and materials of remembrance itself: “these 
ruins are really us.” In Pato’s metaphor, where language is cast as emerging from ruins, the 
poet’s language figuratively animates the ruin and resurfaces it from any sinking narrative of 
passive decay. Since languages are inherently impervious, if not more resistant, to the forces 
of gravity than buildings, Pato’s metaphor supplants the narrative of linear collapse with the 
ruin-language’s dynamism and contingency on human vitality, the ghosting lyrical voice, 
nonetheless memorable despite its ghostliness.   
Since the poem “Ruins” suggests the book’s mise-en-abyme as the ruins of poetry 
(and, doubly, of Pato/Moure’s poetry book in particular), it points us back into the book, 
reframing our reception, recasting our vision of Secession’s poetry as textual architecture. Just 
as Walter Benjamin saw in the ruin the emergent matter of memory in the production of 
allegorical thought, the ghosts from Pato’s ruins can be found haunting the pages of Moure’s 
memoir, either as translational vapours or as the building stones of poems or finally as the 
                                                
140 Pato and Moure, Secession, 169. 
 144 
cobblestones of the revolution that undo the narrative of progress and endurance proper to 
history. In this sense, it is as though a pattern of flames were already imprinted in the grain of 
the wood that burns, the pattern of fire already archived in the wood that burns. The 
translational ruin is ablaze with its imagery that leaps from the allegorical grain of thought, 
from the text of departure where its metaphorical tracks (of transport) are emblazoned in its 
heart.    
 If it has been noted previously that any translation should be conceived as a translation 
of fragments, might it be more precise, in this case, to cast the task of lyrical translation as a 
translation of ruins—ruins implying as they do the collapsed remains of something in time? If 
indeed the poem is not composed of fragments but of ruins that are remainders of an earlier 
collapse or of one still to come, then the translator of poetry erects a transmedial scaffolding 
spanning the surface and its gaps. Perhaps, then, it’s no coincidence that on the cover of 
Moure’s book there’s an image — on the inner surface, sheet metal, and on the outer, wooden 
scaffolding and in between a bird’s nest. Here, we have represented, the closed and the open, 
the thing made and the thing that is being built — the voice that is impossible to climb, that is 
inaccessible, and the voice that provides a scaffolding. Scaffolding as the voice of the 
translator — something one might climb, skeletal perhaps, but something of the transmedian 
that it is possible to grasp nevertheless. And in between the two, the rough structure of a nest, 
of beginning, and the potential of flight.  
The location of the lyrical voice, either in motion and nomadic among a horde of 
voices, or temporarily installed along scaffolding, is always shown against its potential 
dislocation, as a comparative phenomenon: almost somewhere it is not, almost something it is 
not, an I that is both like and unlike another I. The lyric as prompting metaphorical, allegorical 
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or figurative reading, evades representation of either a group or an individual in terms of 
identitary essentialism. The metaphorical text represents only its own constant changing and 
thus continual comparison: “and they are metaphor because they are dislocation, praxis that 
unites what is dislocated.”141  
The structure of Secession/Insecession, referred to by Barbour as a ‘double helix,’ is 
based on conditions of metaphor.142 It confronts the reader with his or her resistance to looking 
across the gutter to the other side, to traverse the cut. To read this book means to engage in a 
process of comparison on several levels, to read across in anticipation of similarities between 
Moure’s text and her translation of Pato’s text, and within the lyric for its metaphors, 
fragments, proximities, ruins. On the one hand, either text can be seen to function as an 
abstraction of a text given its dislocation from an ‘original,’ in which case the process of 
comparison dissolves into a incommeasurability of abstractions. Instead, a unification occurs 
through praxis, on the threshold of points of affinity, from one text to another, points scattered 
as unpredictably as by the wind, even then as vegetation that creeps up and along the ruins of 
representation.  
Because the ruin exists in time, it is never monotonous, as monotony is atemporal. 
Instead, it signifies slow change and collapse. Rather than monotony, the ruin exists on the 
axis of melancholy. This takes the form of a longing for a lost communal past (the rural 
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142 Douglas Barbour. “Chus Patos with Erin Moure: An Incredible ongoing conversation continues.” 
https://eclecticruckus.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/chus-pato-with-erin-moure-an-incredible-ongoing-
conversation-continues-in-secessioninsecession/ 
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farming life of the ancestors), as the ghosts of past generations live on, in a clamor of 
melancholy. Yet, under what conditions might the nation cease to be melancholic if its very 
identity as a nation has yet to be acknowledged?  
 
Yes, as I tell you, the war never ended, identity crumbled from us bit by bit. The ruins? 
It took us a long time to see them, the whole country was crumbling around us, houses, 
I already told you so. Bombings no, dear, there were no bombings: the bombs were 
invisible 
time-bombs143  
 
Identity can be seen to function either as a monotonous manifestation of repetition or 
as a melancholic longing for an originary attribute of bindingness such as has been rendered 
invisible or unknowable. Identity might be determined by the sovereign to produce conformity 
or it can represent an oppressed or submerged experience of difference, such as in the case of 
melancholy. In either case, identity is formed by the power of the law, even as a state of 
emergency is declared which represents the sovereign’s absolute power, not an anarchic 
suspension of law. This is the problem of identity, which Pato raises in the interview 
epigraphed at the beginning of this chapter, and which points to a constellation of 
considerations. For one, how to avoid the pithy constructs of identity that any politic of 
nationalism might risk abusing? Secondly, is it possible to conceive of nationalism beyond the 
aporia of sovereignty, of a national community beyond the very politics of statehood that 
disempower that community, that even threat to render it unthinkable? And, finally, what is 
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the place of writing, of poetry, outside the ‘fold,’ outside the ‘flag,’ in relation to the national 
community?   
For Agamben in The Coming Community, the “singularity” allows for an alternative 
production of community and therefore of the notion of belonging: that of the community-to-
come. The singularity can only be understood as that which it is (which it is coming to be) — 
it cannot be ascribed properties that are the conventional conditions of belonging: 
 
Dans celle-ci l’être-quel est repris dans son appartenance à telle ou telle propriété, qui 
indentifie comme membre de tel ou tel ensemble, de telle ou telle classe- (les rouges 
les francais les musulmans)  et il est repris non par rapport à une autre classe ou à la 
simple absence générique de toute appartenance mais relativement à son être à 
l’appartenance même.144 
  
For Agamben, belonging itself and not the conditions of belonging (identity-based essences or 
properties that yield sets based on similarity and difference) will form the community-to-
come. Agamben’s project, therefore, is to present a new ontological order, based on the 
singularity in lieu of the set, and proximity, in order to undo the political problem of the state 
of exception: in other words, to undo the logic of sovereignty, because “sovereignty and the 
law that fill all space available to them are nihilist.” Thus, Pato writes of the urgency “to 
violate the state of permanent emergency that oppresses us. To exist beyond sovereignty,” 
which also entails a reconsideration of the subject’s constitution as sovereign subject to a 
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Raiola (Multitudes: Revue politique, artistique, philosophique. Printemps, 1990), n.p. 
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subject-hood of proximity and relation.145 In The Coming Community, since constituent power 
is never free of constituted power, Agamben reconsiders political theory in terms of 
ontological potentiality, relocating the subject from the politics of power to the possibility of a 
politics of ontology, through which a political theory free from the “aporia of sovereignty” 
might be conceived.  
 Earlier in this chapter, the observation was made, following Blanchot, that 
undermining the vital event of inscription is the problem of neutrality: the supposition that 
language can be translated with transparency and that the invisible translator does not 
intervene in what she writes. In the process, a voice is elected to cross the border, a body is 
discovered and lost, the performance of the cut sealed and absorbed, a gutter traversed without 
declaration or resistance. If the lyrical I by definition challenges the sovereignty of the subject 
and voice, then its translation does so exponentially. In the first place, the I is neither the voice 
of the poet nor the representation of a sovereign subject; in the second, the I is neither the 
voice of the poet, nor of the translator, nor the representation of a sovereign subject. The 
translator’s encounter is more permanent and less indifferent, more than a matter of word-
counts, fidelity and authenticity against which the signature of the author is compared. Indeed, 
the translator’s encounter does leave its residue on the glass of authenticity, another signature, 
a third text, a shiver in the surface of the neutral.   
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The Intelligibility of the Outside 
 
The problem of literary translation, as Walter Benjamin has argued, is that it fails when it tries 
to render a literary text more easily readable in the translating language than it was in the 
original, given that easy readability has never been a defining feature of literary production. 
“If it [the translation] were intended for the reader, the same would have to apply to the 
original. If the original does not exist for the reader’s sake, how could the translation be 
understood on the basis of this premise?”146 Any attempt to reproduce the literary work in 
language such as it is already commonly used, language so familiar that it draws no attention 
to itself but is absorbed runs counter to the gestures of literary creation and the emergence of 
literary language in general. Proust once made the charming claim that “beautiful books are 
written in a sort of foreign language,” a point of view that Deleuze takes up in his essay on the 
stutter, “Bégaya-t-il…” where he theorizes the ‘foreignization’ that occurs in the language of 
the literary text to begin with, because the writer is a stranger to his or her own language, a 
foreigner of the inside.147    
What is the nature of such a foreign language within a language, without a people, a 
nation or a country? How does a text invent its unique language? Deleuze explores this 
concept via the stutter, which serves as an example of a type of anomalous language usage and 
rhythmic difference. To illustrate what it means to write this stutter, Deleuze contrasts two 
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147 Deleuze, Critique et Clinique (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit), 135-143. 
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common approaches fiction writer might take to represent a character’s stutter in writing. In 
the first case, like Balzac does in Eugene Grandet, the writer can demonstrate a character’s 
stuttering speech by laying out each syllable, as it sounds, in writing. In the second case, the 
writer can simply refer to the stutter summarily by indicating “she stuttered,” for example, and 
thus leave it to the reader’s imagination to produce the stutter in question. Deleuze then offers 
a third, but radically different way of thinking about the stutter in literature. In this case, 
moving away from the specific case of spoken language to the case of language itself, Deleuze 
asks, what if language itself stutters? “ Ce n’est plus le personage qui est bègue de parole, 
c’est l’écrivain qui devient bègue de la langue.”148 Such a stutter would happen when language 
is pushed to its limits and arises as an intersection of tensions. In this way all literature 
emerges from great tension as a stutter in language, when the limits of language are pushed 
according to lines of variation that twist and turn away from normative syntactical usage and 
bend grammar to its limits. Thus, Deleuze explains, the language of a particular work of 
literature is born like a foreign language within a given language to constitute a sort of minor 
language or, rather, a minor language usage within a major language.  
Despite his use of the term “minor language” in the essay on the stutter, which would 
normally suggest a comparison between languages (and which such comparison is developed 
in “Qu’est-ce qu’une littérature mineure?”), here Deleuze is clear to separate this notion of a 
minor language from the case of bilingualism or multilingualism. Instead, he argues that a 
work of literature is unique as its language partakes in a unique expression, which is therefore 
unrepeatable, even if, as a stutter, it emerges as a convulsion of repetitions itself. Such a 
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“minor” language does not belong to a social group or even to an individual (again, it is not a 
matter of comparing languages); rather, ‘minor’ language connotes a unique usage of a 
language that constitutes the material of a singular literary work. It does not draw on 
something outside itself; instead it emerges as a unique variation within a language. Further, 
we should add that any translation must do this too — emerge as a foreign language or a 
stutter within a given language. 
 
Les deux aspect s’effectuent suivant une infinite de tonalités, mais toujours ensemble: 
une limite du langage qui tend toute la langue, une ligne de variation ou de modulation 
tendue qui porte la langue à cette limite. Et de meme que la nouvelle langue n’est pas 
exérieure à la langue, la limite asyntaxique n’est pas extérieure au langage: elle est le 
dehors du langage, non pas au-dehors.149  
 
Deleuze’ emphasis on the outside, indicated by his use of italics, subtly points to the notion of 
the foreign as meshed within rather than purely outside. The foreign is within the one or the 
primary position. It crystallizes along its surface. The new language is an external surface, a 
materialization in the abyss of language, a spontaneous growth or crystallization that appears 
out of the common substance of language. If this new, externalized language had an opposite, 
that would properly be purely internal, and purely transparent, the stuff of the cliché.  
The cliché is a transparent surface without depth, pure surface. It only becomes visible 
when the dehors crystallizes along it. This surface can be appropriated and put to use in 
different contexts but only in some will the surface reflect a luster and engage attention, a 
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flash of luminosity that troubles its transparency in ripples. This luster might appear with 
changing contexts, but it is only the shine of monotony, of cliché and repetition.  
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CONCLUSION 
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In an essay titled, “Philosophy and Music,” Theodor Adorno reminds us that in order to 
investigate the condition of music, philosophy first has to ask the question, What is music? 
However, any attempt to categorize art is a gesture that art, by its very definition, defies. 
Adorno goes on to suggest, somewhat paradoxically, that the “raison d’être of all art is to 
reject the raison d’être, that is to say the justification of its own existence.”150 In this way, art 
resists attempts to legitimate it, name it, to capture it, to know its ephemeral shape. As art 
escapes our grasp, its elusive gesture exceeds our capacity for naming and disrupts our 
epistemological frames. And yet, despite this disruption, we know and recognize art without 
any observation of a manifest category that would define it as such. One recognizes art just as 
it eludes any settled definition.  
As with music, any discussion of the condition of poetry needs first address the 
question, What is poetry? In any attempt to address this question, several problems unfold and 
demand consideration. For one, any primary investigation of the definition of poetry raises the 
problem of origins, and not merely of singular origins but an attendant multiplicity of cultural 
and historical contexts from which to consider poetry. To ask What is poetry? means to elicit 
an exploration of the historical narratives that create and carry poetries from many languages, 
from not one but many sources, because poetry seeks diversification, not its inverse. Clearly 
there is no exhaustive list of such questions generated by an attempt to define the chimera that 
is ‘poetry.’  
Perhaps most significantly, however, the question, What is poetry? elicits a 
comparative taxonomy in response: How is poetry distinct from music or the visual arts, for 
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example, and how is poetry similar to or different from these arts? This is the main concern of 
field of poetics, evident in studies undertaken by writers as diverse as Giorgio Agamben, 
Susan Stewart, Marjorie Perloff or Roman Jakobson, to name but a few. Moreover, it is the 
primacy of this aim, Jakobson argues, that grants poetics a preeminent status in the field of 
literary studies: “Because the subject of poetics is the differentia specifica of verbal art in 
relation to other arts and in relation to other kinds of verbal behavior, poetics is entitled to the 
leading place in literary studies.”151 Poetics is consumed by this interrogation, with its self-
definition, producing a constant re-assessment of the parameters for its objects of study, which 
are constantly changing. This is in part because the study of poetics presents us with the 
problematic representation of ‘language’ itself as the medium of poetry (for example, when 
compared to music or art); when considered in material terms, it incites an abrupt 
disorientation in the field of cognition and any comparative definitions.  
Adorno’s argument against defining art hinges on an essential premise that art is by 
definition opposed to such instrumental rationality. He carries this argument further to develop 
his distinctions among music, poetry and visual art, to argue that the essential “riddle-
character” of visual art and poetry is hidden by its apparent participation in a medium of 
cognition (language) or objective representation (visual art). In other words, a certain 
expectation or threshold of meaning is problematized by the work of poetry, visual art or 
music, where, according to Adorno’s argument, only music enjoys exemption from 
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communicative expectations that might be held out for the other two arts. Unlike poetry and 
visual art, music is not burdened with provisions of comprehensibility and knowledge.  
While Adorno’s main purpose in laying out these distinctions is to develop a thesis on 
the condition of music, one aspect of this comparison proves useful to a discussion of poetry. 
Simply put, Adorno claims that the “riddle-character” of poetry is concealed by its 
participation in language, a medium of quotidian communication. Poetry, due to its 
participation in the medium of cognition, is coded with meaning and should be 
comprehensible; however, it thwarts or dismantles these expectations. It is problematized as 
incomprehensible and, in fact, the very inaccessibility that grants writers freedom in their 
process betrays poetry by relegating it to a marginal section of the bookshelf. The one 
enduring main argument poetry faces is this: that it is “difficult to understand” or 
“unintelligible,” a charge that many writers, Gertrude Stein among them, have countered. In 
response to questions about the difficulty of her work, Stein, in a 1934 interview, claimed that 
intelligibility results from enjoyment as a parallel experience of understanding. Poetry needs 
only be enjoyed to be understood or comprehended. Rather than being premised on an 
apprehensive potential for explanation and paraphrase, as it is conventionally defined, 
intelligibility is thus related to pleasure:    
 
Being intelligible is not what it seems. You mean by understanding that you can talk 
about it in a way that you have a habit of talking […] but I mean by understanding 
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enjoyment. If you enjoy it, you understand it, and lots of people have enjoyed it so lots 
of people have understood it.152  
 
Stein releases the notion of the inaccessible opacity of poetic language from 
conventions and constraints of understanding; in the same gesture, she displaces reading from 
the strains of epistemological hierarchies. Enjoyment is a freedom and a creative act involving 
that which could not be known in any other way. In the process, Stein implies that the writerly 
act of enjoyment is akin to the readerly act of enjoyment. 153   
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153 In a similar spirit of defense, American poet Laura Riding Jackson’s original preface to her 
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claims that art’s reasons must be to defeat themselves.) In a synthesis of the arguments offered by 
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Regardless, neither pleasure nor enjoyment is commensurate with facility, and nothing 
in Stein’s argument suggests that intelligibility is easy. In fact, the very charge of “difficulty” 
might be offered as the essential characteristic of poetry if we were pressed to define poetry in 
a non-comparative and ahistorical manner: Poetry is language deployed in a way that pushes 
semantic limits, explores the vectors of tension that co-extend with the comprehensible 
potential of a language. In this definition, a key tension resides, first of all, between layers of 
reference and resonance — or ‘meaning,’ and secondly, between a discourse that tests the 
limits of representation and the intelligibility of the language as ‘language.’ This latter tension 
is inescapable due to poetry’s participation in the medium of cognition that is language, on the 
one hand, and the non-lexical semantics of music and visual art on the other. However, our 
definition of poetry would thus be expressed in negative terms — incomprehensible, 
impossible to understand — rather than in terms that express poetry’s qualities of possibility, 
potentiality and freedom. The main problem here is how resolve these notions of 
understanding and freedom. Does one renounce the possibility of freedom in the act of 
understanding or is freedom reconcilable with understanding and intelligibility? Or is it that in 
poetry’s very incomprehensible nature the conditions of freedom are found? 
The Freedom of Poiesis 
La seule liberté, le seul état de liberté que j'ai éprouvé sans réserve, c'est dans la 
poésie que je l'ai atteint, dans ses larmes et dans l'éclat de quelques êtres venus à moi 
de trois lointains, celui de l'amour me multipliant. 
                                                
Riding and Stein, we might say that the reason for reading and writing poetry must be the same 
(Riding) and derive from enjoyment (Stein).   
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— René Char 
 
In the above lyrical excerpt, René Char expresses a belief commonly held among poets (albeit 
uncommonly expressed): poetry represents the only unrestrained freedom the speaker has ever 
known. But what is it about writing poetry that sets one free? Further, is the poet’s freedom 
reducible to an individualistic, romantic inner freedom or does its intensity extend beyond the 
event of making and beyond the isolation of the lyric subject?  
Surely, one is not entirely free when writing for another, and more specifically, one is 
not free when writing according to another’s rules, if another has prescribed a purpose to the 
task of writing. Is one condition of freedom that one has designed the purpose of a work? Or is 
one only truly free in conditions of purposelessness, to which condition poetry lends itself 
readily?  
It is evident that one must not be fulfilling another’s purpose to be free when writing, 
as much as in any field of experience where freedom to choose is only encumbered by the law 
of necessity, in turn governed by external economical conditions or legislation. Freedom 
therefore is connected to the capacity to design one’s own formal rules for the architecture of 
creation. In The Poet’s Freedom, American poet Susan Stewart follows a line of reasoning 
proposed by Kant that relates freedom to self-legislation in this way: “Freedom lies thereby in 
giving one’s self one’s own law out of one’s own essence. Analogously, as the maker or 
genius gives the rules to art, he or she is enjoying positive freedom in conditions of unusual 
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intensity.”154 The domain of freedom is drawn in chalk-lines of intensity that fluctuate and that 
are ephemeral. These intensities flower. They correspond to the maker’s capacity to invent the 
very laws of making, but also to the freedom to circumvent their own laws, to disabuse 
themself of the law and its containment. Freedom therefore is only connected to the capacity 
to design one’s own formal rules for the architecture of creation if it also entails the capacity 
to write with a lawlessness that continually reinvents its rules or rejects the notion of intent 
entirely. The freedom in making thus corresponds to freedom from the constraints of an end-
goal or purpose.  
Susan Stewart’s arguments about poetic and artistic freedom hinge on the premise of 
an internal field of action, which renders artistic activity distinct from labour and from forces 
that are in turn external to the worker. She compares Kant’s views on self-legislation to a 
passage in Marx explaining the workers’ sense of alienation from their products as a result of 
their incapacity to self-legislate, their obligation to another’s rule, intent and purpose. Stewart 
points to this comparison despite the differences between labour and work: Whereas labour is 
monotonous and based on external rules, poiesis corresponds to the capacity of the ‘genius,’ 
governed by the conditions of inner freedom. She argues that since making (poiesis) is not a 
means to serve some other end and is free to be made according to conditions determined in a 
situation of freedom and self-legislation, it does not result in the maker’s alienation, unlike the 
commodity.  
                                                
154 Susan Stewart, The Poet’s Freedom: A Notebook on Making (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011), 11. 
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While the production of poetry is surely self-governed, does poetry never belong to 
another? Despite its relative obscurity, is poetry free of the demands of reception? The charge 
of ‘difficulty’ would suggest not. While the neutral may be the cornerstone of freedom, 
readerly insistence on intelligibility as a form of superficial transparency is its most serious 
antagonist (recall Stein’s words: the common readerly demand for so-called ‘intelligibility’ is 
in fact a demand for a text that can be paraphrased, a text that the laws of language have 
legitimized, an utterance considered meaningful because it can be represented in another way).  
 However, the capacity to form one’s own rules is only the first step in achieving the 
conditions of freedom; the capacity to exceed the limits of self-legislation by writing for no 
purpose (not even to abide the law one has made except insofar as it conditions freedom from 
purpose) is the complement to this argument. In “What is Freedom?” Hannah Arendt moves 
beyond the discussion of freedom in terms of the will and intellect — beyond the realm of 
judgment — to the very principles of inspiration and creation that are at the heart of the poetic 
endeavour as a free action. Arendt writes about “the freedom to call something into being 
which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as an object of cognition or 
imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known. Action, to be free, 
must be free from motive on one side, from its intended goal as a predictable effect on the 
other.”155 Such an action, she explains, originates in a principle, which operates independently 
of goals and motives. This principle does not come before or after the action, but emerges with 
the action itself: “… unlike the judgment of the intellect which precedes action, and unlike the 
                                                
155 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking, 
1961), 151. Emphasis mine.  
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command of the will which initiates it, the inspiring principle becomes fully manifest only in 
the performing act itself.”156 As such, the principle of inspiration is unrivalled and unique as it 
coalesces with poetic invention, neither before nor after the act of writing, but in the very 
performance of writing itself. In adopting this view, we depart from the common notion of 
inspiration that ties it to hierarchies elaborated in religious thought. According to Arendt’s 
principle, considering what inspiration means for the poet leads us not to the image of the 
writer subdued by and heeding a greater voice, inscribing dictation received from an 
otherworldly source — not the dual struggle for mastery and the split between internal and 
external — instead, the notion of inspiration derives from a creative force that is inextricable 
from the issuance of performance, the freedom of performance itself, and which begins with 
the smallest unit, an incomparable and unique principle. Accordingly, freedom arises with the 
act; there is no freedom without action and one is free as long as one acts. Consequently, the 
poet does not have freedom, as freedom is not something the poet can possess; neither is it a 
quality to be bequeathed, loaned, given, stolen or purchased. As long as the conditions of 
writing can be met, the poet is free in the event of writing and the event of writing is the poet’s 
freedom. Further, the conditions of the poet’s existence are those of writing, and therefore 
without the conditions of freedom, the poet does not exist. Freedom is not the instigator to 
action but it is the beginning of action insofar as action is always a beginning and insofar as 
writing is the poet’s beginning.      
 Significantly, Arendt’s description of the creative act as the freedom to create 
something original supports Stein’s claim of poetry’s irreducibility to something that has 
                                                
156 Ibid,, 152.  
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already existed. Arendt defines creation as the freedom to call into being something that has 
not already existed and therefore could not be known. To reiterate, Stein suggests that pleasure 
and desire form the domain of intelligibility rather than a text’s communicability or capacity 
for paraphrase: “Being intelligible is not what it seems. You mean by understanding that you 
can talk about it in a way that you have a habit of talking […] but I mean by understanding 
enjoyment.”157 What has not been previously known cannot be paraphrased in language, 
cannot be conventionally ‘understood’ if it cannot be known, if it is not familiar and cannot be 
represented according to patterns of common language usage. If poetic creation produces 
something that could not otherwise be known, how could it be represented in any other way? 
The freedom of the act of poiesis is an articulation of the freedom from anterior knowledge of 
what one is doing or to what end, and it finds its correlate in the act of reading.  
 
The Freedom of the Neutral 
 
Where is the place of the neutral in poetry’s freedom? Poetry’s freedom is that it cannot be 
represented in other words. It resists being captured in another unknowable shape. Its 
intelligibility is of a form that resists domestication, resists neutralization, resists erasure, 
resists reduction to the containable and the tame, to the categorical. It announces itself as that 
which is new to meaning but also possibly as the irrecoverable part of meaning, the impartial 
part, the present absence of what is not known now. The opacity of transparency is its 
paradoxical mode of expression; it is of language but it is also the outside surface of language; 
                                                
157 See note 140.  
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its material is the medium of cognition but the act of creation is predicated on freedom from 
purpose — freedom even from the purpose to communicate in language.  
 If for Barthes, the neutral represents the desirable uselessness of the lyric, that which 
cannot be marketed, a desire for pleasure as a purposeless, a continually renewing aim of 
aimlessness, it is important, in conclusion, to distinguish this neutral from the overwhelming 
predominance of the ‘neutralization’ in contemporary usage. Indeed, the neutral is the 
condition of a freedom that surpasses or thwarts any attempts at neutralization.  
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